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Building applications and information systems increasingly means dealing with con-
currency and faults stemming from distribution of system components. Atomic trans-
actions are a well-known method for transferring the responsibility for handling con-
currency and faults from developers to the software’s execution environment, but
incur considerable execution overhead. This dissertation investigates methods that
shift some of the burden of concurrency control into the network layer, to reduce
response times and increase throughput. It anticipates future programmable network
devices, enabling customized high-performance network protocols.
We propose Atomic Transfer (AT), a distributed algorithm to prevent race conditions
due to messages crossing on a path of network switches. Switches check request
messages for conflicts with response messages traveling in the opposite direction.
Conflicting requests are dropped, obviating the request’s receiving host from detecting
and handling the conflict. AT is designed to perform well under high data contention,
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as concurrency control effort is balanced across a network instead of being handled
by the contended endpoint hosts themselves.
We use AT as the basis for a new optimistic transactional cache consistency algo-
rithm, supporting execution of atomic applications caching shared data. We then
present a scalable refinement, allowing hierarchical consistent caches with predictable
performance despite high data update rates.
We give detailed I/O Automata models of our algorithms along with correctness
proofs. We begin with a simplified model, assuming static network paths and no
message loss, and then refine it to support dynamic network paths and safe handling
of message loss.
We present a trie-based data structure for accelerating conflict-checking on switches,
with benchmarks suggesting the feasibility of our approach from a performance stand-
point.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Contributions
Humanity’s data, business processes and social interactions are rapidly moving on-
line. Before long, the pervasiveness of the Internet will be complete in the developed
world, with everyone permanently connected at work, home or on the go through a
wireless device. In the developing world, mobile phone technology is already making
a positive impact on people’s lives. But in general, the expectation is growing that
any information about anything should be accessible at any time from anywhere in
the world. These kinds of trends will likely continue, and thinking them through to
their logical conclusion we arrive at the following:
1. We want unfettered access to applications of arbitrary complexity from any-
where, with a user interface experience matching or surpassing that of applica-
tions installed on local workstations today.
2. We want to view fresh data, updated in our user interfaces not within minutes
or seconds but within milliseconds of changing. The intuitive illusion of every
data item having one global consistent copy should be maintained at all times.
3. We want to modify data in real time in collaboration with other people, regard-
less of physical location. The default mode of working with information should
be to observe it and interact with it, not distribute it or download it.
4. We want it to work! We should never lose time, work or data due to component
failures in our computing infrastructure.
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Systems meeting these requirements will inevitably be distributed, due to the need
for global accessibility and scalability. Developing such systems is highly challenging
though, due chiefly to the concurrent execution and partial failures inherent in dis-
tributed systems. Attempts by multiple applications to modify the same data must
be reconciled and the transient or permanent failure of some of the tens or hundreds
of components that may partake in an application’s execution must be tolerated.
The futility of handling these issues on an ad-hoc basis has long been recognized by
the designers of large, mission-critical data processing systems. A widely adopted
solution for handling them is the atomic transaction [1, 2].
An atomic transaction is a collection of operations that must appear to execute to-
gether as a whole or not at all. In the first case a transaction is committed and
its effects on data are permanently recorded, while in the latter case it is aborted
and no data is affected. Furthermore, transactions are prevented from interfering,
so a transaction never sees the intermediate effects of any concurrently executing or
aborted transactions but only the consistent state left behind by committed transac-
tions. This is achieved through the use of concurrency control algorithms, that delay,
re-order, abort or otherwise manipulate transactions to ensure that the result of an
execution could have been produced by some total order of the transactions.
The performance overhead of concurrency control can be significant. Enterprise-
critical database systems and applications have long chosen to pay this price, as
the price of system failures is higher still. A failed fund transfer operation in the
computing system of a bank or financial institution, for example, could easily lead
to the loss of the transfer’s money and the firm’s reputation. But while Internet
applications commonly rely on a transactional database or data store behind the
scenes, transactions have yet to be adopted as the basis for software development in
general. We propose an architecture for network-centric concurrency control designed
to facilitate such a transition. The key architectural ingredients of our approach are:
1. An execution model that makes progress by executing atomic transactions.
2. Pervasive caching of persistent global data, with atomic cache consistency.
3. Publish/subscribe multicasting and forwarding of data as name/value pairs.
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This dissertation makes the following primary contributions.
1. We propose an algorithm for distributed concurrency control with network
switch participation, enabling an aggressively speculative atomic request / re-
sponse protocol and reducing the load on servers imposed by concurrency con-
trol.
2. We develop a scalable atomic cache consistency protocol that relies on the guar-
antees provided by the network for safety.
We make certain forward-looking assumptions about the network. In particular, we
assume that we can customize the network’s routing and forwarding protocols and
functionality. While we do not advance the art of multicast routing or subscription
processing per se, our approach depends heavily on these elements.
We take atomic transactions and persistent data in a global namespace as the basis for
our approach. We take an optimistic approach to concurrency control, where applica-
tions first execute transactions on locally cached data before sending the transactions
to a server for commitment. Existing work suggests that this approach leads to good
performance and scalability [3]. This dissertation investigates ways to further improve
the performance of such systems. We provide a detailed model of our algorithms and
prove them to be correct.
We do not present a complete implementation, but we do evaluate the performance
of a data structure for the performance-critical processing that would take place on
network switches in an implementation of our approach.
1.2 Overview of Approach
Our novelty stems from recruiting the network layer into making distributed atomic
execution and cache consistency more efficient. Data networks have a graph-like struc-
ture, whose main components are switches1 connected via data links. This structure
1We use the term somewhat inaccurately to refer to both switches, routers and related devices.
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is usually opaque to applications, which treat the network as a “cloud” that accepts
packets tagged with destination network addresses and delivers them to addressees,
sometimes losing, rearranging or duplicating packets in the process. We are mainly
concerned with packets containing operation requests and responses. Requests are
sent from application hosts to server hosts to invoke operations while responses are
sent from servers to report back operation results. We observe that the forwarding of
packets is an active computation process, performed by the switches along network
paths. Most importantly, packets navigating a network path between a pair of hosts
pass through the same switches.
This sets the stage for Atomic Transfer. We ask: what if requests could “collide” with
responses at the switch where they meet in the network, such that a request rendered
invalid by a recent response would be dropped and never reach its destination server?
For example, if a request to toggle the status of a bit from 0 to 1 encountered a
response noting that the bit has just been set to 1, the request would no longer be
applicable. With traditional concurrency control, the server would detect this situa-
tion and resolve it, for example by rejecting the latter request. But while the effort a
server expends on concurrency control is usually manageable, it can increase consider-
ably in the presence of heavy data contention, where many applications concurrently
attempt to access the same data in incompatible ways. By contrast, if most such
conflicts were resolved in the network, they would not consume any server resources
whatsoever.
While today’s switches perform fixed data routing and forwarding according to stan-
dard protocols, there is nothing that fundamentally precludes them from performing
other types of processing as well, such as checking packets for concurrency conflicts.
However, conflict checking can only add a very slight overhead to switch processing
before its gains are outweighed by increased normal-case forwarding costs. Our results
indicate that conflict checking can be sustained at multi-gigabit data rates, although
we’ve yet to verify this in a real implementation.
Atomic Transfer requires that application hosts receive the uninterrupted sequence
containing all responses that may conflict with their requests, to ensure that con-
flicting requests and responses meet in the network. For this reason, we assume
multicasting capability in the network, for efficient transmission of responses to a
4
large number of receiving applications. Although not widely deployed, multicasting
has been the focus of much research. Since we already assume that we can customize
switches and network protocols, assuming multicast does not seem contentious.
We make an important observation, that the threat of concurrency control overwhelm-
ing a server is especially acute with the family of algorithms known as Optimistic
Concurrency Control (OCC). At the same time, OCC works particularly well in con-
junction with application-side caching of data, while readily admitting the type of
speculative execution that can mask network latency to a large extent. We perceive
a beneficial synergy here: the multicast architecture required for Atomic Transfer
enables efficient maintenance of application caches, while Atomic Transfer may mit-
igate cache-friendly OCC’s principal weakness, i.e. its failure to cope with heavy
contention. We believe that an architecture utilizing Atomic Transfer-based cache
consistency could meet our high-level goal: scalable and low-latency access to shared
data and applications.
In our proposed model, application hosts are essentially stateless, but cache arbitrary
amounts of data from the servers tasked with persistent data storage. Application
hosts non-deterministically issue requests and apply server responses to their cached
data. We use the term “application” in a broad sense. For example, an application
host could correspond to a user device, with non-determinism stemming from user
input. As a different example, an application could correspond to a front-end host,
with non-determinism stemming from incoming legacy RPC calls [4, 5]. As a final
example, it could correspond to a proactive monitoring agent or workflow processing
controller, with non-determinism stemming from timing and ordering of responses and
scheduling decisions. In each case, the execution model presented to software devel-
opers2 is very simple: all data is globally scoped and is modified only by transactions,
that seemingly move the system from one global state to another.
To enable rapid conflict checking of requests and responses we require that data
be organized as global name / value pairs, such that requests invoke operations on
data names and responses report the results of operations on data names. In an
implementation, names would be encoded into packets in a standardized format such
as the one described in Chapter 8, enabling switches to perform conflict detection with
2And ultimately: application end-users and data owners.
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limited knowledge of the semantics of requests and responses. In fact, our models go
a step further and assume that switches forward packets based on data names, not
host or network identifiers. While this is not strictly required for our approach, it
makes our protocols simpler, more self-contained and more highly abstracted.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related work at a rel-
atively high level. Additional related work is discussed in context, at the end of
each technical chapter. Chapter 3 models a network of switches that perform Atomic
Transfer of requests and responses and shows that they function correctly, assuming
certain well-formedness conditions are met by application and server hosts. Subse-
quent chapters present a series of refinements of the switches, applications and servers
comprising an atomic network. Chapter 4 adds servers and data-caching applications
to the network, and shows that application executions are atomic, or serializable, given
the appropriate operation conflict relation. The model in these chapters assumes a
reliable network and a static association between applications and servers. The sys-
tem of Chapter 5 relaxes these assumptions, permitting applications to dynamically
subscribe to servers and subscribe to only subsets of a server’s state. Furthermore,
it tolerates message loss, although with loss of performance. Chapter 6 improves on
the cache system of Chapter 4 for dynamic/partial subscriptions. Chapter 7 further
improves the scalability of the system of Chapter 6 by permitting hierarchical caches,
allowing applications to fetch data into their caches from the caches of other appli-
cations. Chapter 8 presents a concise, trie-based data structure that could serve as
the basis for high-performance conflict detection on switches, along with synthetic
micro-benchmarks for the data structure. Chapter 9 discusses future extension of our
work to multi-server transactions, as well as suggesting a few optimizations.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter gives an account of related work, organized around a discussion of our
architectural ingredients. It gives a relatively broad overview of relevant fields, while
the technical chapters present more detailed discussions of related work in the context
of the material presented in each chapter.
2.1 Transactions and Concurrency Control
A variety of formal and semi-formal definitions of transactions have been proposed,
but their essence is that an atomic transaction is a set of operations seemingly ex-
ecuting together as an indivisible whole, never executing partially nor interleaving
with operations from other transactions.
While the ideas underlying transaction processing originate with the development of
mainframe database systems in the late sixties [6], the terms and concepts began to
take shape in the early seventies [7]. The classic transaction papers [1, 2] describe the
notion of atomic transactions and serializability [8], as well as rules and implemen-
tation techniques for locking and distributed commit of multi-server transactions.
Concurrency control is a rich, mature field [9] and we do not attempt a complete
survey.
The defining properties of transactions are often known by the acronym ACID:
Atomic, Consistent, Isolated and Durable. Atomic, because partial results of trans-
actions that fail to commit are never visible to outside observers, Consistent because
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a (correctly programmed) transaction moves a system from one consistent state to
another, Isolated because a transaction never sees intermediate results from other
concurrently executing transactions, and Durable because the effects of a committed
transaction survive transient system failures, such as crashes that lose the contents
of volatile memory.
The purpose of concurrency control is to permit multiple independent applications
to access shared data while preventing anomalies resulting from interfering data up-
dates. For example, if two fund transfer programs interfere in such a way that one
deposit is lost, that would be considered an anomaly. In general, it may be less
clear what constitutes an anomaly-free, correct execution. Various formal execution
correctness standards have therefore been developed, giving precise conditions for
which interleavings of operations in a concurrent execution are permitted. All are
based on the notion of a concurrent execution being consistent with some sequential,
non-concurrent execution of the same operations. Intuitively, an execution is cor-
rect if none of the participants in it can distinguish it from a sequential execution.
The most widely used standard in transactional systems is that of serializability [1],
which says that a concurrent execution is correct if its operations could be re-ordered
such that 1) each operation of each transaction appears before or after those of other
transactions, and 2) the re-ordered sequence is a correct sequential (serial) execu-
tion of the transactions. There are many subtle aspects to such definitions [9], with
important consequences for the consistency of state observed by transactions, the
rollback of aborted transactions (transaction recoverability) and the achievable levels
of concurrency and performance. Our algorithms are based on conflict serializability,
the variant most commonly used in practice, where only those operations defined as
non-conflicting may be re-ordered for correspondence to a sequential execution.
A notable alternative to serializability is linearizability [10], mainly used to reason
about correctness of concurrent data structures and algorithms in shared-memory
concurrent systems without recoverability. Another standard, originally defined in
terms of shared-memory multiprocessors, is that of sequential consistency [11].
A concurrency control algorithm constrains the execution of transactions at run-
time as to preserve an execution’s consistency. Concurrency control algorithms fall
into three main classes: algorithms based on (pessimistic) locking, timestamps and
8
(optimistic) validation. The first class is dominant in current practice, but many
hybrid schemes exist, combining elements from more than one class.
• In locking schemes, transactions obtain exclusive (write) or shared (read) locks
on data items before using them. A transaction attempting to obtain a lock
incompatible with an existing lock on an item becomes blocked and must wait
until the lock is released again. Alternatively, either transaction may be aborted.
Locking is a relatively straightforward, well-understood technique and handles
contention well, granted that locks are held for short durations of time. It
suffers performance loss from blocking, which increases rapidly with increased
transaction waiting times and contention [12]. This makes it less attractive for
distributed systems, where network latency may contribute to waiting times.
It also suffers the well-known drawbacks of locking, such as deadlocks and con-
voying.
• In timestamp schemes [13] the ordering of a transaction is decided as it is cre-
ated, by assigning to it a unique timestamp from a totally ordered domain. The
concurrency control algorithm then decides whether operations are permitted to
complete based on transaction timestamps. For example, if a transaction with
a lower (earlier) timestamp attempts to read a value written by a transaction
with a higher (later) timestamp, either one of the transactions must be aborted.
Pure timestamp schemes have been found to perform worse than locking or op-
timistic methods, owing to their conservativeness in permitting concurrency
and the scheduling rigidness resulting from choosing transaction ordering in ad-
vance. They are more commonly used as a part of other concurrency control
schemes [14], for example in the validation phase of optimistic schemes.
• In optimistic schemes [15] a transaction is executed in isolation, with changes
made to a local buffer invisible to other transactions. Once ready to commit,
the transaction enters a validation phase that checks whether the transaction is
still serializable, that is: whether it has been invalidated by another transaction
in the meantime (backward validation) or alternatively: whether it would in-
validate some other as of yet uncommitted transaction (forward validation). If
not, it is committed and its changes are atomically propagated to the globally
visible state. In a distributed system, a requesting host must obtain the data
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values read by a transaction and / or cache a copy of those values. If hosts cache
data across transactions, the concurrency control problem effectively becomes
that of ensuring cache consistency [16]: that the values read from cache could
have come from the original state.
Our algorithm falls under the rubric of optimistic transactional cache consistency
algorithms, as requesting applications execute transactions locally using cached data
and then send the request (and possibly its response) to the original server for vali-
dation. This results either in an update to the server’s global state or rejection and
rollback in the requester’s cache. An important difference between pessimistic and op-
timistic algorithms is that pessimistic transactions are ready to commit at any time,
since they’ve “stopped the world” to preserve their state assumptions. Optimistic
transactions execute blithely based on cached state, but can only commit following a
successful validation phase verifying that their assumptions still hold.
We state our models in terms of operation invocations on abstract data types [17, 18],
rather than low-level data reads and writes. Aside from generality, abstract data
types can support enhanced levels of concurrency, by supporting a wider range of
non-conflicting operations that can proceed in parallel [19].
As an important note, the models in this dissertation do not permit a transaction to
be distributed across more than one server, that is: all the operations of a transaction
must be executed at the same server. Multi-server transactions need additional pro-
cessing steps to ensure that a transaction commits at all the servers involved or none
of them, and that transactions can be serialized in compatible orders at all servers.
While multi-server transactions are a fundamental requirement for scalable trans-
actional systems, postponing their consideration simplifies our discussion and keeps
it focused on the novel contributions of this dissertation, which is Atomic Trans-
fer. However, we have begun work on extending our protocols to handle multi-server
transactions, using the network to accelerate distributed atomic commit, as discussed
in Chapter 9 on future work.
Transactions are today nearly synonymous with database systems and enterprise ap-
plications. Innumerable database systems have been built, academic and commercial.
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Pioneering implementations such as IBM’s IMS [20] and System R [21] ran in main-
frame environments. In the eighties, research on scalable “database machines” shifted
the focus from custom hardware solutions [22] to shared-nothing architectures [23, 24]
and eventually to commodity hosts and interconnects, the platform of choice for to-
day’s commercial database systems.
Databases gain considerable implementation flexibility from the relational data model
[25], allowing automated partitioning of data and parallelization of (declarative)
queries, for example. However, despite many attempts at addressing it, an “impedance
mismatch” remains between databases and general-purpose programming languages
based on memory objects and pointers. Object-Oriented (OO) Databases [26, 27]
seek to meld OO programming into databases, while work on orthogonally persistent
programming languages [28, 29] seeks to meld databases into languages. While OO
databases have had some commercial success, they have had a limited impact on
general software development practice.
An alternative approach is to provide atomicity at a lower level, in language-agnostic
transactional data stores [30, 31, 32, 33], file systems [34, 35] or virtual memory [36].
Such systems suggest a more layered approach, as apposed to the fully integrated
approach of databases, and could provide a foundation for AT-base server implemen-
tations. There have been calls for more modular architectures for database systems
[37, 38].
Active Databases [39, 40] are yet another approach to bridging the gap, embedding
atomic application actions within a database’s execution environment. Actions are
executed according to Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rules, specifying the changes
(events) and a predicate (condition) for when an action may be scheduled to run, sim-
ilar to guarded commands [41]. These ideas have influenced mainstream databases,
most of which support ECA-like “triggers” for stored procedures executing within
the database. Our model would be suitable for ECA-structured applications, with
condition evaluation performed by application hosts in response to cache updates.
An interesting recent area of research is transactional memory (TM) [42, 43, 44], at-
tempting to provide transactional semantics for batches of memory location loads and
stores, using extensions to memory cache coherency logic (hardware TM), software
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techniques (software TM) or both. TM is motivated by the ongoing shift to multi-
processors that require application-level concurrency for full utilization. TM has
reignited some interest in atomic language constructs [45, 46]. Our work is conceptu-
ally related to TM, if viewed as an extension of TM to clusters of hosts, treating the
network like a scalable cache coherency controller. Yet, performance of software TM
prototypes has been disappointing so far [47]. We conjecture that providing atomicity
at the low level of memory loads and stores suffers similar overhead characteristics as
do distributed memory systems (see Section 2.3).
ACID transaction have been criticized for being overly restrictive and unsuitable to
emerging types of applications, such as long-running work-flow processing systems
and intermittently connected mobile applications, e.g. This has spurred considerable
research into relaxed notions of atomicity [48, 49, 50]. A common technique is to use
compensating actions to undo the effect of transactions that were “prematurely” com-
mitted in order to unblock other activities. Although new models are being proposed
to this day, they have seen limited use as the basis for system implementation. In any
case, most such extensions rely on an underlying notion of atomicity of operations.
Similarly, systems that preserve availability during transient partitions3 by offering
weaker eventual consistency “guarantees” [52, 53, 54, 55], and attempt to reconcile
conflicting operations upon reconnection [56], also assume atomic actions as an un-
derlying framework. Many of the world’s most highly scalable data stores offer very
selective atomic guarantees, for example on a per-row or per object basis [57, 58, 59].
These systems relax consistency guarantees to achieve higher availability and lower
response times.
Our view is that full, “hard-nosed” atomic actions should always be available as a basic
system primitive, since their performance will suffice for all but the most demanding
of applications and any execution overhead will be paid back through significant
decreases in development and operational costs accruing from simplified programming
models and robust fault handling. When atomic actions are too expensive, one can
always relax the degree of consistency they provide by breaking large transactions
into smaller ones and handling any resulting scheduling, progress and consistency
issues on an ad-hoc basis or through some application-specific methodologies.
3A fundamentally unavoidable trade-off [51]
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2.2 Atomic Actions
We have described transactions as an aggregation of individual operations. It is also
instructive to view them as a mechanism for matching the atomicity of an application’s
execution steps to the application’s structure and semantics, instead of matching it to
the structure of the computing hardware. A transaction turns a group of operations
into an atomic action [60, 61, 17], that captures the underlying structure of a program
as a set of discrete state transitions [41]. For example, writing a word of memory
may be atomic at the machine instruction level, but it might suit an application’s
semantics better to update some two particular words atomically together (or not at
all). Similarly, it better suits a banking application to have the debiting and crediting
of accounts involved in a fund transfer occur as a single indivisible step, instead of the
multiple separate steps of sending and receiving requests over a network, computing
balances and reading and writing data to non-volatile storage, etc.
This is the enduring attraction of atomic actions: the software developer implements
operations at an abstraction level and granularity that suits the task at hand, while
the execution environment ensures they appear to execute atomically. This largely
frees the developer from having to anticipate and handle failures and concurrent
interference, allowing her to pretend that actions runs sequentially in a failure-free
world.
The early eighties saw a flurry of transaction research, shoring up the formal founda-
tions of atomic execution while extending its definition in many ways, most notably
to hierarchically nested transactions [62, 63] that allow transactions to recursively
contain other, concurrently executing transactions. ARGUS [64, 65] was a pioneering
distributed transactional programming system, adding atomic execution constructs
to the CLU programming language. The Camelot [66] system had full support for
nested transactions. It was based on C and the C++ derived Avalon language. While
these systems were highly influential, they suffered from lackluster performance. The
follow-up to ARGUS, Thor [67], improved performance with new optimistic cache con-
sistency algorithms [14], among other things. Another notable system is Quicksilver
[35], a UNIX variant with atomic execution semantics for processes and a transac-
tional file system. Performance overhead was moderate and the researchers reported
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positively on their experience with the use of transactions. Our work is directly in-
spired by these pioneering efforts, although we provide only a well-defined execution
model and refrain from dictating programming languages.
The advantages of atomic actions cannot be overstated. Anticipating every failure
and writing the code to roll back partial state changes is an error-prone and arduous
task. Anticipating and preventing undesirable interleavings of data accesses from con-
currently executing programs or threads is harder still [68], and even thorough testing
will likely leave some latent bugs undiscovered. Co-mingling failure-case and normal-
case code tends to obfuscate the latter, making maintenance hard and error-prone.
But in addition to their manifold benefits for developer productivity and system ro-
bustness, atomic actions directly reify the notion of application state transitions and
states. This significantly aids the implementation of replication[69], as two executions
can be kept synchronized by ensuring they execute the same sequence of actions4. It
also aids state migration and (dynamic) system reconfiguration [70, 71], as executions
can be readily halted in a well-defined state and restarted on a different host, after a
copy of the state has been installed on it.
A final and possibly underrated benefit of well-defined, relatively coarse-grained
atomic actions is their potential for turning any execution into a shared, multi-user
experience. An application based on atomic actions can be readily shared by several
hosts, each caching the application’s state and sending locally initiated operation re-
quests to the application’s server. Since the server’s concurrency control decides (or
restricts) the “official” order in which operations execute, the execution appears as
if all hosts execute operations sequentially on a single copy of the application, less
aborted actions. The sharing might take place at the level of the application’s data
structures, with the entire application cached at each host. Alternatively, it might
take place at the level of its user interface elements, with the elements translating
local user input into operation requests for the application’s server. The latter is an
interesting option, as it might allow a relatively low-powered devices to access re-
motely executing computationally demanding and / or data-rich applications. While
this dissertation does not further explore these scenarios, we believe our model, com-
bining distributed atomic actions with multicast-based cache synchronization, would
be a good fit.
4Assuming circumscription of non-determinism.
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Why the world is not yet sold on programming with atomic actions may owe some-
thing to the fragmented and awkward architecture of contemporary information sys-
tems, with non-atomic, non-recoverable programs written in general-purpose pro-
gramming languages trading queries and messages with transactional databases and/or
atomic program snippets written in highly specialized and proprietary languages ex-
ecuting within the database domain. A tortuous mapping between the language’s
object model and the relational model is often involved. A common protocol for
atomic data operations might help break this logjam. But another important reason
may be the performance overhead of (distributed) transactions, perceived and real.
If our protocols succeed in lowering that overhead, this would strengthen the case for
atomic programming.
2.3 Atomic Cache Consistency
Data caching is indispensable for building high performance computing systems.
Caching plays a crucial role at every level of a computing system’s architecture, from
the memory caches built into modern CPUs and caching of disk data in memory to
the caching of remote data on proxy hosts and middle-tier database hosts. Indeed
the World Wide Web might not work quite as well as it does were it not for the
world-wide caching of pages in the “content delivery networks” of Akamai [72] and
similar providers.
Our models are based on a master/slave configuration, where each data item is hosted
on a particular server at any one time and all other copies of it are considered caches.
This model is simpler than replicated multi-master models, but can lead to the mas-
ter server becoming a bottleneck. Our contributions to this problem are twofold: a
network-based concurrency control algorithm that preserves the goodput of servers
under data contention and a multicast-based scalable caching architecture that un-
burdens the server from serving read requests while maintaining consistency despite
heavy data update rates. It goes without saying that any scalable system must even-
tually re-balance workloads to prevent server overload. However, executing atomic
actions across multiple independently failing and autonomous hosts is inherently more
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costly than executing them within a single host (see Section 9.2) so it is prudent to
restrict executions to individual hosts as much as possible.
Caching can simultaneously lower data access latency and increase data access band-
width, while preserving capacity on original data host(s) and their channel(s) [73].
Furthermore, it can do so transparently, maintaining the illusion of homogeneously
accessible data with relatively good performance even as data is stored in a hetero-
geneous and possibly distributed fashion. This bears similarity to the way virtual
memory in modern operating systems provides the illusion of uniform ranges of bytes
in memory, while memory pages may in fact be swapped in and out from disk. In
summary, caching can significantly increase data access performance in a manner
transparent to those accessing the data.
A large body of work exists on distributed caching for file systems and the Internet [74,
75, 76]. For end-user browsing of web pages, temporary inconsistencies or staleness
of data are rarely an issue. To ensure atomic and serializable execution, however, the
illusion must be perfect; a transaction must never observe behavior that is inconsistent
with serial execution. This is the challenge of cache consistency.
These issues were explored in research on Distributed Shared Memory (DSM) systems
[77], seeking to extend virtual memory across a network of hosts, presenting them with
a shared global address space. But the overhead of ensuring uniformly sequential
consistency for all memory reads and writes proved too great, exacerbated by the
problem of false sharing resulting from unrelated data co-residing on large-granularity
data pages. Logically simple operations such as inserting an entry into a map, can
become expensive to share at the raw memory level, when arrays must be reallocated
or hash tables rehashed, for example.
Later systems [78, 79, 80] progressively relaxed consistency guarantees, requiring pro-
grammers to explicitly synchronize shared accesses with locks, semaphores or barriers,
e.g. They also shifted from memory-based coherency to finer-granularity, higher-level
type and object-based coherency [81, 82], blurring the distinction between DSM and
distributed object systems such as Thor. Some early systems (and, in a category
of their own, shared-memory “supercomputers”) used specialized hardware and op-
erating systems to accelerate communication and coherency operations, while later
systems are based on networked clusters of commodity “shared-nothing” hosts.
16
Most DSM systems are geared towards high performance for large, scientific com-
putations, treating fault-tolerance and availability as a secondary issue. They differ
along many dimensions, such as whether it is predominantly data or computation that
is shipped around, whether coherency is enforced through centralized or distributed
means and whether all replicated copies of data are equal or whether there is a master
copy to which other copies are subservient. The last point is important, because a
thin line divides coherent caching from more general replication.
We find it desirable, in general, for master copies to be stored in secure data cen-
ters rather than end-user access devices. However, moving all computation from
“dumb” access devices into remote servers may create a barrier for the performance
and responsiveness of applications. Network latency and bandwidth will continue to
be bound by geographic distances and the laws of physics. We believe that global,
atomic consistency caching strikes a good balance between restrictive, total central-
ization and free-wheeling complete distribution. We compare our approach to existing
atomic consistency caching algorithms at the end of Chapter 6.
In the “message-passing vs. shared-memory” argument, we side tend to with the
latter. While the low-level optimization opportunities afforded by message passing
may give it a performance edge in most cases, we believe that the intuitive abstraction
provided by globally shared data portends its adoption for general applications and
information systems. While global-scale systems can and are being built using highly
asynchronous message-passing programming styles, the difficulties are significant and
successes may be hard to replicate.
2.4 Name-based Routing and Multicast
Atomic Transfer is premised on switches rapidly detecting conflicts between requests
and responses. While Chapters 3 and 4 treat requests and responses as abstract
entities, subsequent chapters refine the model so a server’s state is partitioned by
data/variable names and conflicts between requests and responses imply that they
have a name in common.
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Our models assume that servers can multicast [83] responses to applications, that
subscribe to the server. We could define our models in terms of end-to-end connec-
tions between servers and application hosts, but assuming multicast leads to more
elegant models and allows more of the concurrency control burden to be shifted to
the network, our original goal. Furthermore, multicast directly supports our cache
architecture, as multiple caches can efficiently receive streams of responses updat-
ing their contents. However, we must make the relatively strong assumption that
the multicast subsystem is reliable, delivering each response to all subscribers in the
order sent, with no response omitted. Scaling reliable multicast is non-trivial, but
numerous approaches have been proposed [84, 85, 86]. We leave integration of Atomic
Transfer with these solutions to future work. We note that while Chapter 5 presents
a refinement allowing safe dropping of response messages, it does so at a cost to
performance and availability.
We go further still and assume that messages are forwarded based on the names they
contain, not host network identifiers. Application hosts address transactions to the
data names on which operations are to be invoked and each response is multicast to
all receivers subscribed to names it affects. In effect, each name in the global data
name space is a multicast topic, and applications subscribe to the names involved
in their requests, ensuring that requests will meet any conflicting response in the
network. By extension, data servers expose state as name / value pairs5. While
implementations could instead resolve names to hosts before sending messages, this
presentation makes our models simpler and allows us to focus on the properties of
Atomic Transfer rather than the details of multicast routing.
Routing and forwarding based on application-level naming is not a new idea. Indeed,
tuple-spaces [87, 88] may represent the ultimate in communication abstraction, with
data transferred between processes based on predicate matching on tuple fields. Most
forms of network communications, though, involve some form of name resolution,
where a human-readable resource name is used to look up the network address(es) of
the host(s) providing access to that resource. The primary method for name resolu-
tion in the Internet is the Domain Name System (DNS) [89], which maps hierarchical
names such as www.wustl.edu to Internet IP addresses. There has been some in-
terest in pushing resource discovery and name resolution deeper into the network
5More specifically, a name corresponds to an Abstract Data Type, providing a set of operations.
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[90, 91, 92, 93, 94], to increase flexibility while raising the abstraction level away from
network identifiers and towards identifiers meaningful to applications. This work ex-
plores the spectrum for the timing of name resolution, from late binding at message
forwarding time to early binding, for example before connections are established. It
also investigates the best division of labor between network elements and end-hosts.
Many proposed systems use consistent hashing [95] for routing towards a name’s home
node, in distributed hash tables (DHTs) [96, 97, 98, 99].
Van Jacobson has recently espoused the view that “Content-Centric Networking” is
the future of networking [100], arguing that globally named data should be the focus,
not the networks used to transmit that data.
Our formal models abstract from routing and the internal structure of names and
resource discovery is outside our scope. Chapter 8 does suggest an implementation
where names are variable-length bit sequences and parts of names are hierarchical,
with similar name suffixes indicating higher probability of resource co-location or
proximity in the network. We find it desirable for hosts to be able to construct and
send requests6 without having to consult name resolution services. Also we find it
important that names and their operations be abstract, to allow system components
freedom in choosing their internal representation details. Encoding pointers or other
machine-dependent data directly, as for example in DSM systems, reduces implemen-
tation flexibility and interoperability.
More generally, an abstract, name-based request/response protocol can serve as a
useful abstraction barrier, enabling diverse, evolving programming languages, network
architectures and host platforms to safely and efficiently share data with atomic
guarantees. The success of protocols such as IP, TCP and HTTP suggests that
conceptually clear network protocols are more likely than complex software libraries
to be adopted as a common ground for diverse distributed systems. In an age where
everything is networked, from powerful database servers to wireless earbuds, the only
thing devices will generally have in common is a network protocol.
There has been considerable interest in publish/subscribe data dissemination systems
[101] over the past decade. Earlier systems supported only topic-based subscriptions
6Possibly in user space, with minimal Operating System involvement.
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[102, 103] but later systems allow content-based subscriptions [104, 105, 106] using
predicates over the data contained in event notifications. A multitude of academic
and commercial systems have been created. In our model, the only “event” of note is a
change in the state of a data server, and the only notifications are responses generated
by operation executions. We believe that programmers and system users are better
served by state-centric abstractions than event-centric ones, as the latter precipitate
the asynchronous, event-driven programming style. However, one can easily imagine
state-update responses feeding into dissemination networks.
Total order multicast algorithms [107, 108, 109] seek to ease the development of
distributed systems by providing powerful communication primitives guaranteeing
causal or total ordering (and sometimes atomicity) of messages exchanged between
a group of closely cooperating programs. This contrasts with state-centric models,
where ordering guarantees and atomicity are primarily enforced on an end-to-end
basis [110, 111]. Our approach is firmly in the second camp, with hosts interacting
only through shared state and servers acting as the roots of individual multicast
trees. In our model, state exists on its own beyond the scope of any program using
it, and concurrency control may have to mediate accesses from arbitrary programs.
Furthermore, whereas ordered multicast groups use rounds of message exchanges to
agree on delivery order, we basically expect the network to preserve the order of
messages multicast.
Expecting more than standard Internet functionality from global networks may be-
come more realistic in the near future. Our approach is partly inspired by the promise
of programmable switches and routers. While high-performance routers have tradi-
tionally used hardwired logic in Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) for
their most demanding forwarding functions, the trend is towards performing them
in software, using general-purpose specialized multiprocessors such as the (now de-
funct) Intel IXP line [112] or the proprietary 40-core Cisco Quantum Flow processor
[113]. While currently found only in academia [114], open programmable router plat-
forms may eventually become widely available. This could transpire, for example, if
general-purpose or embedded multi-core processors acquire the features needed for
high-performance router implementation, such as asynchronous memory access and
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high-performance I/O interfaces coping with multi-gigabit data rates. In the mean-
time, research can be carried out using commodity PC routers [115, 116] and overlay
network testbeds [117].
Deployment of radically new network protocols in the Internet is currently a near-
impossibility [118, 119]. It is significantly easier to deploy novel protocols within
the confines of data centers, that have centralized control of network equipment and
configuration. At the time of this writing, the notion of renting host and network
resources from data centers has garnered much interest, under the moniker of cloud
computing. Our algorithms are highly applicable to data center settings and fit well
with the hierarchical network architectures they commonly employ. Such network
topologies facilitate content-based forwarding and multicasting as well as flexibility in
choosing “choke points” for concurrency conflict checking. The gateway switch into a
subnetwork, for example, is well placed to detect conflicts between operation requests
from (possibly high-latency) external requesters flowing into that sub-network. To
summarize, data centers built from commodity programmable switches and networks
would be a suitable foundation for scalable, atomic cloud computing infrastructures
based on our approach.
2.5 Background: I/O Automata
This section gives a short review of the I/O Automata [120, 121] formalism, which
we use to model and reason about our algorithms. Our summary below is adapted
from [122].
An I/O automaton is an (infinite) state machine whose state transitions are actions.
An I/O automaton signature S consists of a set of actions, denoted acts(S), parti-
tioned into input actions, output actions and internal actions, denoted in(S), out(S)
and int(S), respectively. Let ext(S) = in(S) ∪ out(S) be the external actions of S.
An automaton a is a tuple (sig, states, start, trans, tasks), with sig an automaton
signature, states a (potentially infinite) set of states, start a non-empty subset of
states, trans a state-transition relation, with trans ⊆ states × acts(sig) × states and
tasks an equivalence relation on ext(S). We abbreviate acts(sig(a)) as acts(a), and
similarly for in, out and so forth.
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An execution fragment of a is a finite sequence s0, pi1, s1, pi2, . . . , pir, sr or an infinite
sequence s0, pi1, s1, pi2, . . . of alternating states and actions such that (sk, pik+1, sk+1) ∈
trans(a) for every k ≥ 0. An execution is an execution fragment beginning in a start
state. An execution α is fair if for each task partition C, α is finite and all actions in
C are disabled in α’s final state or α is infinite and there are either infinitely many
occurrences of actions from C in α or infinitely many occurrences of states in which
all actions in C are disabled. Let execs(a) and fairexecs(a) be the set of all executions
and fair executions of a, respectively.
The trace of an execution α of a, denoted trace(α), is the subsequence of α consisting
of all the occurrences of actions from ext(a). Any two finite execution fragments α, α′
of a where α′ begins with the last state of α may be concatenated (less the last state
of α) to yield another execution fragment of a, denoted α · α′. The occurrence of an
action pi in an execution or trace is called a pi event.
An action pi ∈ int(a) ∪ out(a) is enabled in state s ∈ states if there exists transition
(s, pi, s′) ∈ trans , for some state s′ ∈ states . Input actions are always enabled by
definition, so for every pi ∈ in(a) and state s ∈ states there is a tuple (s, pi, s′) for
some s′ ∈ states. The actions in in(a) ∪ out(a) are called the local actions of a, and
a is said to be quiescent in state s if none of its local actions are enabled in s.
A collection {ai}i∈I of automata may be composed to form a new automaton a if
the signatures of each pair ai 6= aj are compatible, meaning that each internal or
output action is under the control of a single automaton. Formally, a collection
{Si}i∈I of signatures (indexed by some countable set I) is compatible if for each
pair Si and Sj with i 6= j we have int(Si) ∩ acts(Sj) = ∅, out(Si) ∩ out(Sj) = ∅
and each action is contained in finitely many sets acts(Si). The signature of the
composed automaton a has out(a) =
⋃
i∈I out(ai), int(a) =
⋃
i∈I int(ai) and in(a) =⋃
i∈I in(ai) −
⋃
i∈I out(ai). The states of automaton a are defined as the Cartesian
product of the states of its component automata, that is states(a) =
∏
i∈I states(ai).
Similarly, start(a) =
∏
i∈I start(ai). trans(a) is the set of triples (s, pi, s′) such that for
all i ∈ I, if pi ∈ int(ai) then (si, pi, s′i) ∈ trans(ai) otherwise si = s′i, with si denoting
the part of state s “belonging” to ai. The task equivalence classes of the component
automata become the equivalence classes of a, that is:
⋃
i∈I tasks(ai).
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Given an execution fragment α and some set of actions A we define the projection
of α on A, denoted α|A, as the subsequence of α comprised of all adjacent states
and transitions pir, sr where pir ∈ A. Similarly, for a trace β we define β|A as the
subsequence of β comprised of all actions in A. The projection α|ai of an execution
α of a composition automata a on one of its component automata ai is defined as
α|acts(ai), with each state sr replaced by the state of ai in sr. Similarly, the projection
β|ai of a trace β of a is defined as β|ext(ai). It can be shown that executions and
traces of a yield executions and traces of ai when projected on ai, for each i ∈ I.
Conversely, given an execution αi for each i ∈ I and a sequence β of actions in
ext(a) such that β|ai = trace(αi) for each i ∈ I, there is an execution α of a such
that trace(α) = β and α|ai = αi for each i ∈ I. Furthermore, if β is a sequence
of actions in ext(a) such that β|ai ∈traces(ai) for each i ∈ I, then β ∈ traces(a).
These theorems enable modular reasoning about executions and traces of composite
automata.
We describe the state transition relations of our automata using a mixture of pseudo-
code and formal expressions. Each output or internal action has a predicate char-
acterizing the states when the action is enabled. The effects of an action on state
are described as a collection of assignments to state components (fields) that occur
together, atomically. We use the convention that v denotes the “old” or current value
of a field v while v′ denotes its “new” value, which takes effect in the automaton’s
next state. If a field is not mentioned in a action it is assumed to retain its previous
value.
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Chapter 3
Atomic Transfer
This Chapter introduces Atomic Transfer (AT), a new primitive in the network layer
that can be used to prevent race conditions due a pair of messages crossing on a path
of network switches. AT can be used, for example, to prevent an operation request
message from crossing “on the wire” with an update notification message that renders
the request invalid. This chapter defines the switches and channels comprising an
atomic network but leaves end-hosts undefined, except for well-formedness conditions
that they must uphold to ensure end-to-end atomic transfer.
In our system of discourse, host machines send requests to remote server host machines
and receive responses in return, over a network of Atomic Transfer switches. A
request can cause a state change on the server executing it, in which case the request’s
response notifies potential requesters about its effects. For example, a request may ask
for the value of a variable to be changed and the corresponding response would notify
of the variable’s new value. The switches in an atomic network provide guarantees
about request and response atomicity that are not provided by traditional network
switches.
We present I/O Automata defining these switches and the atomicity guarantees they
provide. We describe requests and response messages quite abstractly, leaving their
semantics undefined. The only thing we need is a relation containing all pairs of
requests and responses that conflict, in some abstract sense. Subsequent chapters
present more concrete refinements, where a request invokes operations on a set of
named variables and conflicts with responses notifying of changes to one or more of
those variables. For example, an operation may specify that it reads a certain variable
v. This puts it in conflict with any response notifying about a new value for v, caused
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by the execution of some earlier request. An atomic switch can detect this conflict
as the request and response “meet” at the switch, by computing the intersection of
request and response variable name sets. The switch can then take actions such as
dropping the request, obviating the receiving end-host from detecting and handling
the conflict. This preserves the goodput of server hosts, particularly during periods
of heavy data contention, when many hosts concurrently send conflicting requests to
the server. But to simplify the discussion and focus on the essential properties of
Atomic Transfer, we use a completely abstract conflict relation in this Chapter.
Recall that this dissertation is limited in scope to single-server transactions, so each
transaction executes independently on a particular server. Furthermore, we implicitly
equate requests and response messages with network packets, that is: each request
and response fits within a single network transmission unit. Section 9.2 in Chapter 9
on future work outlines an approach for removing these restrictions.
3.1 Atomic Switches and Atomic Transfer
We model the system as an undirected graph S = (NODES, CHANNELS), where
NODES represent network nodes and CHANNELS represent bi-directional commu-
nication channels between them. The set of nodes is partitioned into the set HOSTS
of computer hosts and the set SWITCHES of atomic switches. Each host is incident
to exactly one node, which is a switch that we term the host’s home switch. Observe
that any pair of nodes have at most a single channel in common.
We lay out our basic definitions for networks and messages. LetM be the domain of all
messages and let Q and R be disjoint subsets ofM corresponding to request messages
and response messages, respectively. A host can send a message q ∈ Q containing
an operation request to a destination host, which may send back a response r ∈ R
containing a response to the operation request. As a simple concrete example, request
set Q could be the set of messages “v := x” requesting the value of some variable v
be set to some value x, while response set R could be the set of messages “v = x”
notifying that a variable v has received the new value x. We will call a host a issuing
a request q the requester of q and the host b receiving request q and generating a
response r the responder of q / responder of r. We also say that host a calls b.
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Incident nodes can exchange data messages directly through their common channel,
while non-incident nodes can exchange messages over a path of channels and switches.
As in any store-and-forward network, a switch must forward each message it receives
on a path leading towards its destination. For each switch i let CHANNELSi denote
the subset of channels in CHANNELS that are incident to i and let qHopi denote a
function Q → CHANNELSi, mapping any request q to a channel that leads to the
destination host of q. Intuitively, qHopi corresponds to the forwarding table that
switch i uses to move requests towards their destinations. We will restrict our discus-
sion in this dissertation to requests that are executed by a single destination host, so
let destination denote a function Q → HOSTS, mapping any request to its destina-
tion host. In Chapter 9 on future work, we discuss the relaxation of destination to a
general relation, allowing multi-server request to be forwarded to multiple destination
hosts.
Let fp(q) denote the forwarding path of a request q sent from a host a to a destination
host b, namely: the sequence of switches s1, s2, ..., sk such that s1 and sk are the
home switches of a and b, respectively, and for each i ∈ {1 .. k - 1} we have qHopi(q)
= (si, si+1). For notational clarity, we will often abbreviate a channel (si, si+1) to
(i, i+1) when it is clear from context that the channel connects two switches on a
particular path. Note that a forwarding path, if it exists, is uniquely determined for
a particular request and switch, since a request’s next hop is a function of the request
at each switch. We will assume, for convenience, that there exists a total function
sender: M → HOSTS, mapping each message m to the host a that originally sent it
(the host a with the send(m)c,a event causing each receive of m, in the model below).
Requests are unicast from a requester to its responder, while responses are multicast to
all subscribed hosts, including the requester. For each switch i let rHopsi be a relation
R × CHANNELSi, relating a response r to the channel(s) that lead toward the
host(s) that should receive r. We assume that the graph induced by rHopsi relations
is acyclic. Intuitively, the rHops relations correspond to multicast subscriptions to
state updates in hosts that occur in response to request execution. We will sometimes
refer to the hosts subscribed to a response r as the subscribers of r. Formally:
Definition 3.1 A host a is subscribed to a response r if there exists a sequence of
switches (s1, s2, ..., sk) such that s1 and sk are the home switches of a and sender(r),
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respectively, (r, (a, 1)) ∈ rHops1 and for each i ∈ {2 .. k} we have (r, (i − 1, i)) ∈
rHopsi.
An Atomic Transfer (AT) is the transfer of a response message along a path of switches
and channels guaranteeing that if a request traveling the path in the opposite direction
conflicts with the response, then this will be detected and can be handled. A request
q could, for example, specify that the current values of some variables v1 and v2 were
assumed as q was issued. If q encountered a response r on its way to destination(q)
notifying of a change in the value of v1, then q is in conflict with r and cannot be
executed, since it has been invalidated by r. The handling of conflicts may vary, but
can include such actions as dropping the request, modifying it or rerouting it. In our
initial model, conflicting requests are simply dropped.
Note the asymmetric handling of requests and responses. Conflicting request mes-
sages may get dropped, in cases when they cannot be executed by their destination
responders anyway. Responses are reliably transported to their subscribers, as they
reflect a completed operation and actual state change in the system.
Atomic Transfer is implemented in switches using an acknowledgement scheme. Let A
be a sub-domain ofM disjoint with both Q and R, corresponding to acknowledgement
messages (ACKs). Let ack be a total function M → A mapping a message to its
unique ACK. Conversely, let message be a function A→M mapping an ACK to the
unique message it acknowledges, so for any m ∈M we have message(ack(m)) = m.
A request q ∈ Q and response r ∈ R conflict if they are related by a conflict rela-
tion, which we denote by (q, r) ∈ conflicts or conflicts(q, r). We place the following
restriction on the conflict relation and forwarding relations:
Definition 3.2 Conflict Locality: for any pair of messages q ∈ Q and r ∈ R where
conflicts(q, r) and any pair of switches i, j ∈ NODES: qHopi(q) = (i, j) ⇒ (r, (i, j))
∈ rHopsj.
In other words: if a switch i forwards a request q on to channel (i, j), then switch
j will forward each responses r that conflicts with q back on channel (i, j). This
ensures that conflicting requests and responses “meet” somewhere in the network so
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the conflict is detected. The restriction implies that a host must be subscribed to all
possible responses to a request q as a precondition for sending q into the network.
The definition does not require all requests from a particular host to follow the same
path to a particular destination; by conflict locality, any conflicting response will
be sent back along all these paths. However, it is convenient for our discussion to
restrict all requests (and thus responses) between a pair of hosts to some unique path.
This allows us to unambiguously refer to the forwarding path fpab from any node a to
another node b, which is either uniquely determined or does not exist.
Assumption 3.1 Unique forwarding path: for any pair of requests q1, q2 ∈ Q and
any node i ∈ NODES: destination(q1) = destination(q2) ⇒ qHopi(q1) = qHopi(q2).
3.2 FIFOChanneli, Channelc and AtomicSwitchi
We provide I/O Automata for network channels and atomic switches below. We only
provide the signature (external events) of end-hosts, but will later specify a set of
well-formedness conditions for their behaviors. We use the dot operator · to denote
concatenation to the end of a sequence or queue. Given a queue or sequence Q, we
use head(Q) to denote the first element of Q and tail(Q) to denote the queue or
sequence resulting from removing head(Q) from Q. We abuse notation and use Q \C
to denote the queue or sequence resulting from removing from queue or sequence Q
all elements that are members of set C. Also, we take x ∈ s to mean that x appears
at least once in queue or sequence s. Similarly, let x 6∈ s mean x does not appear in
queue or sequence s.
We leave the precise action that a switch takes upon detecting a conflict unspecified
for now. A typical implementation might discard the conflicting request, possibly
sending an exception notification back to the sender.
FIFOChanneli,j
Models a unidirectional, reliable FIFO channel, connecting nodes i and j.
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State:
outQueuei,j: a FIFO queue of messages from i to j currently in transit on the channel.
Input actions:
send(m ∈M)c,i
Effect:
outQueue′i,j = outQueuei,j ·m
Output actions:
receive(m ∈M)c,j
Precondition:
head(outQueuei,j) = m
Effect:
queue′i,j = tail(outQueuei,j)
Channelc
Models a bidirectional, reliable FIFO channel for edge c = (i, j) in CHANNELS, con-
necting nodes i and j. We define it as the I/O Automata composition of FIFOChanneli,j
and FIFOChannelj,i.
Hosti
The signature of host i, that sends and receives messages, including requests and
responses.
Input actions:
29
receive(m ∈M)c,i
Output actions:
send(m ∈M)c,i
AtomicSwitchi
Models the behavior of an Atomic Switch.
State:
for each c ∈ CHANNELSi
outQueuec: queue of messages outbound on c, initially empty
for each c ∈ CHANNELSi
responsesc: set of non-acknowledged responses sent or outbound on c, initially empty
Input actions:
receive(q ∈ Q)c,i
Effect:
// if the request conflicts with a response we’re buffering
if ∃r ∈ responsesc such that conflicts(q, r)
// do not enqueue it, but handle it somehow
handleConflict()
// else: enqueue the request on the appropriate output channel
else let d = qHopi(q) in
outQueue′d = outQueued · q
receive(r ∈ R)c,i
Effect:
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// enqueue an ACK back
outQueue′c = outQueuec · ack(r)
for each d ∈ CHANNELSi such that (r, d) ∈ rHopsi
// forward response
outQueue′d = outQueued · r
// remember it, at outbound port
responses′d = responsesd ∪ {r}
receive(a ∈ A)c,i
Effect:
// the acking node is now responsible
responses′c = responsesc message(a) }
Output actions:
send(m ∈M)c,i
Precondition:
head(outQueuec) = m
Effect:
outQueue′c = tail(outQueuec)
The receive(q ∈ Q)c,i action receives a request from channel c and enqueues it for
forwarding, but only if it doesn’t conflict with a response already enqueued for for-
warding on c. This behavior is the foundation for Atomic Transfer.
The receive(r ∈ R)c,i action receives a response and enqueues it for forwarding on
one or more outbound channels, as per rHopsi. It also remembers the response at the
outbound channels, so that conflicts with future requests arriving on those channels
can be detected. It enqueues an ACK back to the sender, to signal that the switch
has now assumed responsibility for detecting conflicts with the response.
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The send(m ∈ M)c,i action sends the next message queued for channel c and re-
moves it from the outbound queue of c. It does not remove a sent response from
the responsesc set; removing a response at this point would allow the reception and
forwarding of a conflicting request currently in transit on channel c, for example.
The response cannot be removed from responsesc until an ACK for its reception has
been received from the other node incident to c, signaling that the node has taken
responsibility for detecting requests that conflict with the response.
The receive(a ∈ A)c,i action receives a response acknowledgement from channel c and
removes the corresponding response from the responsec set. Note that these ACKs are
for atomic transfer alone, not reliability; Channels are assumed to reliably transfer all
messages, including requests. An implementation using unreliable channels could use
a unified acknowledgement scheme for atomicity, reliability and possibly flow-control,
but our model abstracts from these considerations. Similarly, an implementation
could use message sequence numbers to obviate the need for ordered delivery by the
network.
3.3 Properties and Proofs
The Atomic Transfer theorem says, approximately, that once a responder has trans-
mitted a response, it is impossible for a requester to successfully transmit requests
that conflict with the response before receiving it. More precisely, we show that once
a response r has been injected into an atomic network, it will only deliver a conflicting
request q traveling in the opposite direction if the requester of q has acknowledged r.
For any pair of event occurrences e1 and e2 in an execution or trace E, we use the
notation e1 <E e2 (read “e1 occurs ahead of e2 in E”) to denote that the occurrence
of e1 in E is before the occurrence of e2 in E. We also say e1 <E e2 if e1 occurs in E
but there is no occurrence of e2 in E. The intuition for the latter case is that e2 would
have to occur after e1 in any sequence extending E. Note that <E is irreflexive and
transitive and that ¬(e1 <E e2) implies e2 <E e1. We use e1 <E e2 <E e3... <E en as
shorthand for e1 <E e2 ∧ e2 <E e3 ∧ . . . en−1 <E en.
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Our first theorem shows that a network forwarding path composed of AtomicSwitch
and Channel automata provides atomic transfer. Our second theorem shows atomic
transfer end-to-end between requester and responder hosts, given certain well-formedness
conditions on the hosts. We begin with two simple lemmas, regarding the behavior
of individual switches and channels. They essentially say that switches do not invent
new requests and that channels do not invent new messages.
Lemma 3.1 (No spontaneous switch requests): In any execution or trace E, for
every send(q ∈ Q)d,i in E where i ∈ SWITCHES there is a distinct receive(q)c,i
earlier in E, for some channel c = (i, j) incident to i. We say that the earlier event
e1 causes the later event e2, denoted by e1 →E e2.
Proof: From the preconditions of AtomicSwitchi we see that a message m must be on
queue outQueued of i before send(m ∈M)d,i can occur. The only way for a request or
response message m ∈ Q∪R to be added to outQueued is via a receive(m)c,i event for
some channel c ∈ CHANNELSi, so such an event must occur earlier in the trace.
Since the send(m)d,i removes m from outQueued, each receive(m)c,i event can cause at
most one send(m)d,i, so there must be at least as many receive(m)c,i events as there
are send(m)d,i events 2
Lemma 3.2 (no spontaneous channel sends): In any execution or trace E, for ev-
ery receive(m ∈ M)c,j in E where c ∈ CHANNELS there is a distinct send(m)c,i
event earlier in E. We say that the send event causes the receive event, denoted by
send(m)c,i →E receive(m)c,j.
Proof: From the preconditions of Channelc we see that message m must be on
outQueuei,j in c before receive(m)c,j can occur. The only way for m to be added
to outQueuej,i is via a send(m)c,i event. Since the receive(m)c,j removes m from
outQueuei,j, each send(m)c,i event can cause at most one receive(m)c,j, so there must
be at least as many send(m)c,i events as there are receive(m)c,j events 2
We extend →E to its reflexive, transitive closure. Hence, e →E e holds for any send
or receive event e and if there exists a subsequence of send and receive events α = s1,
r1, s2, r2, ..., sn, rn in some trace E such that sj →E rj for j ∈ { 1, 2, ..., n } and
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rj →E sj+1 for j ∈ { 1, 2, ..., n-1 }, we say that e1 →E e2 for any pair of events e1, e2
∈ α where e1 <E e2. Contrariwise, if ¬(e1 →E e2), so no such subsequence exists, we
say that e1 does not cause e2, denoted by e1 6→E e2. The following Lemma highlights
the relationship between →E and <E:
Lemma 3.3 (Time ordering and causality): If e1 and e2 are distinct events in an
execution or trace then e1 →E e2 ⇒ e1 <E e2.
Proof: if e1 and e2 are related non-transitively by →E, then the definition of →E
implies that e1 occurs earlier in E than e2, so e1 <E e2. If they are transitively
related by→E, then for each pair of events (ei, ej) in the sequence of events S leading
from e1 to e2 occurs we have ei <E ej, so e1 <E e2, by transitivity of <E 2
Note that while →E may resemble Lamport’s happens-before relation [123], it is
different. It relates a send (receive) event precisely to the receive (send) events that
cause it, but not to unrelated events occurring on the same switch. Also note that
while →E is currently defined for request messages only, we extend the relation to
other message types in later chapters as needed.
Switches along a network path share the responsibility for detecting conflicts along the
path. We define the concept of responsibility intervals, corresponding to the period in
an execution during which a switch buffers a response and conflict-detects incoming
requests against it.
Definition 3.3 A state s of AtomicSwitchj is in a responsibility interval of r in j
with respect to a channel d ∈ rHopsj(r), denoted s ∈ resp-interval(r)d,j, exactly if r ∈
j.responsesd in state s. We say for an event e in X that e ∈ resp-interval(X, r)d,j
if se ∈ resp-interval(r)d,j, where se is the state preceding e in X. It is clear from the
definition of AtomicSwitchi that receive(r)c,j <X e <X receive(ack(r))d,j, where c is
the channel by which r is received at j.
From the definition of the receive(q ∈ Q)c,i action of AtomicSwitchj, we immediately
have the following:
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Corollary 3.1 (Conflicting receives in responsibility intervals never cause sends):
In any execution X in which AtomicSwitchj appears, if receive(q ∈ Q)d,j ∈ resp-
interval(X, r)d,j for some r ∈ R and conflicts(q, r) then receive(q)d,j 6→X send(q)c,j,
for any channel c ∈ CHANNELSj.
The first Atomic Transfer Theorem is stated for a path of switches and channels, with
no reference to the behavior of hosts; this is deferred to Theorem 3.2.
Let AS Let be the I/O Automaton composed of an AtomicSwitchi automaton for
each switch si ∈ SWITCHES and a Channelc automaton for each channel c = (i,
j) ∈ CHANNELS. Let s1, s2, ..., sn denote the switches of fpab, the forwarding
path from host a ∈ HOSTS to some other host b ∈ HOSTS. We will use sk to
denote the k-th switch on the path, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Note that requests travel
from lower-indexed switches to higher-indexed switches, while responses travel from
higher-indexed switches to lower-indexed switches. We have a straightforward Lemma
relating the responsibility intervals of adjacent switches in fpab.
Lemma 3.4 (Overlap of responsibility intervals): In any X ∈ execs(AS), events
send(r)(k,k+1),k+1, receive(r)(k,k+1),k and send(ack(r))(k,k+1),k are all in
resp-interval(X, r)(k,k+1),k+1.
Proof: the first event is caused by the receive(r)(k+1,k+2),k+1 event defining the begin-
ning of resp-interval(X, r)(k,k+1),k+1, the first causes the second, the second causes
the third and the third causes the receive(ack(r))(k,k+1),k+1 that defines the end of
resp-interval(X, r)(k,k+1),k+12
The lemma makes it explicit that the responsibility intervals on adjacent switches for a
response r overlap in any executionX, since receive(r)(k,k+1),k <X receive(ack(r))(k,k+1),k+1.
Theorem 3.1 says that if a switch i on path fpab receives request q ∈ Q via fpab in
an interval after a switch j further down fpab receives a conflicting response r but
before i receives the ACK for r, then request q is dropped and never delivered by j.
While the proof could appeal to Conflict Locality directly, a slightly weaker version
of it suffices, referring only to switches on path fpab. It is clear from our definition
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that general Conflict Locality implies Path Conflict Locality for all forwarding paths.
Formally:
Definition 3.4 For any q ∈ Q, fp(q) has Path Conflict Locality for q if for any
r ∈ R where conflicts(q, r) and any pair of switches sk and sk+1 on fpab: qHopk(q) =
(k, k + 1)⇒ (r, (k, k + 1)) ∈ rHopsk+1.
Theorem 3.1 (Path Atomic Transfer): For all X ∈ execs(AS), all i, j ∈ [1, n]
where i ≤ j and all r ∈ R and q ∈ Q where fp(q) has Path Conflict Locality:
receive(r)(j,j+1),j <X receive(q)(i−1,i),i <X receive(ack(r))(i−1,i),i ∧ conflicts(q, r) ⇒
receive(q)(i−1,i),i 6→X send(q)(j,j+1),j.
Proof: Assume for contradiction that there exists some X ∈ execs(AS) and some
r ∈ R, q ∈ Q where conflicts(q, r) such that receive(r)(j,j+1),j <X receive(q)(i−1,i),i <X
receive(ack(r))(i−1,i),i and receive(q)(i−1,i),i →X send(q)(j,j+1),j, where i, j ∈ [1, n] and
i ≤ j. Let I be the execution interval of X beginning after receive(r)(j,j+1),j and
ending after the receive(ack(r))(i−1,i),i.
Since receive(q)(i−1,i),i →X send(q)(j,j+1),j then for each switch sk on fpab: (q, (k,
k+1)) ∈ qHopk. Similarly, since conflicts(q, r) then by the Path Conflict Locality of
fpab for q, (r, (k-1, k)) ∈ rHopsk, that is: sk forwards r along fpab in the direction
opposite to q. Also, by the definition of→ and the construction of AS there must be
a receive(q)(k−1,k),k event and a send(q)(k,k+1),k event in I for every i ≤ k ≤ j, where
receive(q)(k−1,k),k →I send(q)(k,k+1),k and send(q)(k−1,k),k−1 →I receive(q)(k−1,k),k. We
show that one of these events is not in I, which contradicts receive(q)(i−1,i),i →I
send(q)(j,j+1),j.
We define q-switch(q, X) as the index of the latest switch on fp(q) to receive a
request q ∈ Q in any execution interval X, or precisely: the largest k such that
receive(q)(k−1,k),k ∈ X, or i-1 if there is no such event in X. We similarly define
r-switch(r, X) as the index of the latest switch on fp(q) to receive response r ∈ R, or
precisely: the lowest k such that receive(r)(k,k+1),k ∈ X.
We argue that the request q received on si and the response r received by sj must
meet somewhere along path fpij. Since each receive(q)(k,k+1),k+1 is caused by an earlier
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send(q)(k,k+1),k event, a receive(q) event increases the value of q-switch by at most 1.
By similar reasoning, a receive(r) event can decrease the value of r-switch by at most
1. Furthermore, since Q and R are disjoint, no single event alters both q-switch and
r-switch. Since q-switch(q, λ) = i-1 but q-switch(q, I)= j, q-switch takes on every
value in [i, j] during I. Since r-switch(r, I ′) ∈ [i, j] for any prefix I ′ of I and is lowered
by at most 1 by any one event, there must be some prefix Ie of I ending with event
e after which q-switch(q, Ie) = r-switch(r, Ie) = k, for some k ∈ [i, j]. Let I ′e be the
prefix of I up to but not including e. There are two possible cases for event e (see
figure 3.1):
sk-1 sk (k,k+1) sk+1
e = receive(r)(k,k+1),k
(k-1,k) (k+1,k+2)
receive(ack(r))(k,k+1),k+1e = receive(q)(k-1,k),k
Figure 3.1: The meeting of a request and response
1. e = receive(q)(k−1,k),k, so e increased q-switch from k-1 to k. Since r-switch =
k, receive(r)(k,k+1),k ∈ I ′e but receive(r)(k−1,k),k−1 6∈ I ′e. By Lemma 3.4, e ∈ resp-
interval(I, r)(k−1,k),k, so by Corollary 1, receive(q)(k−1,k),k 6→I send(q)(k,k+1),k,
which is a contradiction.
2. e = receive(r)(k,k+1),k, so e decreases r-switch from k+1 to k. Observe that this
case only occurs for k < j. By Lemma 3.4, e ∈ resp-interval(I, r)(k,k+1),k+1. Since
q-switch= k, receive(q)(k,k+1),k ∈ I ′ and the ack(r) enqueued by receive(r)(k,k+1),k
is behind q in sk.outQueue(k,k+1). By the FIFO property of sk.outQueue(k,k+1)
and channel (k, k + 1), receive(q)(k,k+1),k+1 <I receive(ack(r))(k,k+1),k+1, so
receive(q)(k,k+1),k+1 ∈ resp-interval(I, r)(k,k+1),k+1. By Corollary 1,
receive(q)(k,k+1),k+1 6→I send(q)(k+1,k+2),k+1, which is a contradiction 2
Reversing the implication of Theorem 3.1, we obtain: For all i, j ∈ [1, n] where
i ≤ j, X ∈ execs(AS) and r ∈ R, q ∈ Q: receive(q)(i−1,i),i →X send(q)(j,j+1),j ⇒
¬conflicts(q, r) ∨ receive(ack(r))(i−1,i),i <X receive(q)(i−1,i),i ∨ receive(q)(i−1,i),i <X
receive(r)(j,j+1),j.
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The first two clauses in the disjunction give us what we want: for any request and
response, either the first switch receives an ACK for the response ahead of the re-
quest or else the request and response do not conflict. But if neither of these cases
applies, the third clause reminds us that a request received at the first switch before
a conflicting response is received at the last switch can in fact be forwarded along
whole path and sent by the last switch. Hence, a responder host can receive a request
conflicting with a response the responder has created (and possibly sent) but which
has not yet been received by the responder’s home switch. The next section closes
this loophole.
Note that the proof makes no mention of requests other than q and only considers a
response r if it conflicts with q. In our model, other requests and responses that do
not conflict with q have no effect on whether q is delivered or not. This highlights the
fact that Atomic Transfer allows all concurrency permitted by the conflict relation
to take place; non-conflicting requests and responses do not interact. We state this
insight as a corollary.
Corollary 3.2 (Independence of non-conflicting requests and responses): let X1,
X2 ∈ execs(AS) be two executions such that no response in X1 conflicts with any
request in X2, and no response in X2 conflicts with any request in X1. Then any
interleaving of executions X1 and X2 is in execs(AS).
3.4 End-to-End Atomicity
Theorem 3.1 is stated in terms of the forwarding path of requests and responses
along switches and message channels. We now state two fairly unrestrictive well-
formedness conditions on requesters and responders and show that these ensure end-
to-end Atomic Transfer. For requesters, we require that they only acknowledge re-
sponses they’ve actually received.
Definition 3.5 ACKWell-Formedness (no spontaneous ACKs) An execution or trace
E is ACK Well-Formed for a requester a ∈ HOSTS if for every send(ack(r ∈ R))d,a
in E there is a distinct receive(r)d,a event earlier in E, where d is the channel incident
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to a. We include these events in the →E causes relation, and say receive(r)d,a →E
send(ack(r))d,a.
We will furthermore assume that for any execution or trace E there exists a partial
function from the requests received at a responder b ∈ HOSTS to the responses sent
by b, defining the pairs of requests and responses (q, r) such that q is the response to r.
This function captures how requester implementations recognize the responses to their
own requests, using requester identifiers and request sequence numbers, for example.
If the function maps q to r then the receive of q at b = destination(q) must precede
the sending of r in E. We include events receive(q)(n,n+1),b and send(r)(n,n+1),b in the
causes relation and say receive(q)(n,b),b →E send(r)(n,b),b. The function is necessarily
partial, as some requests are dropped and never cause a response. We say that a
request that causes a response is successful.
The well-formedness safety condition for responders says that a responder must check
incoming requests for conflicts with the responder’s recently created responses. More
precisely: the responder must drop any request q received after the event er enqueu-
ing a response r that conflicts with q but before the responder receives the ACK for r
from its home switch. To model implementations that execute requests sequentially
in the order received, we can use the event receiving a request as event er, assuming
that event executes the request and enqueues its response. However, framing the
discussion more generally in terms of a (possibly internal) enqueueing event er per-
mits implementations to choose the order in which they execute their set of received
but not yet executed requests. Furthermore, it permits modeling of responders that
generate responses spontaneously, without external requests. This can be used to
model sources of original data, such as sensors or user input devices, as well as active
computation processes in responders.
A downside of using er is that it refers to the “enqueuing” of a response, a somewhat
vague notion when discussing an unknown responder implementation. But all we
need to know about the er is that it irrevocably commits to sending r, ahead of the
response to any request received after er. Formally:
Definition 3.6 Event er is an event that enqueues a response r ∈ R at a responder
b in an execution or trace E if er follows a send(r)(n,b),b event in E and for every
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q ∈ Q: er <X receive(q)(n,b),b ⇒ send(r)(n,b),b <X send(rq)(n,b),b where rq is a response
such that receive(q)(n,b),b →E send(rq)(n,b),b and n is the home switch of b.
Responder Well-Formedness defines the responsibility of a responder for conflict-
checking requests against responses recently created by the responder. Formally:
Definition 3.7 Responder Well-Formedness (responder checks unacknowledged re-
sponses). For any X ∈ execs(AS), X is well-formed for a responder host b with
home switch n if for each r ∈ R enqueued by an event er at b and each q ∈ Q received
by b: er <X receive(q)(n,b),b <X receive(ack(r))(n,b),b ∧ conflicts(q, r) ⇒ receive(q)(n,b),b
6→X send(rq)(n,b),b, for any rq ∈ R.
Note that the condition does not restrict the processing order of two requests q1 and
q2 when the response to neither request conflicts with the other, allowing responder
implementations to process such requests concurrently. Also note that if b receives a
request qr that does not cause a response (because it conflicts and is dropped) then
Responder Well-Formedness holds vacuously and the reception of qr does not impact
other requests. Hence, in the case when the responses to two requests q1 and q2 do
(mutually) conflict, the responder can freely choose which one to execute and which
one to drop. For example, a highly concurrent server implementation, running on a
modern multiprocessor, might preserve well-formedness through some internal form of
concurrency control, using locks, transactional memory [42] or even Atomic Transfer!
A sequential responder, by contrast, can preserve well-formedness in a straightforward
way. For example, it can maintain a set of generated but un-acknowledged responses,
similar to responses sets on switches and only execute requests that do not conflict
with any response in that set. The server host models of Chapter 4, for example, use
this approach.
We have the following extension of Theorem 3.1, stating that if a requester a sends a
request on path fpab = s1, s2, ..., sn after responder b receives some request causing
a conflicting response but before a itself sends an ACK for that response, then the
request will not cause a response. In other words: if the request and a conflicting
response cross in transit, the request is dropped.
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Theorem 3.2 (End-To-End Atomicity): For all X ∈ execs(AS) where X is well-
formed for hosts a, b ∈ HOSTS, each r ∈ R enqueued by an event er at b and all
q ∈ Q : er <X receive(q)(n,b),b ∧ send(q)(a,1),a <X send(ack(r))(a,1),a ∧ conflicts(q, r)
⇒ send(q)(a,1),a 6→X send(rq)(n,b),b, for any rq ∈ R.
Proof: Let X ∈ execs(AS) be an execution that is well-formed for hosts a, b ∈
HOSTS and let r ∈ R be enqueued by an event er at b and let q ∈ Q be a request
such that er <X receive(q)(n,b),b ∧ send(q)(a,1),a <X send(ack(r))(a,1),a ∧ conflicts(q,
r). We must show that send(q)(a,1),a 6→X send(rq)(n,b),b, for any rq ∈ R. We separate
the cases where request q is received at some switch on fpab before sn receives r
or after sn receives r. Let R-RCV-FIRST denote ∃g ∈ [1, n] : receive(r)(n,b),n <X
receive(q)(g−1,g),g.
1. If R-RCV-FIRST is false, then receive(q)(n−1,n),n <X receive(r)(n,b),n. Since
receive(r)(n,b),n enqueues ack(r), By FIFO we have receive(q)(n,b),b <X receive(ack(r))(n,b),b,
so we have er <X receive(q)(n,b),b <X receive(ack(r))(n,b),b, and by Responder
Well-Formedness, receive(q)(n,b),b 6→X send(rq)(n,b),b, for any rq ∈ R.
2. If R-RCV-FIRST is true, let k be the latest (greatest) k such that receive(r)(n,b),n
<X receive(q)(k−1,k),k. If there is no such k then q is not received at the first
switch and the Theorem holds trivially. Otherwise, we show that receive(q)(k−1,k),k
<X receive(ack(r))(k−1,k),k.
For k = 1, send(q)(a,1),a <X send(ack(r))(a,1),a directly implies receive(q)(a,1),1 <X
receive(ack(r))(a,1),1, as required. For k > 1 (see figure 3.2) observe that
by the definition of k, receive(q)(k−2,k−1),k−1 <X receive(r)(n,b),n, so we have
receive(q)(k−2,k−1),k−1 <X receive(r)(n,b),n <X receive(q)(k−1,k),k. By Lemma 3.3,
receive(q)(k−2,k−1),k−1 <X receive(r)(k−1,k),k−1, so by switch FIFO and ACK well-
formedness, send(q)(k−1,k),k−1 <X send(ack(r))(k−1,k),k−1 and by channel FIFO,
receive(q)(k−1,k),k <X receive(ack(r))(k−1,k),k. Hence we have receive(r)(n,b),n <X
receive(q)(k−1,k),k <X receive(ack(r))(k−1,k),k, and by Theorem 1, receive(q)(k,k+1),k+1
6→X send(q)(k+1,k+2),k+1.
In both cases, we have receive(r)(n,b),n <X receive(q)(k−1,k) <X receive(ack(r))(k−1,k),k,
and by Theorem 3.1, receive(q)(k−1,k),k 6→X send(q)(n,b),n. By the definition of
→X therefore, send(q)(a,1),a 6→X send(rq)(n,b),b 2
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Figure 3.2: the case of k > 1
Note that we only invoke Responder Well-Formedness for the “loophole” case where a
request is received on the last switch before that switch receives a conflicting response;
if R-RCV-FIRST is true then the network path takes care of detecting the conflict.
By reversing the implication of Theorem 3.2 we get a corollary for the case when a
request is not dropped but successfully causes a response, namely:
Corollary 3.3 For all X ∈ execs(AS) where X is well-formed for hosts a, b ∈
HOSTS, r ∈ R enqueued by an event er at b and q ∈ Q: receive(q)(n,b),b →X
send(rq)(n,b),b ⇒ receive(q)(n,b),b <X er ∨ send(ack(r))(a,1),a <X send(q)(a,1),a ∨ ¬conflicts(q, r).
This justifies calling the transfer “atomic”: a successful request q is received at b
before any conflict-causing response r is enqueued or else requester a had already
sent an ACK for r before issuing q and so presumably took r into account when
issuing q. Informally, if we think of responses as carrying information and let each
request conflict with information that could have prevented the request from being
issued, then every successful request is based on up-to-date information. By analogy
with serializability of transactions [8], every execution of the network corresponds to
a serial execution where all non-conflicting requests are received in the same order
but only a single message is in-flight in the network at any one time.
Notice that once b has received the ACK for a response r, it can effectively behave as
if it had received the ACK from all the subscribers of r, no matter how many or far
removed they are. Since b does not need to track the identities of these subscribers,
Atomic Transfer should scale in a similar way as reliable multicast protocols.
Also note that AT by itself doesn’t enforce any particular correctness standard, such as
serializability. The consistency guarantees of AT depend entirely on the semantics of
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requests and responses and the conflicts relation. The related work section of Chapter
5 presents an example of a simple read/write system that preserves serializability.
3.5 Liveness
We’ve shown the safety of Atomic Transfer, that is: a request cannot traverse a
path containing a conflicting response. We now show that this safety property is not
trivial, that is: a request that does not encounter a conflicting response is eventually
delivered to its receiver. This is straightforward, since the network behaves very much
like a normal store-and-forward network in this case.
We require for liveness that requesters never attempt to send a query that cannot be
forwarded (which is trivial if each qHopi is total).
Definition 3.8 An execution or trace E is Subscription Well-Formed for a requester
a ∈ HOSTS if for every event receive(q ∈ Q)(a,i),i in E at the home switch i of a,
qHopi(q) is defined.
Our proof shows that the distance between a message and its destination, measured
as the number of messages ahead of it in switch and channel queues on its forwarding
path, continues to decrease in any fair execution. Eventually, it falls to zero and
the message is delivered. We define message distances with respect to channels and
switches as follows:
Definition 3.9 For any message m ∈ c.outQueuei,j where c ∈ CHANNELS, let
distancec(m) be the number of messages in front of m on c.outQueuei,j.
Definition 3.10 For any message m ∈ i.outQueuec where i ∈ SWITCHES and
c ∈ CHANNELSi, let distanceci(m) be the number of messages in front of m on
i.outQueuec.
For every channel c = (i, j) ∈ CHANNELS we define the following tasks, recalling
the I/O Automata definition of tasks from Section 2.5:
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• rcvc,i, containing all receive(m ∈M)c,i actions.
• rcvc,j, containing all receive(m ∈M)c,j actions.
• sndc,i, containing all send(m ∈M)c,i actions.
• sndc,j, containing all send(m ∈M)c,j actions.
This ensures that in any fair execution, a channel or switch enabled to send or receive
will always get a chance to make progress. We show that a message enqueued on a
channel is eventually delivered. A switch implementation would need to implement a
fair scheduling policy to preserve liveness, for example FIFO or else some fair queueing
discipline such as (weighted) round-robin.
Lemma 3.5 (Channel Liveness) For all X ∈ fairexecs(AS), for any message m ∈M
such that m ∈ c.outQueuei,j in a state t ∈ X, where c ∈ CHANNELS, there is a
receive(m)c,j later in X.
Proof: Let d = distancec(m) at t and let X
′ denote the suffix of X beginning with t.
Each receive(m′ ∈M)c,j event inX ′ decreases d = distancec(m) by 1, since it removes
the head of the queue. Since receive(m′ ∈ M)c,j is always enabled when the queue
is non-empty, it cannot become disabled before m is removed from the queue. Since
X is fair and receive(m′ ∈ M)c,j is in its own task, either there are infinitely many
occurrences of receive(m′ ∈ M)c,j in X ′ or there are infinitely many states where
receive(m′ ∈ M)c,j is disabled. In the first case, the events must eventually drive
d to zero, making m the head of the queue at the next receive event, receive(m)c,j.
In the latter case, the queue will eventually become empty, so X ′ must contain a
receive(m)c,j event that removes m. In each case, the Lemma holds 2.
Similarly, we show that a message enqueued on a switch is eventually sent. Note that
we used “cause” in the formal sense defined in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2.
Lemma 3.6 (Switch Liveness) For all X ∈ fairexecs(AS), for any message m ∈
M such that m ∈ i.outQueuec in a state t ∈ X, where i ∈ SWITCHES and c ∈
CHANNELSi, there is a send(m)c,i later in X.
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Proof: The proof proceeds almost exactly like the proof of Lemma 3.5, using distanceci(m)
as the progress metric and send(m′ ∈M)c,i events 2.
Theorem 3.3 (Atomic Transfer Liveness) For all X ∈ fairexecs(AS), where X is
Subscription Well-Formed for a host a ∈ HOSTS with home switch i, for each event
e = send(q ∈ Q)(a,i),i such that no message caused by e is detected as a conflict in X,
there is a receive(q ∈ Q)(b,j),b event in X, where b =destination(q), and j is the home
switch of b.
Proof: Let let X ′ denote the suffix of X whose first event is e. Let fp(q) = s1, . . . , sn,
the forwarding path of q. By Lemma 3.5, every message enqueued on a channel is
eventually received. Since a is Subscription Well-Formed, qHops1(q) is defined. Since
q is never detected as a conflict, every receive(q)(k−1,k),k event caused by e adds q to
sk.outQueuek+1, for 1 ≤ k < n. By Lemma 3.6, every message enqueued on a switch
is eventually sent. Inductively, therefore, there must be a receive(q ∈ Q)(b,j),b event
in X ′ 2
One might wonder how a requester a knows whether a request q it issues is dropped
due to a conflict or not. Requester a can in fact infer the dropping of q if it recognizes
its own responses, that is: if it knows for any response r whether r is a response to q
(a reasonable implementation assumption). If q is dropped, it is due to a conflict with
some other response r′, and by Conflict Locality a is subscribed to r′. Requester a can
therefore store the latest request sent to each responder and conflict-check incoming
responses against that request. If a receives a response r′ that conflicts with q but is
not a response to q, then a knows that q was dropped.
3.6 Optimizations
This section presents a few enhancements for atomic switches, for better performance
or increased flexibility.
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3.6.1 Permissible Message Reordering
Although the proofs for Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 assume strict FIFO communication
between nodes, we can relax these a bit, demonstrating that Quality of Service (QoS)
processing, such as assigning message priorities, is compatible with Atomic Transfer.
We describe the permissible reorderings of adjacent pairs of messages in channel or
switch queues. This captures how implementations would reorder messages by placing
them on one of a channel’s several outbound queues that have different priorities. The
main restriction is that the relative order of requests and ACKs from a particular
sender may not be altered.
A request q can swap place with an adjacent request or ACK m if q and m have
different senders. In this dissertation, we impose the restriction that a requester only
issue two requests concurrently if both can execute regardless of whether the other
one is dropped or not. Then, two requests q and q′ from the same sender can be
swapped, but a request q cannot be swapped with an ACK a from the same sender.
If q moved ahead of a, it might be erroneously detected as a conflict. Conversely, if
q moved behind a, it could have a conflict that is not detected.
A response r can swap place with an adjacent response or ACK m if r and m have
different senders. Two responses r and r′ from the same sender can be swapped if they
commute, that is: if it doesn’t matter to receivers in which order they are received.
Even if they don’t commute, their order can be swapped if the receiver can detect
that a response is missing when it receives an out-of-order response, and put them
back in the original order. A response r can swap places with a request q. Since q
and r are heading the same direction, q cannot be bound for the responder of r and
the messages are unrelated.
3.6.2 Discarding doomed requests
To reduce the number of messages processed, atomic switch implementations can
remove “doomed” outgoing requests as soon as a conflicting response is received,
without affecting the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. This can be modeled as a
simple addition to the receive(r ∈ R)c,i action for AtomicSwitchi, as follows:
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receive(r ∈ R)c,i
Effect:
outQueue′c = outQueuec · ack(r)
for each d ∈ CHANNELSi such that (r, d) ∈ rHopsi
outQueue′d = outQueued · r
responses′d = responsesd ∪ {r}
// remove requests that would be detected as conflicts on receiving switch
let CQ = { q ∈ outQueuec : conflicts(q, r) } in
outQueue′c = outQueuec \ CQ
Whether this optimizations helps in practice depends on whether the cost of the
additional detection of conflicting requests outweighs the gain from not having to
transmit them.
3.6.3 Mixed Networks and Dynamic Shirking
In our models, atomic switches are connected via reliable FIFO channels. These can
represent any reliable link, including end-to-end constructs such as TCP/IP connec-
tions. More generally, a channel may be composed of multiple links and switches, at a
lower level. Hence, Atomic Networks can be composed of a mixture of atomic switches
and normal, non-atomic switches, as long as assumptions about path uniqueness and
reliability are met. High-throughput switches in the network’s core, for example,
may not be able (or willing) to perform conflict-checking, while switches closer to
requesters and responders may be configured to conflict-check their requests and re-
sponses. In the limit, atomic requesters and responders can interact over a network
containing no atomic switches at all! In that case, all conflict detection takes place
on the responder and Atomic Transfer essentially reduces to an existing optimistic
concurrency control algorithm (see Section 6.9.2 in Chapter 6).
An atomic switch can in fact decide whether to behave as an atomic switch or normal
switch dynamically, on a response-by-response basis. A switch i can dynamically shirk
responsibility for checking a response r it receives, by forwarding r but not sending
an ACK for it nor entering it into a responses set. This way, the sender j of r remains
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responsible for conflict-checking requests with r, with i essentially serving as a simple
FIFO channel with respect to r. Upon receiving the ACK for r, i forwards it back to
j, allowing j to remove r from its j.responses(i,j),j set. By shirking responsibility for
conflict-checking r, i shifts conflict-checking effort from itself to j. Shirking is easily
implemented when a response is bound for a single channel. If, on the other hand, it
is bound for multiple channels then additional steps must be taken to ensure that an
ACK is only forwarded back once all outbound channels have ACKed the response.
Hence, shirking adds state and/or complexity in the general case. We also observe
that shirking increases the retention time of responses, so high fan-out nodes with
long response-times to non-shirking switches might face a higher conflict-checking
burden.
Yet, dynamic shirking may be an important technique for obtaining a net perfor-
mance gain from Atomic Transfer. Since conflicts are generally rare, switches may
shirk responsibility as a general rule, incurring no forwarding overhead. In this case,
responders would hold onto their responses for a relatively long time and conflict
checking would be performed more or less end-to-end. However, switches would pref-
erentially hold onto responses affecting “hot” data, experiencing many conflicts. Re-
sponders could help, by measuring data temperatures and flagging responses they
generate that affect hot areas. This way, switches could focus their conflict-checking
efforts where they are most needed.
We keep our models simple in this dissertation by considering only “pure” atomic
networks, comprised only of atomic switches that do not shirk. A fuller investigation
of shirking awaits future work.
3.7 Discussion and Related Work
This section discuss Atomic Transfer design and performance issues in relation to
existing work.
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3.7.1 Performance Analysis
The main overhead imposed by AT is the computation needed to check a request
against responses held on a switch. Chapter 8 presents an implementation with mod-
est time and space overhead. We note that AT does not increase messages residency
times on switches beyond what would be needed for hop-by-hop reliable transfer, for
example. Hence, the memory overhead of AT can be made modest.
The main motivation for Atomic Transfer is to enable atomic cache systems based
on Optimistic Concurrency Control (OCC) to better handle heavy data contention
[16]. As data contention increases at a responder host using traditional OCC, the
ratio of requests that fail validation rises and the useful throughput of the responder
host falls. The loss of goodput leads to a rise in request response times, increasing
the probability of conflicting responses being issued. This can create a negative
performance feedback loop. We note that even if conflict checking is fast, which
it must be in order to run on switches, a host’s reception of a message may by
itself require significant processing, including the copying of data between buffers and
crossings of operating system protection domains, etc.
The basic idea behind Atomic Transfer is to drop most conflicting requests before they
reach a responder, protecting responders from overload due to a deluge of conflicting
requests during periods of high contention. One might ask whether this cannot be
achieved by simply slowing the influx of requests using per-connection flow-control, as
responder multiprogramming and load levels rise above desired levels. This is a poor
option, though, because barring information about the accesses of requests awaiting
delivery7 it would mean a uniform slowdown of delivery of all requests, not only
those accessing contended data. Even if only a small fraction of a server’s data were
contended, its overall performance for all requests would be adversely affected. By
contrast, Atomic Transfer filters out the conflicting requests, delivering an unimpeded
flow of (mostly) conflict-free requests even if some data are heavily contended. This
is particularly important for multi-processing and/or virtualized [124] servers, that
process multiple unrelated requests in parallel.
7It could be known if certain connections have relatively static affinity for certain data, e.g.
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Theorem 3.1 shows that the only way for a request q to reach a responder host b
and be detected as a conflict with a (recently created) response r at b is for q to be
received at the home switch i of b before r is received at i. If r is created in response
to a request q′, then q must be received at i within rttib + pq′ time units of q′ being
sent from i, where rttib is the round-trip-time between i and b and pq′ is the amount
of time it takes b to process q′ and generate response r. If q is received later than
this, then r has been received at i and q will be detected as a conflict on i. Let δb
denote pb + rttib, where pb is the average time it takes b to process a request.
Let q and q′ be two conflicting requests issued to a responder b, or more precisely:
where the response r′ to q′ causes q to be dropped at b. Let a and a′ be the requesters
of q and q′, respectively, and let t and t′ be the round-trip-times to b from a and a′,
respectively. Since q is detected as a conflict and dropped at b, it must be sent by a
no later than 1
2
t + δb +
1
2
t′ time units after a′ sends q′, since otherwise r′ will reach
a before it issues q and prevent q from being issued. If we assume that a is equally
likely to issue q at any point in this period after q′ is sent, then the probability that
q will be received at i within δb time units of q
′ and be detected as a conflict at b is:
δb
1
2
t+ δb +
1
2
t′
(3.1)
If we assume t ≈ t′ then the equation simplifies to δb/(δb + t). Hence, the probability
of a conflict being detected at the server is the ratio of responder response time δb
to round-trip request / response time. Equation 3.2 confirms the intuition that the
efficacy of Atomic Transfer in shielding responders from wasting effort on validating
conflicting requests depends substantially on the relationship between network latency
and request processing times.
In general we expect rttib to be low in relation to t, e.g. on the order of tens or
hundreds of microseconds. In current systems, the factor pb for processing would
usually dominate. For example, if a request involves one or two hard disk accesses,
then pb could be on the order of 10ms. If requesters were widely distributed, with
average round-trip-time of around 100ms, b would have to detect about about one out
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of ten conflicts. If requesters were in the same LAN, however, with average round-
trip-time of around 1ms, then b would have to detect the conflict in nine out of ten
cases.
There are reasons to believe that processing times for transactional requests will
decrease significantly in the near future. Historically, the time needed to force-write
state updates or log entries [125] to a hard disk has contributed at least several
milliseconds of latency to atomic operation response times. Scattered data reads from
hard disks are similarly expensive. Emerging storage technologies such as solid-state
disks (SSDs) reduce this latency by one to two orders of magnitude. Furthermore,
non-volatile memory capacities have grown to the point that many databases fit
entirely in main memory [126], largely obviating the need for disk reads. Techniques
have also been suggested for building persistent stores from volatile memory, using
battery back-up, software protection [127] and/or redundancy [128]. By contrast,
while network bandwidth has been growing apace, network latency cannot decrease
to the same measure [129, 130].
More importantly, though, equation 3.2 concerns a pair of conflicting requests. For
server concurrency control performance, what matters is the proportion of all con-
flicting requests that are detected at the server instead of the network. Since a single
response can cause an arbitrary number of conflicting requests to be dropped in the
network, this proportion actually falls as contention increases. More precisely, let
pq = δb/(δb + t) be the probability that a conflicting request q is dropped at b, as
defined for the derivation of equation 3.2 assuming uniform network round-trip time
t. If k conflicting requests are issued no earlier than δb + t time units before q and
arrive at the home switch i of b ahead of q, the probability of q being dropped at b
is the probability of q and the other k requests arriving at i within δb time units of
each of other. Hence, the probability of q being dropped at b as a function of k is pkq .
If we assume that n requests that conflict with q are issued on average during any
time period δb + t, the probability that j of these requests are received ahead of q at
i is 1/n, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Hence, the probability that request q is dropped at b as a
function of n is:
n∑
k=1
1
n
· pkq =
1
n
· p
n+1
q − pq
pq − 1 (3.2)
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This is also the proportion of conflicting requests dropped at b, tending to 0 as pq tends
to 0 and 1 as pq tends to 1. Hence, even for a relatively high pair-wise probability
of pq = 0.9, the proportion of conflicts detected at b is only around 0.73, 0.58 and
0.08, for n = 5, 10 and 100, respectively. A more favorable ratio of pq = 0.25 yields
ratios 0.07, 0.003 and close to zero, respectively. The expected number of conflicting
requests detected at b per unit of time is proportional to (pn+1q − pq)/(pq − 1), which
tends to pq/(1−pq) as n tends to infinity, for |pq| < 1. Given these somewhat idealized
assumptions and simplified case, the number of conflicting requests reaching b and
wasting its resources therefore stays relatively constant, regardless of data contention
levels.
These calculations also assume that requesters are equally likely to issue their con-
flicting requests at any point in the interval before q is issued. That assumption can
easily be violated in practice if requests are correlated, for example if requesters are
equidistant from b and react to the same responses with the same reaction times.
Requesters could attempt to detect such situations and resolve them by adding a
random delay on the order of δb to their reactions, similar to the randomized backoff
delays used in the physical layer in some shared-medium network protocols8. As an
alternative, Section 9.3.1 of Chapter 9 on future work sketches an approach that may
help in such cases, by completely obviating b from conflict-checking.
We observe that in our model, the maximum rate of mutually conflicting requests that
a server can execute is 1/(δb + t), the inverse of the time for request execution and a
network round-trip. This is because the next conflicting request that is successfully
executed can only be issued after its requester receives the response for the prior
request, or else it will be detected as a conflict. Note that this limit is independent
of the number of concurrent requesters. Also note that his is not an artifact of our
approach, but a more general limit imposed by a requester’s need to receive recent
enough state information to issue a request that can be serialized. Still, Section 9.3.2
of chapter 9 on future work suggests ways to permit servers to surpass the throughput
limit imposed by round-trip delays in the non-contended case, by allowing requesters
to pipeline requests to a server.
8Note that there is no possibility for livelock, since a request is only dropped due to a successfully
executed request
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3.7.2 Related Work: Isotach Networks
While supercomputers and other specialized multiprocessor systems are often de-
signed around specialized interconnect networks, the only relatively general work
we’re aware of that specifically seeks to use networks to accelerate concurrency con-
trol are Isotach Networks [131]. The idea is to ensure that the network delivers
messages in an order consistent with logical time [123]. Furthermore, the network
preserves the isotach invariant, which says that a message takes exactly one unit
of logical time to travel from one switch to another. This allows a node that has
knowledge of a network’s topology to ensure that a set of messages are delivered at
multiple destinations at the same logical time, by setting the logical time of each send
event es to er−d, where er is the desired receive logical time and d is the distance (in
logical time units / network hops) to the receiver of the message. A set of messages
can be bundled together as an isochron, so they are delivered (in a sender-specified
order) at the same instant of logical time. Switches and network interface adapters
delay messages as to ensure that messages are received and delivered in logical time
order. Isotach Networks can readily preserve sequential consistency [11] and imple-
ment totally ordered multicast, but they cannot directly ensure serializability, as write
operations have no dependencies associated with them but simply overwrite values.
New operations are introduced for this purpose: a SCHED operation that effectively
locks variables and an ASSIGN operation that updates them.
This approach is quite different from ours. Incrementing and comparing logical times-
tamps is faster than comparing requests and responses. However, while simulations
show impressive gains over locking [131], assigning a single logical clock to each host
creates an artificial ordering on otherwise independent activities on the host. By
contrast, in our approach, unrelated (non-conflicting) requests and responses do not
impede one another. We believe the ability to run multiple, unrelated applications
on the same host is important for flexibility and high host utilization. Also, delay-
ing messages in the network is problematic. At higher (gigabit) data rates, storing
messages for even a short time requires significant amounts of memory. Indeed, the
prototype Isotach implementation [132], on top of a reliable Myrinet interconnect,
does not delay messages but buffers them at end-points and essentially performs Iso-
tach processing end-to-end.
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End-to-end arguments [133] loom large over any suggestions to add functionality to
the network layer. Ultimately, Atomic Transfer is only justified if it improves per-
formance. Operation conflict-detection can certainly be done end-to-end. However,
the algorithm of Chapter 7 for hierarchical consistent caching takes direct advan-
tage of network topology and in-network processing in a way that does not seem to
have an efficient end-to-end counterpart. As a general thought, in the uphill struggle
against latency [130], it seems significant that the earliest time conflicting requests
and responses can physically meet in a networked system is within the network.
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Chapter 4
Transactional Cache using Atomic
Transfer
As our main and motivating example of the application of Atomic Transfer, we show
how to build a system of application hosts that send atomic operation requests to data
server hosts. The system ensures that concurrent operations from one host do not
cause errors by interference with those of other hosts. An application host executes
each request optimistically using locally cached server state and subsequently sends
the request to its server, which executes it and/or incorporates it into the server’s
state, barring conflicts.
4.1 Application Hosts, Data Server Hosts and Ex-
ecutions
Let HOSTS now be partitioned into the sets APPS and DATAS of application hosts
and data server hosts, respectively. As a starting point in this simple system, an
application host has no state of its own but caches a complete copy of a recent
state of each data server it calls. Initially, we assume that each application host
is permanently subscribed to the responses of each data server host it calls. We
remove this assumption in Chapter 5, where we describe a protocol allowing hosts to
dynamically vary their subscriptions.
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As a concrete example of a system environment, application hosts and data servers
might be hosted in the same data center, with multiple ongoing applications con-
tending for their data. Additional application hosts might connect from outside the
center, executing interactive applications used by remote and / or mobile end-users.
The low-latency atomic execution afforded by AT caching would be highly suitable
for interactive multi-user applications such as shared document editing, conferencing
and multi-user virtual worlds, for example.
Associate with each server b ∈ DATAS a (possibly infinite) state space STATESb and a
unique start state startb ∈ STATESb. As before, each request is handled entirely by
one data server. Requests spanning multiple hosts require an atomic commit protocol
such as two-phase commit [2] to ensure that a transaction is committed at one host if
and only if it is committed at all the other hosts. Chapter 9 on future work outlines
how to incorporate such a protocol into our model.
For each server b ∈ DATAS let executeb be a relation STATESb × Q × R, relating
states of b and requests to possible responses given that state. We use executeb(s, q)
to denote the set of possible responses to q in state s, so r ∈ executeb(s, q) ⇔ (s, q,
r) ∈ executeb. For convenience, we define executeb to be total for any pair of state
and request, returning designated error responses for requests that are malformed for
the server or otherwise invalid in the current state.
When a server b ∈ DATAS executes a request q it moves to a new state according
to a deterministic state transition function TRANSb: STATESb × R → STATESb,
known to all application hosts that call b. We define TRANSb as total, returning
a designated error state errorb ∈ STATESb for responses that are malformed or
otherwise invalid for a state. We also stipulate that STATESb is the identity mapping
for error responses.
Note that the state transition takes a response as an argument, not a request; a
server’s mapping from requests to responses is defined by executeb. The TRANSb
function roughly correspond to the part of an implementation and protocol that up-
dates state caches in applications and keeps them synchronized, while the executeb re-
lation corresponds to (possibly non-deterministic) server-side software. A server may
also update its state and create a response spontaneously, without being prompted
by an external request.
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4.2 Cache Consistency through Atomic Transfer
We use Atomic Transfer to prevent requests based on stale cache information from
being executed. More specifically, the AT cache system drops requests whose set
of possible responses may be different from what the application expected, due to
concurrent interference. To this end, we define the conflict relation conflicts-inv as
containing all pairs of requests and responses (q, r) such that r can invalidate q, by
altering the set of possible responses to q. Precisely:
Definition 4.1 conflicts-inv = { (q ∈ Q, r ∈ R) | ∃s ∈ STATESb :
executeb(s, q) 6⊆ executeb(TRANS b(s, r), q)}, where b = destination(q).
In the case where executeb is deterministic for q, the condition simplifies to: exe-
cuteb(s, q) 6= executeb(TRANSb(s, r), q). The conflicts-inv relation may be conser-
vative: the presence of a pair implies that a particular response can invalidate a
particular request, depending on the server state. On the other hand, the absence of
a pair means that the response can never invalidate the request, in any server state.
As a simple but concrete example of an application adhering to this model, let re-
quests be sets of variable reads and writes and let responses be notifications about
variable value changes. In this case, the state transition function is simply the func-
tion yielding the old state with the component corresponding to the updated variables
replaced with new values. The conflicts-inv relation could include all requests and
responses where the response has a variable name in common with a read in the re-
quest. However, our model does permit a wider range of requests and response types,
corresponding to more complex conflict relations. We further discuss this and related
work in Section 4.5.
The system we present may seem somewhat constrained, with stateless applications
that maintain caches of data and do not even keep track of the requests they have
issued! But keep in mind that application hosts can cache large amounts of data for
arbitrary lengths of time, and that transactions access this data with performance
similar to a purely local application. When contention is light the overhead can
be made very small, but when data sharing and contention arises the concurrency
57
control ensures that executions interleave in a correct, serializable manner. Also,
at the implementation level, an application will likely keep track of its outstanding
requests and, possibly, their (predicted) effects on its cached state. However, effects
do not take permanent effect until a response is received.
We note that our model as presented does not guarantee starvation-freedom: an
application can fail to make progress in the case where its requests repeatedly conflict
with responses from other applications. The network’s topology can influence the
likelihood of this occurring. For example, if several applications react to the same
state change, the application host closest to the data server in the network is most
likely to get its request executed. In cases where this is undesirable, techniques where
losing request queue up for a chance at re-execution can be used to enforce fairness
[134]. Conflict checking might play a role in establishing the queuing order. Section
9.3.3 in Chapter 9 on future work sketches how this might work.
Applications are permitted to have more than one request outstanding at a time,
but only if the requests are independent, that is: if a response to neither request
can conflict with the other. This assumption can be lifted to allow applications to
“pipeline” dependent requests, as we discuss in Chapter 9 on future work.
We contend that atomic caching is a flexible building block for scalable systems and
a sound basis for dynamic balancing of workloads across a collection of hosts. Hosts
in today’s data centers are woefully underutilized, often running at 3-10% of capacity
[135], which is wasteful since they draw significant power even as they idle or perform
at low levels. Atomic, “stateless” applications can be migrated between hosts with
relative ease to maintain efficient load levels and additional copies of applications can
be swiftly started and stopped to meet fluctuating demands. Conversely, when loads
are low, applications can migrate closer to the servers hosting their data and in the
limit, onto the same hosts. Such techniques are widespread for simple applications
such as serving of Web content, but challenging for more demanding applications
that both read and update shared state. While various ad-hoc techniques have been
used to scale such systems, we believe that the vision of universally accessible and
shareable applications needs a stronger and more rational foundation. We believe
atomic execution models and high-performance, transparent caching to be such a
foundation.
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4.3 SimpleAppHosta and SimpleDataServerHostb
We provide I/O automata for application hosts and data server hosts below. We then
show that composing these with atomic switches and channels results in a system
where the cached state on application hosts stays synchronized with the corresponding
server(s) and invalid requests are never executed.
SimpleAppHosta
Models an application host, that issues requests and consumes responses by updating
its cached state for the server sending the response. Non-deterministically chooses
(valid) requests to issue to servers.
State:
for each b ∈ DATAS that SimpleAppHosta calls
stateb: a state from STATESb, initially startb.
outQueue: queue of outbound messages, initially empty.
Input actions:
receive(r ∈ R)c,a
Effect:
// update cached state
state′b = TRANSb(stateb, r), where b = sender(r)
// enqueue an ACK back
outQueue′ = outQueue · ack(r)
Internal actions:
createRequest(q ∈ Q)a
Precondition:
// q must be valid, given the current cached state
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∃r ∈ R : (stateb, q, r) ∈ executeb, where b = destination(q)
Effect:
// enqueue a request
outQueue′ = outQueue · q
Output actions:
send(m ∈ M)c,a
head(outQueue) = m
Effect:
outQueue′ = tail(outQueue)
The receive(r ∈ R)c,a action receives a response and updates the corresponding data
server’s cached state, using the server’s state transition function. Note that the
application host behaves the same way whether the response is due to its own request
or not. The action also enqueues back an ACK, that will allow the home switch to
remove the response from its responses set.
The createRequest(q ∈ Q)a action enqueues an arbitrary request, with the sole re-
striction that it must be possible to execute the request in the cached version of the
destination data server’s state.
The send(m ∈M)c,a action moves a pending message to the outbound channel.
SimpleDataServerHostb
Models a data server host, that executes requests and creates responses.
State:
state: the state of the data server ∈ STATESb, initially startb.
outQueue: queue of outbound responses, initially empty.
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responses: set of non-acknowledged responses, initially empty.
Input actions:
receive(q ∈ Q)c,b
Effect:
// if the request conflicts with an un-acknowledged response we’ve created
if ∃r ∈ responses such that conflicts-inv(q, r)
// do not enqueue it, but handle it somehow
handleConflict(q)
else let r ∈ R be a response such that (q, state, r) ∈ executeb in
// update state, as per response r
state′ = TRANSb(state, r)
// enqueue response
outQueue′ = outQueue · r
// remember response, for conflict checking
responses′ = responses ∪ {r}
receive(a ∈ A)c,b
Effect:
responses′ = responses \ {message(a)}
Output actions:
send(r ∈ R)c,b
Precondition:
head(outQueue) = r
Effect:
outQueue′ = tail(outQueue)
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The receive(q ∈ Q)c,b action receives and executes a request, but only if it doesn’t
conflict with an unacknowledged response. If the request is executed, the correspond-
ing response is enqueued for sending. It is also added to the set of unacknowledged
responses.
The receive(a ∈ A)c,b action removes the acknowledged response from the set of
unacknowledged responses, since responsibility for conflict-checking the response has
shifted to the home switch and, ultimately, the tree of network paths leading to
subscribing application hosts.
The send(m ∈M)c,b action hands a pending message to the outbound channel.
4.4 Properties and Proofs
Let CS be the I/O automaton composed of an AtomicSwitchi automaton for each
switch si ∈ NODES, a SimpleAppHosta automaton for each application host a ∈
APPS, SimpleDataServerHostb automaton for each data server host b ∈ DATAS and
a Channelc automaton for each channel c = (i, j) ∈ CHANNELS.
We first prove some straightforward lemmas, showing that requesters receive a server’s
responses in the order that the server sends them. We subsequently use those results
to show that application caches accurately reflect recent server states. Note that these
lemmas concern the FIFO properties of channels and switches, not Atomic Transfer.
The proof of atomicity follows from Theorem 3.2 in a straightforward manner. We
begin with some notation. We define a function to allow us to refer to the message
associated with a send or receive event.
Definition 4.2 For all events e = send(m ∈ M)c,i or receive(m ∈ M)c,i events and
any c ∈ CHANNELS and i ∈ NODES, let messageOf(e) = m. We extend messageOf
to function messagesOf over sequences of these two types of events in the obvious way,
mapping a sequence of events to the sequence of the messages of each event parameter.
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We also introduce a function to easily refer to send and receive events to and from
particular switches and hosts.
Definition 4.3 For any execution or trace E, i, j ∈ NODES and message set G ⊆M ,
let sndSeqc,j(E, i,G) (rcvSeqc,j(E, i,G)) denote the maximal subsequence of trace(E)
or E, respectively, consisting of send(m ∈ G)c,j events (receive(m ∈ G)c,j events) that
are caused by send(m ∈ G)d,i events, for some c ∈ CHANNELSj, d ∈ CHANNELSi.
Note that if i ∈HOSTS then for each receive(m)c,j in rcvSeqc,j(E,i,G) we have i =
sender(m). Finally, we define a prefix comparison operator as follows:
Definition 4.4 Let ¹ denote the relation containing sequences s′ and s exactly if
they are equal or if s′ is a prefix of s, so we write s′ ¹ s.
We begin with a Lemma showing that a network path maintains FIFO order of
responses from a particular server. More precisely, we show that the sequence of
responses sent from a server b to an application a by the home switch of a is a prefix
of the sequence of responses received from b by the home switch of b. Note that
the Lemma appears “reversed” with respect to ¹, since it talks about the responses
sent by an applications home switch and received by a server’s home switch, not the
responses received by an application and sent by a server.
Lemma 4.1 (switch response order): For each E ∈ traces(CS), any application host
a ∈ APPS with home switch i and any data server host b ∈ DATAS with home switch
j, messagesOf(sndSeq(a,i),i(E,b,R)) ¹ messagesOf(rcvSeq(j,b),j(E,b,R)).
Proof: If a is not subscribed to b then sndSeq(a,i),i(E,b,R) is empty and the result
holds vacuously. Otherwise, we proceed by induction on path fpab = i, s2, s3, ..., j,
the (unique) forwarding path in CS from host a to b.
The base case (Figure 4.1a) is the path comprised of a single switch s. Since the
send(r ∈ R)d,s action consumes, in order, each response enqueued on outQueued by the
receive(r ∈ R)c,s action,messagesOf (sndSeqd,s(E,b,R))¹messagesOf (rcvSeqc,s(E,b,R)).
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Figure 4.1: Base case, inductive case and Lemma 4.1
For the inductive step (Figure 4.1b), let fp′= i, ..., sk, sk+1 denote the first k+1
switches of fpab, where k is less than the length of fpab. Let rcvk+1 = message-
sOf (rcvSeq(k+1,k+2),k+1(E, b, R)) and let sndk+1 =messagesOf (sndSeq(k,k+1),k+1(E, b, R)).
Since the send(r ∈ R)(k,k+1),k+1 action consumes, in order, each response enqueued
on outQueued by the receive(r ∈ R)(k+1,k+2),k+1 action, sndk+1 ¹ rcvk+1. Now let
rcvk = messagesOf (rcvSeq(k,k+1),k(E, b, R)). By Channel FIFO, rcvk ¹ sndk+1. By
the inductive hypothesis, the lemma holds for the path comprised of the first k
switches of fp′, so sndi ¹ rcvk, where sndi = messagesOf (sndSeq(a,i),i). We have
sndi ¹ rcvk ¹ sndk+1 ¹ rcvk+1, which completes the induction (Figure 4.1c) 2
Lemma 4.1 concerns a path of atomic switches. We can readily extend it to the
sequence of responses received by an application host and the sequence of responses
sent by a server.
Definition 4.5 For any execution or trace E, any i, j ∈ NODES, let snd-seq-ri(E) =
messagesOf(sndSeqc,i(E, i, R)) and let rcv-seq-rji(E) = messagesOf(rcvSeqd,j(E, i, R)),
where c and d are channels incident to i and j, respectively.
Lemma 4.2 (End-to-end response order): For any trace E ∈ traces(CS),
rcv-seq-rab(E) ¹ snd-seq-rb(E).
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Proof: If a is not subscribed to b then rcv-seq-rab(E) is empty and the result holds vac-
uously. Otherwise let i, s2, s3, ..., j = fpab. Let rcvc(E) =messagesOf (rcvSeqc,j(E,b,R)),
where c = (j, b). By Channel FIFO, rcvc(E) ¹ snd-seq-rb(E). By Lemma 4.1, se-
quence sndi(E) = messagesOf (sndSeqd,i(E,b,R)) ¹ rcvc(E), where d = (a, i). By
Channel FIFO, sequence rcv-seq-rab(E) = messagesOf (rcvSeqd,a(E, b, R)) ¹ sndi(E),
so we have rcv-seq-rab(E) ¹ sndi(E) ¹ rcvc(E) ¹ snd-seq-rb(E) 2
Since responses are delivered in FIFO order, we can show that the states cached by an
application correspond exactly to those on the original server. We define the sequence
of values (states) taken on by caches and servers, as well as the sequence of responses
generated, as follows:
Definition 4.6 For any execution X ∈ execs(CS) and server b ∈ DATAS, let state-
seqb(X) denote the sequence of values of b.state (the state field of server host b)
from states following receive(q)c,b events in X. Similarly, let cache-seqab(X) denote
the sequence of values of a.stateb (the stateb field of application host a) following
receive(r)d,a events in X. Let resp-seq-rb(X) denote the sequence of responses chosen
by the receive(q ∈ Q)c,b action of SimpleDataServerHostb in X.
Lemma 4.3 (Cache synchronization): For each X ∈ execs(CS) and any application
host a ∈ APPS that subscribes to a server b: cache-seqab(X) ¹ state-seqb(X).
Proof: For each response r ∈ resp-seq-rb(X), in order from first to last, b assigns
TRANSb(b.state, r) to b.state while simultaneously enqueuing r on b.outQueue. By
the FIFO property of b.outQueue, snd-seq-rb(X) ¹ resp-seq-rb(X).
For each response r in rcv-seq-rab(X), in order from first to last, a assigns TRANSb(a.stateb,
r) to a.stateb. Since TRANSb is a (deterministic) function, since b.state = a.stateb in
the start state of CS and since rcv-seq-rab(X) ¹ resp-seq-rb(X), the result follows 2
Before invoking Theorem 3.1, we must establish that SimpleAppHosti and SimpleDataServerHosti
preserve well-formedness.
Lemma 4.4 SimpleAppHosta preserves ACK Well-Formedness.
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Proof: Immediate, since the only action in SimpleAppHosta that enqueues ack(r) is
receive(r)d,i, where d is the channel incident to a 2
Lemma 4.5 SimpleDataServerHostb preserves Responder Well-Formedness.
Proof: Let r ∈ R be the response sent by b in response to a request qr ∈ Q and
let q ∈ Q be a request received by b, such that receive(qr)c,b <X receive(q)c,b <X
receive(ack(r))c,b ∧ conflicts(q, r), with c the channel incident to b.
We see from SimpleDataServerHostb that following the receive(qr ∈ Q)c,b event we
have r ∈ b.responses, up to the receive(ack(r))c,b event that removes r from b.responses.
Hence, r ∈ b.responses at receive(q)c,b and the receive(q)c,b action drops q 2
The SimpleDataServerHostb has only one type of event that enqueues requests, as
defined in Chapter 3. Since SimpleDataServerHostb executes a request q and enqueues
its response r in a receive(q)d,b event, that event is the enqueuing event er for r.
Observe that this is the only event that modifies the server’s state field.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section, which says that if a server
executes a request q then the response is among those possible given the application’s
cached state at the time the application issued q. Our proof shows that otherwise the
intervening execution of the request that altered the server’s state would have caused
a response that conflicted with q and q would have been dropped.
Theorem 4.1 (Cache Operation Atomicity): For any execution X ∈ execs(CS),
application a ∈ HOSTS, server b ∈ DATAS and channels d and c incident to a and
b, respectively: send(q ∈ Q)d,a →X send(rq ∈ R)c,b ⇒ rq ∈ executeb(sa, q), where sa
is the value of a.Stateb at the createRequest(q)d,a event enqueuing q.
Proof: Assume for contradiction that there exists some execution X ∈ execs(CS) and
server b ∈ DATAS where send(q)d,a →X send(rq ∈ R)c,b but rq 6∈ executeb(sa, q).
From Lemma 4.3 we have cache-seqab(X) ¹ state-seqb(X), so b.state has value sa at
a point in X before the receive(q)c,b event that executes q. Therefore, there must be
an event er at b preceding receive(q)c,b that assigns to b.state a value sb such that rq 6∈
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executeb(sb, q). If we let r be the response enqueued by er, then by the definition of
conflicts-inv, conflicts-inv(q, r). Since a.stateb = sa at the createRequest(q)a event
issuing request q, we have createRequest(q)a <X receive(r)d,a and therefore by FIFO
send(q)d,a <X send(ack(r))d,a. This gives us er <X receive(q)c,b ∧ send(q)d,a <X
send(ack(r))d,a. Since by Lemma 4.4 a is ACK Well-Formed and by Lemma 4.5 b
is Responder Well-Formed, by Theorem 3.2 we have send(q)d,a 6→X send(rq)c,b, a
contradiction 2
4.5 Discussion and Related Work
This section discuss performance issues and related work in concurrency control for
Abstract Data Types.
4.5.1 Performance Analysis
Theorem 4.1 shows that CS implements a cache consistency algorithm, as requests
based on stale cache information are dropped, either in the network or at the des-
tination server. The host and server automata are fairly simple, depending on the
guarantees of Atomic Transfer for their correctness. We claim that cache consistency
based on Atomic Transfer is efficient in at least two respects.
First it admits all the concurrency afforded by the conflict-resp relation, since non-
conflicting requests are never dropped. Schemes based on timestamps or logical time
are more conservative and will generally reject some valid requests because they might
be invalid given their timestamp or assigned logical time, reducing concurrency and
performance.
Second, successful requests complete with minimum latency, in the sense that no
message hops are added beyond those needed to get a message to the server and
back again. An algorithm based on locking, by contrast, would require at least two
round-trips: one to request and receive back the confirmation of a lock and another
round-trip to issue the actual request and release the lock. Locking can also block
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and delay requests from other servers, reducing concurrency. Finally, locking can lead
to deadlocks, while our method is deadlock-free.
We observe that since responses atomically update the cache, an application always
has a consistent cache, corresponding to the current or, when stale, recent state of
the server.
4.5.2 Serializability for Abstract Data Types
Our model is defined in terms of abstract requests and responses, rather than simple
reads and writes of variables. Aside from generality and concord with Abstract Data
Types (ADTs) and encapsulation, abstract operations can achieve higher levels of
concurrency than simple reads and writes. For example, commutative operations
such as addition can be defined as being non-conflicting and allowed to proceed in
parallel. Adding a constant i to a state variable v using reads and writes, by contrast,
requires a request that reads (depends on) v having a certain value x and then writes
the new value x + i. All such operations on v must be totally ordered, so if v is
contended it can become a hot spot, a concurrency control bottleneck in the system.
By contrast, the TRANSb relation permits arbitrary response semantics, as long as
the computation of a new state is a function of the old state and the response.
Hence, responses may be defined at a relatively high level, performing complex state-
dependent processing such as deleting all values satisfying a certain predicate or
transforming a 3D model according to some complex method, etc. This can lead to
smaller response messages than explicit encoding of all values modified by a response.
But defining conflict relations that preserve an appropriate consistency standard for
applications is a challenge. Classic serializability theory [8] deals with reads and
writes, not abstract operations. However, Weihl and Herlihy have developed a theory
of concurrency control for ADTs [19, 18] which is highly applicable to our model.
Simplifying somewhat, let a request be comprised of a group of operation invocations
on a group of typed objects (we will in fact model requests thus in the following Chap-
ters). For each ADT we define an invalidated-by conflict relation such that operations
p′ and p are related if inserting p′ into some valid execution ending with p renders the
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execution invalid. Using a generalization of serializability to ADTs [18, 63], Herlihy
and Weihl prove several concurrency control algorithms, pessimistic, optimistic [136]
and hybrid, using only the algebraic properties9 of (arbitrary) conflict relations. The
theory can also be applied to systems where objects use heterogeneous concurrency
control methods. This may aid the interfacing of highly concurrent shared-memory
hosts with Atomic Networks, since locking is often the preferred method for concur-
rency control within such hosts.
The theory can provide a foundation for deriving conflict relations for ADTs in sys-
tems based on Atomic Transfer. Transactions whose operations do not conflict may
execute in parallel, while conflicting transactions must be totally ordered. Table 4.1
shows an example conflict relation, for a “register” ADT with only simple read and
write operations. Operations are shown as invocation/reply pairs, and the operation
in a row depend on the operation in a column when the condition in that row/column
is true.
read()/v write(v)/OK
read()/v′ v 6= v′
write(v′)/OK
Table 4.1: Invalidated-by relation for a simple read / write register.
A read can be invalidated by an earlier write using a different value, so a read depends
on such writes. If we replace v 6= v′ with “true”, this corresponds to classic serial-
izability. But invalidated-by relations may also be defined in terms of return values
of operations, which can be exploited to yield smaller relations, that is: that define
fewer operations as conflicting. For example, the example from Herlihy [136] in Table
4.2 gives a conflict relation for a bank account ADT, with debit and credit operations
where the latter can return “over” to indicate insufficient funds for a debit.
Credits can proceed in parallel, but one debit may invalidate another, by lowering the
balance so that the latter results in overdraft. A debit that results in an overdraft,
on the other hand, conflicts with a credit, since the credit may turn the debit into a
successful one. A conflict relation using only reads and writes would have to define
9The fact that they are serial dependency relations [19]
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credit(n)/OK debit(n)/OK debit(n)/over
credit(m)/OK
debit(m)/OK true
debit(m)/over true
Table 4.2: Invalidated-by relation for a bank account ADT.
debits as being in conflict. This relation could be extended further to allow some
degree of concurrency among credits [136, 137], should the need arise.
To use this type of conflict detection with AT caching, a requester would include its
expected replies in its requests, that is: the replies generated by the local execution
using cached state. Conversely, responses would include the invocation for each of
the replies they contain. Switches would then check whether operations on the same
datum conflict or not, which can be done efficiently by arranging operation codes in
bitmap masks, for example (see Chapter 8 for one possible approach).
Striking a good balance between ADT operation expressivity and the complexity of
the implementation of conflict checking on switches may be a challenge. In general, we
expect programmers to re-use existing ADTs and conflict relations more often than
they invent new ones. In many cases the choices might be constrained by the available
programming languages, compilers and libraries, as well as the conflict relation types
supported on the switches in a network.
In summary, basing our execution model on abstract request is a better fit with
abstraction in programming languages, defined in terms of queues, sets, relations and
other ADTs instead of simple reads and writes. It also and creates opportunities for
networking and concurrency control optimizations, which can be used to solve “hot
spot” problems without abandoning atomicity.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Subscriptions
Our models have hitherto used the qHopi and rHopsi relations for message forwarding
and assumed that requesters are subscribed to every message of each responder they
call throughout any execution. This section relaxes these impractical assumptions,
allowing requesters to dynamically vary their subscriptions. Furthermore, they may
subscribe to only a subset of a responder’s responses. We show that our dynamic
subscription protocol preserves Atomic Transfer. We also relax the assumption that
switches never drop messages, but use Atomic Transfer to prevent conflicts from
escaping detection when this happens. This provides a safe way for switches to
discard responses during overload or error conditions, for example.
5.1 Subscriptions and Conflicts
A static switch i of Chapter 3 forwards messages based on the static qHopi and rHopsi
relations. A dynamic switch i, on the other hand, uses dynamic relations stored in its
qHop and rHops fields. Requesters configure these fields using a multicast subscription
protocol, establishing and tearing down the network paths that carry their requests
and the responses to those requests. In general, a requester a must provide its home
switch with some representation of the domain Qa ⊆ Q of requests that the requester
wishes to be able to make, as well as some representation of the set Ra ⊆ R of
responses that conflict with requests in Qa. Our particular protocol’s representation
for subscription requests in fact captures both domains.
71
The main restriction on a multicast protocol for atomic switches is that it preserve
Conflict Locality. Restated in terms of the new fields, Conflict Locality requires for
each pair of adjacent switches i and j that if an entry (q, j) is present in i.qHop,
then for every response r such that conflicts(q, r) there is an entry (r, i) in j.rHops.
Since fields in distinct switches cannot be updated atomically, this means that when
configuring a forwarding hop from i to j, the conflicting response entries must be
added to j.rHops before the request entry for q is added to i.qHop. Conversely, when
tearing down a forwarding hop from i to j, the entry for q must be removed from
i.qHop before the corresponding entries of j.rHops are removed. This is illustrated
in Figure 5.1. As we will show, if Conflict Locality is upheld on the forwarding path
fp(q) of a request q then the Atomic Transfer safety guarantees of Theorem 1 hold
for q.
ji ji
(r, i)
(q, j)
Adding a new forwarding hop
Removing a forwarding hop
ji
(r, i)
Figure 5.1: configuring a forwarding hop for conflicting request/response q and r.
Instead of developing Dynamic Atomic Transfer in terms of purely abstract requests
and responses, we do it for a system where the dependencies and effects of requests
and responses can be related to independent subcomponents of responder states. We
introduce the notion of names and values, for this purpose, basically corresponding
to variable names and values (or seen another way, object identities and states).
The refined switch introduced in this section forwards messages based on the names
contained in them. As well as simplifying our presentation, names abstract away
from host identities, allowing seamless subscriptions to subsets of host names as well
as to names hosted across multiple hosts. The performance objectives informing the
design of our subscription protocol are:
1. To minimize the delay from when a requester host initiates a subscription to a
responder host until the requester can start issuing request to that responder.
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2. To keep that delay relatively independent of the load on the responder and the
rate at which the responder is sending out responses.
3. To keep that delay relatively independent of the number of requesters concur-
rently in the process of subscribing to the responder.
The protocol defined in this Chapter does well with respect to the first of these
objectives, but the second and third one are only fully addressed in the scalable
refinement of the algorithm presented in Chapter 7.
5.2 Names and Conflicts
To support partial subscriptions to subsets of the responses sent by a host, the host’s
state must be partitioned in such a way that a requester can execute correctly while
observing only responses for those partitions containing data relevant to the requester.
A relational database, for example, could be partitioned along tables, rows and/or
columns, while hierarchical data such as XML files or virtual worlds may be parti-
tioned along sub-hierarchies.
We use a simple scheme for partitioning hosts, akin to those commonly used for
operational definition of simple programming languages. For each host b ∈ HOSTS,
let NAMESb be some countable set of names, disjoint from the name sets of all other
hosts. Let VALUES be the set of values for names. Let NAMES be the union of all
NAMESb sets, for each b ∈ HOSTS, and for any n ∈ NAMES let host(n) denote the
host b ∈ HOSTS such that n ∈ NAMESb. We say that host(n) is the host of n, or
that name n is hosted on host(n). Note that we do not impose types on names or
values, as this is outside our scope.
For every request q ∈ Q, we define the dependency set of q, denoted depends(q), as the
subset of NAMESb of host b = destination(q) whose values may affect the execution
of q. For every request r ∈ R, we define the effect set of r, denoted effects(r), as
the subset of NAMESb of responder b = sender(r) potentially affected by r. While
Chapter 6 gives a more concrete refinement for a dynamic atomic cache system, this
section does not further specify the semantics of dependency or effect sets. Our only
73
requirement for now is that conflicting requests and responses always have a name in
common, that is:
Assumption 5.1 Names and Conflicts: for any q ∈ Q, r ∈ R: conflicts(q, r) ⇒
effects(r) ∩ depends(q) 6= ∅.
Note that the converse need not be true in general; even if we have effects(r) ∩
depends(q) 6= ∅ there may exist responder states where response r does not affect the
outcome of executing q.
The reversal of the implication, however, does tell us that if effects(r) ∩ depends(q)
= ∅ then q does not conflict with r. Hence, the set of all responses whose effect
includes some name in the dependency set of q contains all responses that conflict
with q. Formally, for any set Nb ⊆ NAMESb for some b ∈ HOSTS, let effect-resp(Nb)
be the set { r ∈ R | effects(r) ∩Nb 6= ∅ }. Then:
Corollary 5.1 conflicts(q, r)⇒ r ∈ effect-resp(depends(q)).
Hence, if a host issues a request q and the host is subscribed to depends(q), then it
is subscribed to all responses that conflict with q and any conflict will be detected.
This is the crucial connection between name sets, requests and responses upon which
our Dynamic Atomic multicast subscription protocol depends.
5.3 Names, Forwarding and Subscriptions
This section discusses the setting up and tearing down of subscriptions. While multi-
casting is not our focus, we fundamentally assume it as the basis for Atomic Transfer
and need to include subscription management in our models in order to reason about
their interactions with Atomic Transfer. We strive keep the multicasting aspects of
our protocol abstract and simple, yet somewhat representative of well-known multi-
cast algorithms [138, 139, 140].
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Dynamic switches forward requests and responses based on their name sets: depen-
dency sets and effect sets, respectively. To abstract from network routing, for each
switch i ∈ SWITCHES let nHopi be a total routing oracle function : NAMES →
CHANNELSi, mapping from each name n to a channel that leads toward host(n),
for example the next channel on the shortest path towards the host. It represents
the network knowledge that a switch implementation would acquire through some
unspecified routing protocol. We assume the absence of circular forwarding paths.
Note that since nHopi is a function, there is a unique forwarding path from each node
to the host of a name. As a notational aid, for any c ∈ CHANNELSi let nHopi(c)
denote the set of names that i forwards on channel c, that is: { n ∈ NAMES : (n, c)
∈ nHopi}.
Since hosts may potentially subscribe to any set of names and issue requests depending
on them, we redefine qHopi in terms of nHopi, that is: qHopi= { (q, c) | depends(q)
⊆ nHopi(c) }. Since nHopi is a function, request forwarding paths are unique, as in
Chapter 3. We also redefine rHopsi, as the relation that forwards all responses along
each path away from the sending responder, that is: rHopsi= { (r, c) | effects(r) ∩
nHopi(c) = ∅ }. Since requests always travel towards their responders, this implies
Conflict Locality for qHopi and rHopsi.
Note that the nHopi oracle is static and that our model does not capture dynamic
route changes. A practical Atomic Network implementation would have to adapt to
changes in network topology, but any re-routing must be carefully choreographed as
to preserve Conflict Locality. Since switches forward messages based on data names,
network re-routing, renaming of data and migration of data between hosts must be
made to appear atomic with the corresponding changes in the forwarding tables on
switches. We leave investigation of these issues to future work.
A host or switch o ∈ NODES subscribes to some set of names at each adjacent switch
i, termed the subscription of o at i and denoted by subo(i). To add names to its
subscription, o sends a subscription request message to i, specifying the set of names
it now wants forwarded to itself. If switch i is not already subscribed to some of the
names requested then i must in turn add to its subscription(s) at adjacent switches.
This chain of events may lead all the way to the home switches of one or more
responder hosts. Home switches receive all their hosts’s responses by our definition.
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However, as in most scalable multicast subscription protocols, a subscription request
only travels as far as needed; as soon as it reaches a switch that is already subscribed
to the requested names, no further subscription requests are sent by that switch.
A DynamicSwitch automaton si, as defined in Section 5.6, has a field outNamesc for
each c ∈ CHANNELSi, storing the subscription subj(i) of the other node j incident
to c, and a field inNamesc storing a copy of the switches own subscription subi(j)
at j. The field names remind us that the fields contain the names being sent “out”
to other switches and the names that funnel “in” to the switch, respectively. Note
that at any time, the union of the inNamesc fields of si must contain the union of the
outNamesc fields of si, in order for si to receive all the data needed by its subscribers.
In the I/O Automata we define the qHop and rHops fields of a switch i as variant
functions of the subscriptions of i. There is an entry (q, d) ∈ i.qHop for each (q, d) ∈
qHopi where the dependency set of q is contained in i.outNamesc, with c the channel
on which q is received at i. There is an entry (r, c) ∈ i.rHops for each (r, c) ∈ rHopsi
such that i.outNamesc contains a name affected by r.
Let a be a requester that subscribes to the name set NQa containing all names in the
union of the dependencies of the set of requests Qa ⊆ Q that a may issue, that is:
NQa = { n ∈ NAMES | ∃ q ∈ Qa: n ∈ depends(q) }. Switch i forwards each response
r it receives onto each channel c ∈ CHANNELSi such that subscription outNamesc
has a name in common with effects(r). By Corollary 5.1, if a is subscribed to Qa
then switch i will forward every response conflicting with requests issued by a a.
A switch i does not add a name n to its subscription set i.inNamesc for channel c =
nHopi(n) until it receives a subscription confirmation messages for n from the switch
j incident to c. This ensures that a name n is added to j.outNamesc and hence the
j.rHops relation of j before it is added to i.qHop, preserving Conflict Locality. A
confirmation message with a name set N therefore signals that a forwarding path has
been established all the way to the host(s) of N .
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5.4 Overflow, Failures and Purging
Conflict Locality implies that all responses must be forwarded to each receiver and
never be dropped. This may be hard to achieve in practice, since bursts in traffic can
exceed network capacity, causing packet queues on switches to overflow and forcing
switches to discard packets. Switches can preclude this scenario through some form
of lossless flow control [141], especially if the flow control creates backpressure on re-
sponders to slow down their execution rate and response generation as capacity nears
exhaustion. While such schemes may apply within a single autonomously managed
subnetwork, they may not be applicable in general, since they can lead to the slowest
receiver dictating the flow of responses in the entire network of subscribers10. Last but
not least, real-world switches and links occasionally fail, losing all responses buffered.
For Atomic Transfer to be practical, it must be able to handle these issues.
The solution comes from noting that a response r can be safely dropped as long as all
in-flight requests conflicting with r are dropped as well. We achieve this by purging
names from subscriptions at the dropping switch, as to prevent conflicting requests
from being forwarded. In effect, the switch can safely breach its obligation to forward a
response by severing the paths for conflicting requests from the response’s subscribers.
Allowing switches to unilaterally purge subscriptions has another practical use, since
it supports the common practice of maintaining subscription and forwarding tables in
switches as soft-state, that expires and is discarded after some length of time and/or
disuse.
There is a potential pitfall, though: a forwarding path could be re-established without
some subscriber noticing that it was severed in the first place. The subscriber might
then receive a stream of responses where one or more responses have been omitted,
which could violate Atomic Transfer of a request conflicting with names in an omitted
response. In addition to local purging and severing of forwarding paths, all affected
requesters must be made aware of the purge.
We handle the problem as follows. When a switch unilaterally purges a subscrip-
tion to some set of names, it sends a special cancellation notification message on
all affected channels, which ultimately propagates to all subscribers of the names.
10Allowing any receiver to dictate the flow would also enable easy denial-of-service attacks.
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These notifications are defined as responses with the purged names in their effect set,
and they are defined to conflict with all requests that have a name in common with
that set. As we will show, cancellation responses ensure that all request/response
conflicts are detected, regardless of the timing of a forwarding path’s severing and
re-establishment.
A switch that fails can similarly notify its neighbors and subscribers when it recovers
again, by sending a cancellation response for the universal set NAMES on each of its
channels. This causes all subscriptions passing through the switch to be reset and all
requests heading its way to be dropped. We do not explicitly model a switch failing,
but such an event can be represented in an execution as a sequence of consecutive
purge events for NAMES and all queued responses on each of its channels.
5.5 Subscription Consistency
To model subscription processing messages, let SQ ⊆ Q, SR ⊆ R be the designated
sets of subscription request messages and subscription response messages, respectively.
A subscription request contains a set of names that should be added to the sender’s
subscription and a set of names that should be removed from it. Let total function
SQ(Ns, Nu): 2
NAMES × 2NAMES → SQ returns the unique message sq ∈ SQ such
that functions sub: SQ → 2NAMES, unsub: SQ → 2NAMES and names: SQ →
2NAMES map sq to Ns, Nu and Ns∪Nu, respectively. A subscription response contains
the set of names that were added or removed from a subscription (due to an earlier
subscription request, for example) as well as the set of names that are pending for
subscription but whose forwarding path has not yet been fully established. Let total
function SR(Ns, Nu, Np): 2
NAMES × 2NAMES × 2NAMES → SR return the unique
message sr ∈ SR such that functions sub: SR → 2NAMES, unsub: SR → 2NAMES,
pend: SR→ 2NAMES and names: SQ→ 2NAMES map sr to Ns, Nu, Np and Ns∪ Nu
∪ Np, respectively. The SQ and SR functions are only defined for mutually exclusive
argument sets, i.e. with no names in common.
We permit a DynamicSwitch i to arbitrarily drop a queued request, using the non-
deterministic internal action drop(m ∈ Q)c,i. We keep assuming reliable FIFO chan-
nels, as modeling the acknowledgement/retry protocols generally used to overcome
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failure-prone links adds no insight to our discussion and is better done in conjunction
with modeling of lower-level network protocols. We leave the question of how hosts
learn about dropped requests and responses undefined, but one solution would be to
use a time-out and a retransmission.
Modeling dropped requests increases the complexity of subscription processing, since
subscription requests may then also be dropped. Switches and applications must
resend subscription requests to overcome such message loss, but the asynchronous
modification and unilateral purging of subscriptions invites race conditions. Further
race conditions may result from the fact that switches cannot satisfy all subscription
requests immediately but must sometimes add names to their own subscriptions first.
Subscription and unsubscription requests and responses can interact in subtle ways
with such pending subscriptions. Furthermore, even if all switches were to eventually
reach a state where their inNames were consistent with the outNames of all adjacent
nodes, this does not suffice. The reason is that we must also ensure Conflict Locality
at all times, lest a conflicting request were to escape detection.
We address the problem using Atomic Transfer. Using the terminology of Chapter
4, we let each switch act like a data server with respect to its outNames sets and
like an application with respect to its inNames sets, treating each inNamesc field
as a cached version of the outNamesc field of the adjacent node incident to channel
c. A subscription request inbound on channel c, therefore, is simply a request to
modify outNamesc, with the switch replying with a subscription response encoding
the changes, similar to how a data server would respond. For each name n in the
request, the response either confirms the requested change of n to a subscribed or
unsubscribed status or else to a pending status, meaning that the switch will complete
the change later, upon adding n to its own subscription. The switch completes the
change in a non-deterministic action predicated on inNames sets containing names
tagged as pending in outNames sets.
We define switches as being permanently “subscribed” to the outNames sets of their
neighbors. This guarantees Conflict Locality for subscription requests and responses
between adjacent switches and allows us to invoke Theorem 3.1 for requests and re-
sponses going between the switches. We take as our conflict relation the relation such
that all subscription requests and responses that have names in common conflict. We
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then use similar argument as used for Theorem 4.1 to show that all (successful) sub-
scription requests are based on an up-to-date view of adjacent subscriptions, leading
to consistent behavior. We require each subscription response to conflict with all
requests sharing a name with, that is:
Assumption 5.2 For all q ∈ Q, sr ∈ SR :
names(sr) ∩ names(q) 6= ∅ ⇒ conflicts(q, sr)
It would suffice for ordinary requests to conflict with the unsub names of subscription
responses, for the purposes of ensuring safety of subscription purges. Conflicts with
other parts of a subscription response would imply an erroneous sender, forwarding a
request without being fully subscribed to its dependency set. But since we will rule
out such erroneous nodes, we use this simpler definition.
5.6 DynamicSwitchi
We now define DynamicSwitchi, the dynamic version of the AtomicSwitchi automa-
ton. We model the decision of a switch i to purge subscriptions on a channel c ∈
CHANNELSi with the non-deterministic internal action purge(N)i,c, which is en-
abled whenever the subscription of channel c is non-empty. To capture the steps
a real switch might take in response to a channel failure or overflow, we allow the
action to simultaneously purge some subset of the responses queued for c, but only
if no adjacent node will be subscribed to any of those responses following the purge.
Purged responses are replaced in the queue with a subscription cancellation message
for N .
Dynamic switches also forward messages in the sets V Q ⊆ Q, VR ⊆ R of value
read request messages (value requests) and value response messages (value messages),
respectively, disjoint with subscription requests and responses, respectively. These
messages are used in the Dynamic Atomic Cache system of Chapter 6, for hosts to
request the current values of names and respond with messages carrying name values.
For the purposes of this section, all we need to know is that a value request or response
message m has an associated set of names names(m) ⊆ NAMES, and that for any
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N ⊆ NAMES we let V Q/V R(N) denote the unique value request/response message
such that names(m) = N . Furthermore, the conflicts relation does not include any
members of V Q or V R, so these messages never conflict with other messages.
Note that the receive(q ∈ Q \SQ \ V Q)c,i, receive(r ∈ R \SR \ V R)c,i and send(m ∈
M)c,i actions of DynamicSwitchi, for normal requests and responses, are virtually
identical to those of AtomicSwitchi. Indeed, our proofs essentially argue that if all
subscriptions for depends(q) on the forwarding path fp(q) of a request q are stable
during an execution interval, then the dynamic switches of fp(q) behave as if the path
were made up of static atomic switches. When subscriptions are unstable and change,
we show that cancellation responses ensure that Atomic Transfer safety is preserved.
DynamicSwitchi
Models the behavior of an atomic switch supporting dynamic name subscriptions.
Note that some fields are defined as variant functions of the switch’s current sub-
scription state. Let SUBSTATUS denote the set { sub, unsub, pend }, of possible
subscription statuses of a name at a node: subscribed, not subscribed or pending
(waiting to become subscribed).
State:
for each c ∈ CHANNELSi
outQueuec: same as in AtomicSwitchi.
responsesc: same as in AtomicSwitchi
outNamesc: a total function NAMES → SUBSTATUS
returning the subscription status of n at i, initially unsub, for all n ∈ NAMES.
inNamesc: a total function NAMES → SUBSTATUS
returning the subscription status i caches for o.outNamesc,
where o is the other node incident to c.
If o ∈ SWITCHES then initially unsub, for all n ∈ NAMES.
Else, initially inNamesc(n) = sub for each n ∈ nHopi(c), unsub for the rest.
Derived State:
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for each c ∈ CHANNELSi
// the subscriptions this switch serves / receives
outSubc / inSubc = { n ∈ NAMES | outNamesc(n) / inNamesc(n) = sub }.
// the subscriptions pending at this switch / other switches
outPendc / inPendc = { n ∈ NAMES | outNamesc(n) = pend / inNamesc(n) = pend }.
inSubs/outSubs/inPends/outPends: the union of inSubc/outSubc/inPendc/outPendc,
for each c ∈ CHANNELSi.
// the subset of qHopi for which the switch has sufficient subscriptions
qHop: Q→ CHANNELSi = { (q, d) ∈qHopi | depends(q) ⊆ outSubc },
where c is the channel on which q is received at i.
// the subset of rHopsi for which the switch has subscribers
rHops: R × CHANNELSi = { (r, d) ∈ rHopsi | outSubd ∩ effects(r) 6= ∅ }
Input actions:
receive(q ∈ Q \ SQ \ V Q)c,i
Effect:
// the same as in AtomicSwitchi
if ∃ r ∈ responsesc such that conflicts(q, r)
handleConflict(q)
else let d = qHop(q) in
outQueue′d = outQueued · q
receive(r ∈ R \ SR \ V R)c,i
Effect:
// the same as in AtomicSwitchi
outQueue′c = outQueuec· ack(r)
for each d such that (r, d) ∈ rHops
outQueue′d = outQueued · r
responses′d = responsesd ∪ { r }
receive(a ∈ A)c,i
Effect:
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// the same as in AtomicSwitchi
responses′c = responsesc\ {message(a)}
receive(sq ∈ SQ)c,i
Effect:
if ∃ r ∈ responsesc such that conflicts(sq, r)
handleConflict(sq)
else
// update the subscription status of the names
let subready = sub(sq) ∩ inSubs, subpend = sub(sq) \ inSubs in
∀n ∈ NAMES: outNames′c(n) =
outNamesc(n), if n 6∈ names(sq),
sub, if n ∈ subready,
pend, if n ∈ subpend,
unsub, if n ∈ unsub(sq).
// send back a subscription response for all affected names
let sr = SR(subready, subpend, unsub(sq)) in
outQueue′c = outQueuec · sr
responses′c = responsesc ∪ { sr }
// send out subscription requests for newly pending names
for each d ∈ CHANNELSi where subpend ∩ nHopi(d) 6= ∅
outQueue′d = outQueued · SQ(subpend ∩ nHopi(d), ∅)
receive(sr ∈ SR)c,i
Effect:
// enqueue an ACK back for the response
outQueue′c = outQueuec · ack(sr)
// update the cached status of the names
∀n ∈ NAMES: inNames′c(n) =
inNamesc(n), if n 6∈ names(sr),
sub, if n ∈ sub(sr),
pend, if n ∈ pend(sr),
unsub, if n ∈ unsub(sr).
// for each channel whose subscription is affected by this change
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let subd = sub(sr) ∩ nHopi(d), unsubd = unsub(sr) ∩ nHopi(d) in
for each d ∈ CHANNELSi where subd ∪ unsubd 6= ∅
// update the subscriptions, for names we’ve lost or added to ours
∀n ∈ NAMES: outNames′d(n) =
outNamesd(n), if n 6∈ subd ∪ unsubd,
sub, if n ∈ subd,
unsub, if n ∈ unsubd.
// send a subscription response, notifying of the change
let sr = SR(subd, ∅, unsubd) in
outQueue′d = outQueued · sr
responses′d = responsesd ∪ { sr }
receive(vq ∈ V Q)c,i
Effect:
// forward value request
for each d such that names(vq) ∩ nHopi(d) 6= ∅
outQueue′d = outQueued · vq
receive(vr ∈ V R)c,i
Effect:
// forward value response
for each d such that names(vr) ∩outSubd 6= ∅
outQueue′d = outQueued · vr
Internal actions:
purge(N ⊆ NAMES)c,i
Precondition:
N ⊆ (outSubc ∪ outPendc) ∧ N 6= ∅
Effect:
// set the status of all the names to unsubscribed
∀n ∈ NAMES:
outNames′c(n) =
outNamesc(n) if n 6∈ N ,
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unsub, otherwise.
// remove and notify about cancellation
// while possibly purging a suffix of responses no node subscribes to anymore
let ρc be any suffix of outQueuec where ∀r ∈ ρc : effects(r) ∩ outSub′c = ∅ in
let Rc = { r ∈ ρc } \ SR, sr = SR(∅, ∅, N) in
outQueue′c = (outQueuec \ Rc) · sr
responses′c = (responsesc \ Rc) ∪ { sr }
drop(q ∈ Q)c,i
Precondition:
q ∈ outQueuec
Effect:
outQueue′c = outQueuec\ { q }
unsubscribe(N ⊆ NAMES)c,i
Precondition:
N ⊆ (inSubsc ∪ inPendsc) \ outSubs ∧ N 6= ∅
Effect:
// spontaneously request to unsubscribe to some names
outQueue′c = outQueuec · SQ(∅,N)
Output actions:
send(m ∈ M)c,i
Precondition:
head(outQueuec) = m
Effect:
outQueue′c = tail(outQueuec)
The receive(q ∈ Q \ SQ \ V Q)c,i action is the same as the receive(q ∈ Q)c,i action
of AtomicSwitchi, except it refers to the qHop field instead of the static qHopi rela-
tion. We do not specify the case when (q, d) 6∈ qHop since, as our proofs show, this
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case cannot occur in the system we model unless there is a cancellation response in
responsesc that conflicts with q.
The receive(r ∈ R \ SR \ V R)c,i and send(m ∈ M)c,i actions are exactly the same
as the receive(r ∈ R)c,i and send(m ∈ M)c,i actions of AtomicSwitchi, respectively,
except that receive(r ∈ R \ SR \ V R)c,i refers to the rHops field instead of the static
rHopsi relation.
The receive(a ∈ A)c,i action is the same as in AtomicSwitchi.
The receive(sq ∈ SQ)c,i action receives a subscription request from the node inci-
dent to channel c and modifies the subscription outNamesc for c. Note that the
action conflict-checks the request, just like any other request. It immediately tags
the names of unsub(sq) as not subscribed. However, it only tags a name n in sub(sq)
as subscribed if the switch is already subscribed to n. Otherwise it tags n as pending,
not upgrading it to subscribed status until the switch itself becomes subscribed to n.
The action enqueues back a subscription response, containing the new status of the
requested names. Also, for each channel leading to a newly pending name(s), it sends
a subscription requests for the name(s).
The receive(sr ∈ SR)c,i action receives a response notifying of changes to the sender’s
outNamesc set, and updates the “cached” inNamesc set of i accordingly. The changes
could be due to an earlier subscription request from i or due to a purge event on some
other switch. The action acknowledges the response, like any other response message.
For each channel subscribed to name(s) whose status is changing to subscribed or
unsubscribed, the action updates the channel’s subscription with the new status of
the name(s) and enqueues a subscription response with the changes. There is no need
to forward names that are becoming pending: these names will already be tagged as
such in any outNames set they are present in.
The receive(vq ∈ V Q)c,i action receives a value request message and forwards it
toward the appropriate host(s). The action could split the message and forward
different subsets of it on different channels, but we model it simply here.
The receive(vr ∈ V R)c,i action receives a value response message and forwards it
towards the appropriate subscribers. The action could forward different, possibly
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overlapping subsets of the message onto different channels, but we model it simply
here.
The purge(N)c,i action models the switch-initiated purging of a subset of the subscrip-
tion on some channel c, possibly along with one or more of the responses enqueued
for c, as captured by the non-deterministic Rc set. A soft-state subscription time-out
might remove no responses, while a link failure or overflow might remove all of them.
The action sends a cancellation subscription response message for any names removed
and adds it to the responsesc set.
As the definition of Rc reflects, a response can be removed only if the channel will no
longer be subscribed to any name in its effect set, as this guarantees that no conflicting
requests received via c will be forwarded by the switch. Also note that the action
removes responses from the tail of the queue only. This ensures that subscribers never
see a sequence of responses where one or more responses have been omitted. This is
not required for Conflict Locality, as any request depending on an omitted response
will be detected as a conflict with the corresponding cancellation response. However,
this stronger guarantee is needed in Chapter 6 and may be generally useful for other
types of end-system hosts as well, since they may otherwise receive requests that are
not applicable to their current state, before receiving the cancellation response.
The drop(q ∈ Q)c,i action models the switch dropping a request, for example due to
an overflowing packet queue. As mentioned before, we opt to model such drops in
the switch rather than the channels. These actions highlight the fact that delivery
of these types of messages is not guaranteed, and such guarantees are not needed for
safety.
The unsubscribe(N ⊆ NAMES)c,i action takes some subset of set of names the switch
needlessly subscribes to on c (after one or more adjacent nodes have unsubscribed
to the names, for example) and sends a request to remove them from its subscrip-
tion. It does not remove them from its subscription set immediately, as the sub-
scription request may yet dropped due to a conflicting subscription response. We
model unsubscriptions as a separate non-deterministic action to give implementa-
tions the freedom to perform them at their own chosen time scales and granularity
levels. They could, for example, sometimes defer unsubscriptions in anticipation of
future re-subscriptions, to avoid subscripton/unsubscription hysteresis.
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5.7 Properties and Proofs
Let DAS be the I/O Automaton composed of an DynamicSwitchi automaton for
each switch i ∈ SWITCHES and a Channelc automaton for each channel c = (i, j)
∈ CHANNELS. The definition of responsibility intervals is the same as in Chapter
3 and Corollary 3.1 from that Chapter still applies, stating that conflicting receives
in responsibility intervals never cause sends. In particular, it holds for cancellation
responses, since they are a subset of the set R of responses.
The event ordering relation <E and causes relation→E for an execution or execution
trace E are the same as before, with the addition to →E of each send(sr′ ∈ SR)d,i
event caused by a receive(sr ∈ SR)c,i event. Note that the message sent is generally
not the same as the one received, but the ordering is nonetheless well-defined. We
begin with a simple invariant, stating that a switch is subscribed to all names for
which adjacent nodes have subscriptions at the switch.
Lemma 5.1 In every state of DynamicSwitchi : i.outSubs ⊆ i.inSubs.
Proof: Only the receive(sq ∈ SQ)c,i and receive(sr ∈ SR)c,i actions change names in
i.outNames to subscribed status, and these names are already in i.inSubs or are being
added to i.inSubs, respectively. Only the receive(sr ∈ SR)c,i action changes names
in i.inNames to unsubscribed status, and these names are changed to unsubscribed
status in i.outNames at the same time. 2
Conflict Locality for dynamic switches differs slightly from that of Chapter 3, as it is
not a constraint on static relations but an invariant on the value of asynchronously
varying qHop andrHops fields in switches. When a switch decides to purge a sub-
scription, for example, the adjacent switches do not learn about it until they receive a
subscription response message. We will refer to Conflict Locality as defined in Chap-
ter 3 as Static Conflict Locality, from here on. Our correctness condition, therefore,
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requires either that Static Conflict Locality holds for every conflicting request and re-
sponse pair on each pair of adjacent switches, or else that a cancellation subscription
response is en route, signaling that the forwarding path has been severed. Formally:
Definition 5.1 Dynamic Conflict Locality: for any pair of messages q ∈ Q and r
∈ R where conflicts(q, r) and any pair of switches i, j ∈ NODES: i.qHop(q) = (i, j)⇒
(r, (j, i)) ∈ j.rHops ∨ (∃ sr ∈ j.responses(i,j) ∩ SR : conflicts(q, sr)).
Our proof strategy is to show that Dynamic Conflict Locality holds in the executions
of DAS. We then argue that either Static Conflict Locality and hence Theorem 3.1
holds on a request’s forwarding path or else the request will have a conflict with a
subscription response and be dropped. In fact we show that it is sufficient for Static
Conflict Locality to hold on the suffix of the path where the request has not yet been
received; a purge on the part of the path “behind” a request does not affect it.
We introduce a new invariant called Name Conflict Locality, which implies Dynamic
Conflict Locality but is easier to work with. We begin with precise definitions of what
it means for a node to be subscribed to a name.
Definition 5.2 For any node o ∈ NODES adjacent to a switch j ∈ SWITCHES
and any n ∈ NAMES, let subscribedo,j(n, t) be true in state t ∈ execs(DAS) ex-
actly if n ∈ j.outSub(o,j) ∨ ∃ cr ∈ j.responses(o,j) ∩ SR : n ∈ names(cr). We say
that o is dynamically subscribed to n in t. For notational convenience, we define
subscribedo,c(n, t) to be equivalent to subscribed(o,j)(n, t) for channel c = (o, j).
A host a ∈ HOSTS, in particular, is dynamically subscribed to a name n ∈ NAMES
in t, denoted subscribeda(n, t), exactly if subscribed(a,i)(n, t), where i is the home
switch of a.
One way of reading these definitions is that either n ∈ j.outSub(o,j) or else t is in
the responsibility interval of a conflicting cancellation response cr, that is: t ∈ resp-
interval(cr)(o,j),j where n ∈ names(cr).
Name Conflict Locality says that if a switch i believes itself to be subscribed to a
name n at an adjacent switch j then either j is forwarding responses affecting n to
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i or else j has a cancellation response bound for i that contains n. We define Name
Conflict Locality and show that it implies Dynamic Conflict Locality.
Definition 5.3 Name Conflict Locality holds in a state t ∈ states(DAS) exactly if
for all pairs of switches i, j ∈ SWITCHES: n ∈ i.inSub(i,j) ⇒ subscribed(i,j)(n, t).
Lemma 5.2 (Name Conflict Locality implies Dynamic Conflict Locality): if Name
Conflict Locality holds in a state of t of DAS then Dynamic Conflict Locality holds
in t.
Proof: Fix any pair of messages q ∈ Q and r ∈ R where conflicts(q, r) and a pair
of switches i, j ∈ NODES such that i.qHop(q) = (i, j) = c. Then depends(q) ⊆
i.outSubd where d is the channel on which i receives q, by the definition of qHop
(noting also that depends(q) ⊆ nHopi(c), by the definition of qHop). By Lemma 5.1,
depends(q) ⊆ i.outSubs ⊆ i.inSubs. By Name Conflict Locality, therefore, for each
n ∈ depends(q) either n ∈ j.outSubc or j.responsesc holds a cancellation response
cr such that n ∈ names(cr). In the first case (r, c) ∈ j.rHops, by the definition of
j.rHops. In the second case conflicts(q, cr) is true, by the definition of conflicts for
cancellation responses. In both cases, the consequent of Dynamic Conflict Locality is
satisfied 2
To show that Name Conflict Locality holds in DAS we use the following Lemma,
which says that once a switch enqueues a subscription response confirming the addi-
tion of a name to a subscription, the response’s receiver is guaranteed to be subscribed
to the name until the switch receives the acknowledgement for the response. Recall
that the term “causes” refers to the →X causes relation.
Lemma 5.3 (Safety of Switch Subscription Expansion): Let e be an event receive(sr ∈
SR)c,i in any execution X ∈ execs(DAS), where i, j ∈ SWITCHES and c = (i, j).
Let eenq be the event enqueuing the sr enabling the send(sr ∈ SR)c,j causing e and let
ea be the receive(ack(sr))c,j caused by the enqueuing of ack(sr) by e (see figure 5.2).
Then for each n ∈ sub(sr) subscribedi,j(n, t) holds in each state t in the interval of
X beginning after eenq and ending immediately after ea, in particular after e.
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Proof: Inspecting DynamicSwitchj, eenq must either a receive(srd ∈ SR)d,j event with
n ∈ sub(srd) and some d ∈ CHANNELSj or a receive(sq ∈ SQ)c,j event with n ∈
sub(sq). By inspecting these actions, it is clear that n ∈ j.outSubc in the state imme-
diately after eenq. If n is not removed from j.outSubc before ea, then subscribedi,j(n, t)
holds as asserted. Otherwise, n is first removed from j.outSubc after eenq by some
intervening event en, where eenq <X en <X e. Inspecting DynamicSwitchi, event
en must be one of receive(sr
′∈ SR)g,j with n ∈ unsub(sr′) and g ∈ CHANNELSj,
purge(Np ⊆ NAMES)c,j with n ∈ Np or receive(sq ∈ SQ)c,j with n ∈ unsub(sq). In
each case, en adds a subscription response srn to j.responsesc, where n ∈ names(srn).
Since e enqueues ack(sr), by FIFO ea <X receive(ack(srn))c,j. Since subscription re-
sponses are never purged, srn ∈ j.responsesc in the interval of X beginning after eenq
and ending immediately after ea, so subscribedi,j(n, t) holds in every state t in that
interval 2
e = receive(sr? SR)c,i
i
j
en
removes n from j.outSubc
enqueues sr: eenq ea = receive(ack(sr))c,j receive(ack(srn))c,j
Figure 5.2: Lemma 5.3 illustrated
We now prove that Name Conflict Locality is invariant in executions of DAS.
Lemma 5.4 (Name Conflict Locality in DAS): In each state t of X of any execution
X ∈ execs(DAS), Name Conflict Locality holds in t.
Proof: Fix anyX ∈ execs(DAS) and any pair i, j of distinct switches from SWITCHES.
Without loss of generality, we use i to denote the switch requesting subscriptions and
sending requests, j to denote the switch satisfying subscription requests and forward-
ing responses and c to denote channel (i, j). We proceed by induction on the prefixes
of X, to show that n ∈ i.inSub(i,j) ⇒ subscribed(i,j)(n, t) for any t ∈ X and n ∈
NAMES, as required. As our base case, Name Conflict Locality holds in the start
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state of X, since the inSubc sets of the switches are empty. For the inductive step,
assume the theorem holds in the final state tx of some prefix X
′ of X such that X ′ ·e
· t = X, where (tx, e, t) ∈ trans(DAS) . We show that DAS preserves Name Conflict
Locality, that is: the invariant still holds in the state t following e, which completes
the induction. We claim that for each action e of DynamicSwitchi enabled in tx the
invariant still holds in t because:
1. If e = receive(q ∈ Q \ SQ \ V Q)c,j, receive(vq ∈ V Q)c,j, receive(vr ∈ V R)c,j,
drop(q ∈ Q)c,j, unsubscribe(N ⊆ NAMES)c,i or send(m ∈ M)c,j, then e affects
no j.outSub , j.inSub or j.responses set, preserving the invariant.
2. If e = receive(r ∈ R \ SR \ V R)c,j, then e affects no j.outSub or j.inSub sets,
preserving the invariant. It may add r to one or more j.responses fields, but
adding responses to a responses set cannot falsify subscribedi,j(n, t), preserving
the invariant.
3. If e = receive(sq ∈ SQ)c,j then e affects no j.inSub fields and e can only add
a response to j.responses, preserving the invariant. It may add names from
sub(sq) to j.outSubc, preserving the invariant, but it may also remove names N
= unsub(sq) from j.outSubc. But then e also adds a cancellation response cr
with unsub(cr) = N to j.responsesc, so the invariant is preserved.
4. If e = receive(sr ∈ SR)c,i then e only adds response to i.responses fields, pre-
serving the invariant. It may also add names from sub(sr) to i.outSub fields,
preserving the invariant. If e adds a non-empty set N = sub(sr) to i.inSubc,
then by Lemma 5.3, subscribedi,j(n, t) holds for each n ∈ N after e, preserving
the invariant. If e removes a set Nd = unsub(sr) ∩ nHopi(d) from j.outSubd for
a channel d ∈ CHANNELSi incident to a node o, then e also adds a cancellation
response sr where unsub(sr) = Nd to i.responsesd, so subscribedo,i(n, s) holds
for each n ∈ Nd, preserving the invariant.
5. If e = receive(a ∈ A)c,j then e affects no j.inNames or j.outNames fields, pre-
serving the invariant, but removes response ra = message(a) from j.responsesc.
If ra 6∈ SR then e cannot falsify subscribedi,j(n, t), preserving the invariant.
Otherwise, ra ∈ SR and a is enqueued by an event er = receive(ra ∈ SR)c,i. By
lemma 5.3 (with e = er and ea = e), subscribedi,j(n, t) holds after e, preserving
the invariant.
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6. If e = purge(N ⊆ NAMES)c,j then e affects no j.inNames fields and removes
no subscription responses from j.responses fields, preserving the invariant. It
does remove set Nc = N ∩ nHopi(c) of names from j.outSubc, but it also adds
subscription response SR(∅, Nc) to j.responsesc, so subscribedi,j(n, s) holds for
each n ∈ Nc.
Since all possible extensions of X ′ preserve Name Conflict Locality, Name Conflict
Locality is preserved for X, completing the induction 2
Consider the case when a receive(q ∈ Q)c,j event occurs and q 6∈ j.qHop but where
there is no conflicting cancellation response in j.responsesc. We claim that if Name
Conflict Locality holds then q cannot have been forwarded to j from a switch. If we
suppose for contradiction that q is forwarded from a switch i then (q, c) ∈ i.qHops,
so depends(q) ⊆ i.outSubd for the channel d ∈ CHANNELSi on which q is received
at i. Since by Lemma 5.2 i.outSubd ⊆ i.inSubc, by Name Conflict Locality we have
subscribed(i,j)(n, t) for each n ∈ depends(q). Since q 6∈ j.qHop, there is a name
n ∈ depends(q) such that n 6∈ j.outSubc and by Name Conflict Locality j.responsesc
holds a cancellation response conflicting with n, which is a contradiction. We state
this insight as a corollary.
Corollary 5.2 At each event e = receive(q ∈ Q)c,j event in any execution X ∈
execs(DAS) where e is caused by a switch : q ∈ j.qHop.
From the definition of qHop we see that the qHopi relation dictates which mappings
may appear in the i.qHop fields of each switch i ∈ SWITCHES and hence the for-
warding path fp(q) of any request q ∈ Q. However, a forwarding path is not effective
unless each switch along actually has an entry for q in its i.qHop field at the time it
receives q. Let fpi(q) denote the suffix of fp(q) beginning with switch si ∈ fp(q). We
define the effective part of a dynamic forwarding path as follows:
Definition 5.4 For any state t ∈ states(DAS) and any q ∈ Q let dfpi(q, t), the
dynamic forwarding path of q in t, be the (possibly empty) longest prefix si, si+1,
..., sm of forwarding path fpi(q) = si, si+1, ..., sn of switches such that for each
k ∈ [i,m] : sk.qHop(q) = (k, k + 1).
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Note that dfpi(q, tstart) = λ for all q ∈ Q, i ∈ SWITCHES in any start state tstart
of DAS. Dynamic / Name Conflict Locality yields the following result, saying that
if a switch i has a qHop entry for a request q in a state t reachable in DAS, then
either dfpi(q, t) = fpi(q) or else some switch in fpi(q) holds a cancellation response
conflicting with q. This captures the fundamental intuition about dynamic atomic
subscriptions: if some name n is in i.inSubc at a switch i for the channel c leading
towards host(n), then all the switches along the path are subscribed to n or else the
path has been (recently) severed and a cancellation response containing n is traveling
back along the path, i.e. the response is buffered on at least one switch on the path.
Definition 5.5 Let hasCR(fp, q, t) be true for a path of switches fp = s1, s2, ..., sn,
q ∈ Q and t ∈ states(DAS) exactly if in state t : ∃ sk ∈ fp : ( ∃ cr ∈ sk.responses(k−1,k)∩
SR : depends(q) ∩ names(cr) 6= ∅).
Lemma 5.5 (dfp transitivity) In each reachable state t ∈ states(DAS), for each
q ∈ Q and any switch si ∈ fp(q) = s1, s2, ..., sn: si.qHop(q) = (i, i+ 1)⇒ dfpi(q, t)
= fpi(q) ∨ hasCR(fpi, q, t).
Proof: Fix any q ∈ Q, switch si ∈ fp(q) and reachable state t ∈ states(DAS) where
si.qHop(q) = (i, i+1). The invariant holds if hasCR(fpi, q, t) is true, so consider
the case when it is false, meaning no switch on fpi(q) has a cancellation response
conflicting with q. We must show in this case that dfpi(q, t) = fpi(q). We proceed
by induction, showing that if sk ∈ dfpi(q) then sk+1 ∈ dfpi(q), for k ∈ [i, n].
As our base case, sn ∈ dfpi(q, t), since sn.qHop(q) = (n, destination(q)), by the
antecedent. As our inductive hypothesis, assume sk ∈ dfpi(q, t) for some i ≤ k < n.
Then sk.qHop(q) = (k, k + 1) and depends(q) ⊆ sk.inSub(k,k+1), by Lemma 5.1 and
the definition of qHop. By Lemma 5.4 and Name Conflict Locality, either depends(q)
⊆ sk+1.outSub(k,k+1) or ∃ cr ∈ sk+1.responsesc ∩ SR : depends(q) ∩ names(cr) 6= ∅.
Since the latter is false in our case (k ≥ i), the former holds, that is: depends(q) ⊆
sk+1.outSub(k,k+1). Since sk+1 ∈ fp(q), qHopk+1(q) = (k+1,k+2) and so depends(q) ⊆
nHopsk+1((k+1,k+2)), by the definition of qHopk+1. This implies that sk+1.qHop(q)
= (k+1,k+2), by the definition of sk+1.qHop, and hence sk+1 ∈ dfpi(q), completing
the induction 2
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By Lemma 5.5 and Dynamic Conflict Locality, if no switch on forwarding path fpi(q)
holds a cancellation responses conflicting with q, then for any r ∈ R where conflicts(q,
r) and any pair of switches i, j on the path: i.qHop(q) = (i, j)⇒ (r, (j, i)) ∈ j.rHops.
Since by definition i.qHop and j.rHops contain subsets of qHopi and rHopsj, respec-
tively, this implies Static Path Conflict Locality for fpi(q), as per Definition 3.4 on
page 36. We have the following corollary:
Corollary 5.3 (Dynamic Path Conflict Locality) For each reachable state t ∈ states(DAS)
and any switch si ∈ fp(q) = s1, s2, ..., sn for some q ∈ Q: si.qHop(q) = (i, i+ 1) ∧
¬hasCR(fpi(q), q, t) ⇒ Static Path Conflict Locality holds on fpi(q) in t.
That switches can purge responses may lead one to worry that a conflicts might go
undetected. However, switches don’t really purge responses but rather subsume them
with new subscription cancellation responses, whose unsub sets contain the union of
any name sets removed. Hence, if an incoming request conflicts with a response in a
response set in a state before a purge event e, it will also conflict with a response in
that set in the state following e, as we now show.
Lemma 5.6 (safety of response purges) In any state t ∈ states(DAS), for any switch
i ∈ SWITCHES: if ∃ q ∈ Q such that depends(q) ⊆ i.outSubc and ∃ r ∈ i.responsesc
such that conflicts(q, r) in t for any c ∈ CHANNELSi, then ∃ r′ ∈ i.responsesc
such that conflicts(q, r′) in any state t′ such that (t, purge(N ⊆ NAMES)c,i, t′) ∈
trans(DynamicSwitchi).
Proof: Let r ∈ R be any response in i.responsesc at t such that conflicts(q, r), for
some q ∈ Q where depends(q) ∈ i.outSubc. If r is not a member of the set Rc non-
deterministically chosen in the purge action, then the invariant trivially holds with r′
= r. On the other hand, if r ∈ Rc then let Np = effects(r) ∩ N , that is: those names
in the effect set of r that are being purged from the subscription. Since conflicts(q,
r) then depends(q) and effects(r) have some non-empty set Nqr of names in common,
by assumption 5.1. Observe that Nqr ⊆ depends(q) ⊆ i.outSubc. Since effects(r) ∩
i.outSub′c = ∅ then Nqr ∩ i.outSub′c = ∅, implying Nqr ⊆ Np, that is: all the names
that q and r have in common are purged. This also shows that Np is non-empty.
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Since Nqr ⊆ Np ⊆ N , Nqr ⊆ unsub(sr), with sr = SR(∅, ∅, N), the cancellation
response that the purge action adds to i.responsesc. Since conflicts(q, sr), by the
definition of cancellation responses and conflicts, the invariant holds with r′ = sr 2
Note that cancellation responses are never purged. Practically speaking, it would be
straightforward to show that replacing a set of cancellation responses C ⊆ i.responsesc
with a single cancellation response cr such that
⋃
r∈C effects(r) ⊆ effects(cr) preserves
Name Conflict Locality.
We can now show the main result of this Section, a Path Atomic Transfer theorem
for dynamic atomic system DAS. It says that Path Atomic Transfer (Theorem 3.1)
holds in the dynamic system. Let fpab = s1, s2, ..., sn, for some nodes a, b ∈ NODES
and let sk denote the k-th switch on fpab. Our proof is structured in a similar way as
the proof for Theorem 1.
Theorem 5.1 (Dynamic Path Atomic Transfer): For all X ∈ execs(DAS), all
i, j ∈ [1, n] where i ≤ j, and all r ∈ R, q ∈ Q with forwarding path fp(q) = fpab:
receive(r)(j,j+1),j <X receive(q)(i−1,i),i <X receive(ack(r))(i−1,i),i ∧ conflicts(q, r) ⇒
receive(q)(i−1,i),i 6→X send(q)(j,j+1),j.
Proof: Suppose for contradiction that there exists some X ∈ execs(DAS) and some
r ∈ R, q ∈ Q where conflicts(q, r) such that receive(r)(j,j+1),j <X receive(q)(i−1,i),i <X
receive(ack(r))(i−1,i),i and receive(q)(i−1,i),i →X send(q)(j,j+1),j, where i ≤ j. Let I be
the interval ofX beginning after receive(r)(j,j+1),j and ending after receive(ack(r))(i−1,i),i.
Observe that since receive(q)(i−1,i),i →X send(q)(j,j+1),j, there is no drop(q) event in I.
We define q-switch(q, E) and r-switch(r, E) the same way as in the proof of Theorem
3.1 in Chapter 3 on page 36.
We separate the cases when Static Path Conflict Locality holds and when it doesn’t
hold on the part of the forwarding path where cancellation responses can affect the
forwarding of q and r. For any finite execution or trace E let fpqr(E) denote the
relevant path of q and r after E, the interval sk+1, ..., sm of fpi(q) where k = q-
switch(q, E) and m = r-switch(r, E). In other words, the path starts with the next
switch after the one where q was last received in E and ends at the switch where r
was last received in E, as illustrated in figure 5.3 a). Let PCL(I) be the predicate
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Figure 5.3: Case 2 of Theorem 5.1 illustrated
that is true exactly if for each prefix I ′ of I : ¬hasCR(fpqr(I ′), q, tI′), where tI′ is
the last state of I ′. In other words, PCL is true for an execution interval I exactly if
¬hasCR holds for the relevant path of q and r in each state of I, so at no point in I
are there any cancellation responses conflicting with q on the path between q and r.
1. If PCL is true, then by Corollary 5.3 Static Path Conflict Locality holds on
fpqr(I
′) in the final state tI′ of every prefix I ′of I, so sk.qHop(q) = qHopk(q)
and sk.rHops(r) = rHopsk(r) at every switch sk ∈ fpi(q) at its receive event
for q and r. By comparing the receive(q ∈ Q\ SQ \ VQ)c,i, receive(r ∈ R\ SR
\ VR)c,i and receive(a ∈ A)c,i actions of DynamicSwitchi to the corresponding
actions in AtomicSwitchi, we see that each pair of actions behaves the exactly
the same in this case.
There may be a purge(N ⊆ NAMES)c,g event at some switch sg ∈ fpqr(I ′)
during I, but it doesn’t purge r since by the definition of qHops, depends(q)
⊆ sg.outSub(g−1,g) in the last state of I ′, and so by Lemma 5.6 the resulting
cancellation response would conflict with q, contradicting ¬hasCR.
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Response r is therefore not discarded but forwarded in the opposite direction to
q along fpi(q) and by the same reasoning as for Theorem 3.1, there must be some
prefix Ie of I with a last event e after which q-switch(q, Ie) = r-switch(r, Ie) = k,
for some k ∈ [i, j]. Event emust be one of receive(q)(k−1,k),k or receive(r)(k,k+1),k,
so repeating the subsequent argument of Theorem 3.1, receive(q)(k−1,k),k 6→I
send(q)(k,k+1),k, a contradiction.
1. If PCL is false then there exists some prefix I ′ of I such that in the last state
tI′ of I
′ : ∃ sg ∈ fpqr(I ′) : ∃ cr ∈ sg.responses(g−1,g) ∩ SR : depends(q) ∩
names(cr) 6= ∅, for some g where q-switch(q, I ′) < g ≤ r-switch(r, I ′). Let
I ′ be the shortest such prefix. Note that other cancellation responses may get
added to path fpqr during the remainder of I due to non-deterministic purge
events, but observe that purge events remove neither requests nor cancellation
responses. For any finite execution fragment E, let cr-switch(E) denote the
index g of the first switch on fpqr(E) that has held a cancellation response cr
∈ SR in E where conflicts(q, cr), that is: the lowest g, q-switch(q, E) < g ≤ r-
switch(r, E), such that receive(cr)(g,g+1),g ∈ E with conflicts(q, cr) or purge(N ⊆
NAMES)(g−1,g),g ∈ E with depends(q) ∩ N 6= ∅.
Recall that q-switch only increases in steps of 1. Observe that each receive(cr ∈
SR)(g,g+1),g event similarly decreases cr-switch by at most 1, since each such
event is caused by a prior send(cr ∈ SR)(g,g+1),g+1 event. A purge(N ⊆
NAMES)(g−1,g),g can decrease cr-switch directly to g, but then g > q-switch by
the definition fpqr, so purge events can only move cr-switch closer to q-switch
without reaching it or going below it. In figure 5.3 b), for example, either a
receive(cr)(g−1,g),g−1 event or a purge(N ⊆ depends(q))(g−2,g−1),g−1 event could
change cr-switch from g to g-1, but a purge(N ⊆ depends(q))(j−1,j),j event would
not change cr-switch, since j 6∈ fpqr at that point.
Let Irem denote the suffix of I starting with the last state of I
′, as illustrated in
figure 5.3 b). Let iq and icr denote q-switch(q, I
′) and cr-switch(I ′), respectively.
We have iq < icr ≤ j. Since q-switch(q, I ′)= iq but q-switch(q, I) = j, q-switch
takes on every value in [iq, j] during Irem . Since cr-switch(I
′) ∈ [cr-switch(I),
icr] in every state of Irem, where cr-switch(I) ≥ icr, there must be some prefix Ie
of Irem with last event e after which q-switch(q, Ie) = cr-switch(Ie) = k, for some
k ∈ [iq, j]. Event e must be one of receive(q)(k−1,k),k and receive(cr)(k,k+1),k,
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so repeating the subsequent argument of Theorem 3.1, receive(q)(k−1,k),k 6→I
send(q)(k,k+1),k, which is a contradiction 2
5.8 Dynamic End-To-End Atomicity
We now show that an application’s requests are executed on a server only if they do
not conflict with other concurrently issued requests. Theorem 5.2 is stated in terms
of the network of switches and channels, with no reference to the end-host attached
to it. For End-to-End Atomicity to hold, requesters must ACK Well-Formed and
responders must be Responder Well-Formed, as in Section 1.
The theorem can now be stated, and easily proven since Theorem 5.1 provides exactly
the guarantees needed to reprise the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 5.2 (End-To-End Atomicity): For all X ∈ execs(DAS) where X is well-
formed for hosts a, b ∈ HOSTS, all r ∈ R enqueued by an event er at b and all
q ∈ Q : er <X receive(q)(n,b),b ∧ send(q)(a,1),a <X send(ack(r))(a,1),a ∧ conflicts(q, r)
⇒ send(q)(a,1),a 6→X send(rq)(n,b),b, for any rq ∈ R.
Proof: Since Theorem 5.1 provides identical guarantees as Theorem 3.1, the proof of
Theorem 3.2 for AS applies 2
5.9 Liveness
Recall from Corollary 5.2 that the case q 6∈ j.qHop at a receive(q)(o,j),j event in a
switch j cannot occur if o is a switch. However, this case can occur if o is a host in a
state where depends(q) 6⊆ o.inSub(o,j). But this means that host o is issuing a request
without being subscribed to its entire dependency set. We consider such hosts to be
in error and rule them out by placing a technical well-formedness condition on the
environment of DAS, roughly corresponding to the Subscription Well-Formedness of
Chapter 3 (Definition 3.8 on page 43).
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Definition 5.6 An execution X ∈ execs(DAS) is Dynamic SubscriptionWell-Formed
for a host a ∈ NODES with home switch i if at each event e = receive(q ∈ Q)(a,i),i in
X, subscribeda(n, t) holds for each n ∈ depends(q) in the state t preceding e.
As before, the reason for this condition is to exclude cases where qHop is undefined
for a request, which is the same property we ensured for Theorem 3.3 of Chapter 511.
In fact, the theorem is very similar to that Theorem.
Theorem 5.3 (Dynamic Atomic Transfer Liveness) For all X ∈ fairexecs(DAS),
where X is Dynamic Subscription Well-Formed for a host a ∈ HOSTS, for each event
e = send(q ∈ Q)(a,i),i such that no message caused by e is detected as a conflict in X
and q is not dropped by a drop(q) event, there is a receive(q ∈ Q)(b,i),b event in X,
where b =destination(q).
Proof: Let letX ′ denote the suffix ofX whose first event is e. Let fp(q) = s1, s2, . . . , sn
be the forwarding path of q, and let I be the shortest suffix of X ′ containing every
event caused by e. For any finite execution or trace E let fpqb(E) denote the rele-
vant path of q after E, the interval sk+1, ..., sm of fp(q) where k = q-switch(q, E). Let
PCL(I) be the predicate that is true exactly if for each prefix I ′ of I : ¬hasCR(fpqb(I ′), q, tI′),
where tI′ is the last state of I
′. Since q is never detected as a conflict, PCL(I) must
hold. Hence, Static Conflict Locality holds on fpqb throughout I. Therefore, Lemma
3.6 still holds and every message enqueued on each switch sk ∈ fpqb(I) is eventually
sent. By Lemma 3.5, every message enqueued on a channel is eventually received. Fur-
thermore, since a is Dynamic Subscription Well-Formed, qHopi(q) is defined. Since
by assumption q is not dropped by a drop(q) event, the argument for Theorem 3.3
still applies, and every receive(q)(k−1,k),k event caused by e adds q to sk.outQueuek+1,
for 1 ≤ k < n. Therefore, there must be a receive(q ∈ Q)(b,i),b event in I 2
This is a fairly weak liveness condition, essentially saying that when no conflicts
or network problems occur, requests will complete. Any stronger guarantee must
make some assumptions about the occurrences of drop(q) failure events. Time-out
and retransmission schemes can be added for request reliability and starvation due to
11Another approach that would suffice for safety would be to let receive(q ∈ Q) drop a request
that cannot be forwarded, as a switch implementation would likely do anyway.
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repeated conflicts alleviated by giving a preference to re-issued requests, as mentioned
at the beginning of this chapter. While liveness and fairness issues can be treated
orthogonally to Atomic Transfer, it could be worth investigating whether conflict
checking and cancellation responses can contribute to efficient algorithms for tackling
these issues.
5.10 Discussion and Related Work
This section discusses the relationship between Atomic Transfer and reliable multi-
cast, and work related to reliable multicast.
5.10.1 Atomic Transfer and Reliable Multicast
Reliable multicast is a fundamental part of our approach. Requests “swim upstream”
towards the root of the multicast trees of destination hosts, and are dropped by any
conflicting responses they encounter along the way.
The choice of underlying multicast routing protocol is mostly orthogonal to Atomic
Transfer. Our multicast model is closest to the source-specific multicast or core-based
tree models [138, 139, 142], since the host of a set of names is the root of the multicast
tree for those names. Holbrook and Cheriton [139] argue that this model is simpler
to implement than multi-source models [143, 144] oriented towards group communi-
cation, since it can reuse the existing unicast (e.g. IP) routing infrastructure directly.
They argue that one-to-many multicast suffices for most applications, especially the
large-scale ones that might benefit most from it, such as Internet broadcasting and
content distribution. Our design would seem to agree with that viewpoint.
Atomic Transfer requires reliable multicast, but scalable and reliable multicast is non-
trivial and still an active area of research [145, 144, 146, 147, 84]. Methods for reliable
transmission and flow control of unicast (point-to-point) links do not easily transfer
to multicast settings, as different receivers may receive different subsets of messages
and have wildly different network latencies, bandwidth and congestion conditions.
Treating n multicast receivers as n instances of reliable point-to-point connections
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does not scale well, as the source host must track membership and reception progress
for all receivers. Also, receiver ACKs lead to congestion as they “implode” back onto
the source host. This problem can be somewhat alleviated by having receivers send
only negative acknowledgements or repair requests for messages they fail to receive,
but ultimately a protocol that relies on the source host for all retransmission repairs
for missing data cannot scale. This has prompted research on receiver-based reliable
multicast [148, 144, 147, 149, 84], where one or more nodes in the system log messages
and receivers are responsible for obtaining missing messages from such nodes. Such
protocols must consider various issues, such as minimizing the number of redundant
repair requests and responses, localizing repair message traffic to the area of network
affected by a message loss and minimizing repair latency, for example. We discuss
these aspects somewhat further in Section 7.5.3.
Atomic Transfer places an important restriction on it’s multicast protocol’s reliability
mechanism, namely that (Dynamic) Conflict Locality be preserved at all time. The
approach we take in this chapter, of severing subscriptions upon discarding responses,
may be needlessly drastic in many cases. It might also lead to liveness problems, as
sporadic drops of a few responses could force a large number of hosts to re-subscribe
to names and, in the systems of Chapters 6 and 7, re-synchronize the affected part of
their cached state.
As a part of integrating AT with a reliable multicast protocol, we plan to investigate
the separation of cancellation responses from cancellation of subscriptions, enabling
a switch to discard responses and send a “drop response” without severing subscrip-
tions. This would preserve Dynamic Conflict Locality, but give a receiver the chance
to repair its response stream by requesting the missing responses from other nodes in
the system, as in receiver-based reliable multicast system.
One might worry that sending additional messages in response to congestion could
make the problem worse. However, as noted earlier, a drop response message can be
made smaller than the combination of dropped responses it represents. For example,
during a transient overflow at a switch, the initial drop response would contain the
exact set of names from the first response dropped. As more dropped responses accrue,
their names can be merged into existing drop responses. In the prototype scheme of
Chapter 8, this happens in the normal case anyway, as a part of maintaining responses
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sets, so no new mechanism is required. In addition, drop responses can be coarsened
in that scheme by replacing groups of names with a prefix they share, shrinking
drop responses at the cost of overstating the name set affected. If the congestion is
transient, the drop response is eventually sent, but if the congestion is durable (due
to a link being a persistent bottleneck link, for example) the switch would eventually
purge some of the names from its own subscription and change the corresponding
drop responses into cancellation responses.
As mentioned earlier, our model assumes static routes, with no route changes during
execution. This assumption must be changed for practical implementation. One way
a route change can occur is when a switch decides to attach to a different parent
switch in the multicast tree. This corresponds to the entries for a set of names N
in a dynamic nHops field changing from one channel to another. A straightforward
way to do this would be for the switch to unsubscribe from one channel and then,
upon receiving its cancellation response (and forwarding it on, possibly as a drop
response), subscribe to the new channel. Clearly this preserves Conflict Locality, but
at a cost to downstream receivers. A less disruptive way would be for the switch
to first subscribe to the new channel and only unsubscribe from the old one upon
receiving the first duplicate message from the new one12, allowing a seamless route
change while preserving Conflict Locality. So while Conflict Locality restricts how
route changes may occur, the restrictions do not appear too onerous.
The last major assumption we make with respect to multicast is that subscriptions
can be made on a very fine-grained level, namely on a name-by-name basis. This
makes our models simple, but may present implementation challenges. On the other
hand, if direct name-based forwarding remains infeasible or inferior to address-based
forwarding, it is relatively simple to separate name resolution from forwarding; a
requester can pre-determine the network address(es) of the server(s)13 for a set of
names and then join the multicast tree(s) rooted at the address(es).
Handling multicast subscription issues for fine-grained names may be a thornier issue.
Although modern routers are equipped with considerable memory, keeping track of
potentially billions of subscriptions is a challenge. Any solution will likely make use
12These issues have been investigated in the context of mobile networking [150]
13Or the network address of the gateway to the host’s data center.
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of names that are at least partly hierarchically structured, such as is the case with
IP addresses and the prototype naming scheme of Chapter 8. For example, a data
name n could be structured as a pair (auth, id), where auth is the cryptographic
digest [151] of the public key [152] claiming authority over n [153]. The id part
would be a variable-length bit string with a hierarchical structure, that is: the longer
the prefix shared by two names in the auth “name space”, the shorter the expected
network distance between their hosts. Subscription processing could take advantage
of this structure, by recording subscriptions to prefixes instead of individual names
as much as possible. The auth part of n coupled with some prefix of id would suffice
to map n to its current host. Core switches might maintain relatively coarse-grained
subscriptions while switches closer to senders and receivers would retain more fine-
grained subscriptions, limiting the flow of superfluous messages onto network edge
links.
In sunmmary, several obstacles to efficient realization of name-based forwarding re-
main. Indeed the multicast subscription problem might limit initial deployment of
Atomic Networks to data centers, where name spaces and (virtual) network topologies
can be carefully controlled. On the other hand, if visions of global, virtual Metanet-
works [154, 118] come to fruition, operators of large-scale distributed applications
might configure relatively stable dedicated multicasting trees for their applications,
making some of these problems more manageable.
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Chapter 6
Dynamic Atomic Cache and State
Transfer
This chapter augments the Atomic Cache system of Chapter 4 to work with dynamic
subscriptions, based on the dynamic atomic network described in Chapter 5. In the
simplified, static system of Chapter 4, application caches initially contain server start
states. They stay synchronized by applying each subsequent server response to their
cached states. But for a dynamic application to subscribe to a server at a later point
in an execution, it must either obtain the complete sequence of server responses up
to that point or else obtain a current copy of the server’s state.
Server state is partitioned using names, as defined in Chapter 5, permitting caching
and transfer of subsets of a server’s state. This Chapter presents a straightforward
cache synchronization protocol where state is transferred directly from servers to
applications. Chapter 7 refines the algorithm to allow applications to synchronize
their caches using other application caches. That protocol is designed to ensure
liveness despite high response generation rates.
6.1 States, Names, Values, Updates and Conflicts
We refine the definition of STATESb, the state space of server b ∈ DATAS that is
completely abstract in Chapter 4. Let STATESb now be some set of finite, partial
functions from names of b to VALUES, so each state s ∈ STATESb is a function
yielding the value of each name in that state, if defined.
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We introduce operators for updating the values of names in states. Let UPDATES
be the set of state updates, each element of which is a finite partial function mapping
NAMES to VALUES ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ 6∈ VALUES. For any u ∈ UPDATES. let
names(u) denote the (finite) domain of u. We will sometimes interpret u as a set of
elements (n 7→ v), each mapping a name n to some v ∈ VALUES ∪ {⊥}.
An update is used to transform one state of a server b ∈ DATAS into another. We
define the function override operator ⊕ : STATESb × UPDATES → STATESb, for
any s ∈ STATESb, u ∈ UPDATES, n ∈ NAMESb, as follows:
• If u(n) is undefined then (s⊕ u)(n) = s(n), or is undefined if s(n) is undefined.
• If u(n) = ⊥ then (s⊕ u)(n) is undefined.
• If u(n) = v for some v ∈ VALUES, then (s⊕ u)(n) = v.
Clearly, for all s1, s2 ∈ STATESb, there exists an update u ∈ UPDATES such that
s1 ⊕ u = s2.
We define the projection operator | : UPDATES × NAMES → UPDATES, as the
operator that for any update u and name set N yields the maximal subset of u which
updates only names in N , that is: { (n 7→ v) ∈ u | n ∈ N }.
We refine the definition of depends and effects functions for requests and responses,
in a way that matches the definition of the conflicts-inv conflict function of Chapter
4. We restate the definition here below.
conflicts-inv = { (q ∈ Q, r ∈ R) | ∃s ∈ STATESb :
executeb(s, q) 6⊆ executeb(TRANSb(s, r), q) }, where b = destination(q).
We define depends(q) as the set of names whose change of value may expand the set
of possible responses to q. Intuitively, it has names whose value changes could lead
to a new response not expected by a requester given the responder’s cached state.
Formally:
Definition 6.1 depends(q) = { n ∈ NAMESb | ∃ s ∈ STATESb,
v ∈ VALUES ∪ {⊥} : executeb(s, q) 6⊆ executeb(s⊕ {(n 7→ v)}, q) }
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If executeb is deterministic then the predicate simplifies to: executeb(s, q) 6= exe-
cuteb(s⊕ {(n 7→ v)}, q).
We define effects(r) as the subset of names of server b = sender(r) that may change
as a result of r being applied. Formally:
Definition 6.2 effects(r) = { n ∈ NAMESb | ∃ s ∈ STATESb: s(n) 6= TRANSb(s, r)(n) }.
Recall assumption 5.1 of Chapter 5, that conflicting requests and responses have a
name in common, for the safety of dynamic subscriptions. Our definitions lead to
this assumption being satisfied, as shown in the following Lemma:
Lemma 6.1 (Names and Conflicts): For any q ∈ Q, r ∈ R :
conflicts-ing(q, r) ⇒ effects(r) ∩ depends(q) 6= ∅.
Proof: Let b = destination(q). If (q, r) ∈ conflicts-ing then there exists a state
s ∈ STATESb such that executeb(s, q) 6⊆ executeb(TRANSb(s, r), q). Let N denote
the set { n ∈ NAMESb | s(n) 6= s′(n) } where s′ = TRANSb(s,r), that is: the set of
names whose values differ in s and s′. By the definitions of response effect sets, N ⊆
effects(r). Since depends(q) contains by definition all names whose value change may
expand the set of possible responses, there is some n ∈ N such that n ∈ depends(q),
so n ∈ (effects(r) ∩ depends(q)) and effects(r) ∩ depends(q) 6= ∅ 2
6.2 Responses and partial states
Recall from Chapter 4 that responses are not direct carriers of new data for caches.
Rather, they carry back the result of a request’s execution, whose effect the applica-
tion recreates on its cached version of the state using the TRANSb function. TRANSb
can range from a simple write mapping that assigns constant values to names to a
complex, state-dependent computation that transforms the state in arbitrary ways.
The fact that dynamic cache application hosts may cache only a subset of a server’s
state creates a complication for this scheme. Clearly, a proper subset s′ of a state s ∈
STATESb is not the same as s, and may even be a non-member of STATESb.
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Whether this matters ultimately depends on TRANSb. A simple value overwrite
function, for example, behaves the same way regardless of its input state. But in
general, a response in the dynamic cache system effectively has a dependency set: the
set of names whose values determine the response’s effect. We could easily define a
dependency set for each response r ∈ R along the lines of:
depends(r) = { n ∈ NAMESb | ∃ s ∈ STATESb, v ∈ VALUES ∪ {⊥} :
TRANSb(s, r) 6= TRANSb(s⊕ {(n 7→ v)}, r) }
However, the design and structure of responses and their dependency sets requires
careful consideration, since an application must be subscribed to and have an up-to-
date copy of a response’s dependency set to be able to apply it. This could lead to
problems, if applications were repeatedly forced to re-synchronize their caches after
receiving a response they were unable to apply. This difficulty can be somewhat
mitigated if responses have an internal structure such that subsets of a response can
be individually applied. In fact, this section will take that approach to its limit and
require that each response is separable, meaning that it can be applied individually
to each name in its effect set. This ensures that a response can always be correctly
applied to any subset of a state’s names. While a simplification and a restriction, this
allows us to focus on the caching and state transfer protocol without worrying about
response semantics. Formally:
Definition 6.3 A response r is separable if for all s ∈ STATES, r ∈ R where b
= sender(r) and state sb ∈ STATESb and s | N = sb | N : TRANSb(sb, r) | N =
TRANSb(s, r) | N , for any N ⊆ NAMESb.
This assumption does limit the expressiveness of responses and TRANSb functions
and we plan to better investigate these issues in the future, as discussed in Section
6.9.1.
6.3 Names and Caches
Once an application a has subscribed to a set of names Na via subscription requests
and responses as described in Chapter 5, it initiates state transfer(s) from the server
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host(s) of Na. The server(s) send back the data that a needs to synchronize its cache
with their state, that is: set as the value cached for each name n ∈ Na the current
value of n on host(n). Once an application has synchronized its cache, it keeps it in
synch by applying responses to it, as before.
Here we use the term synchronized loosely, as servers generally execute requests and
send responses concurrently with state transfers. An application host must carefully
combine state transfer messages and any concurrent response messages it receives to
obtain a correct, up-to-date state. Indeed, a state transfer from a server b to an ap-
plication host a may never “complete”, in the sense of reaching a state where a.stateb
= b.state, particularly if b is generating responses rapidly. Still, host a must somehow
know when it becomes “synchronized enough” with b to safely issue requests. This is
the task of a cache synchronization protocol, to get an application host synchronized
with a name set so that it can safely issue requests depending on the names.
Recall the definition of value read requests and response messages, from Chapter 5.
We let each value message vr ∈VR correspond to an update update(vr) ∈ UPDATES,
and let V R(u) denote the unique value message vr such that update(vr) = u. Each
read request vq ∈ V Q is associated with a set of names names(vr) ⊆ NAMES, and we
let V Q(N) denote the unique read request vq such that names(vq) = N. For notational
clarity, if a value message vr is used in a context where an update is required, as for
example in the expression s ⊕ vr, then vr is taken to mean update(vr). Similarly, if
a read request vq is used in a name set context then vq is taken to mean names(vq).
For an application a to obtain the latest values for some set of names Na ⊆ NAMESb
from a server b, it must receive a set Va ⊆ V R of value messages from b that together
provide values for each name in Na. Application a can request the names explicitly
using a value request message, but we leave open the possibility for b to proactively
generate value messages. For example, it could multicast them periodically, for par-
allel synchronization of multiple application caches.
Host a can receive and apply the messages of Va in any order. Furthermore, we
will show that our state transfer protocol never delivers stale value messages, so as
soon as a has received values for each name in some set N ⊆ NAMES that a is
subscribed to, a has a consistent view of N and can issue any request q such that
depends(q) ⊆ N , even if it has yet to receive other names from Na. We note that
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some concurrency control schemes only guarantee that transactions which commit see
a consistent state. Guaranteeing that all transactions see consistent state, as in our
model, allows software developers to assume that state invariants hold, rather than
having to check them explicitly.
6.4 Direct Cache Synchronization
The cache synchronization protocol in this chapter is relatively simple, transferring
state directly from the server where it is hosted. Just after an application host a has
completed subscribing to a name set N , each name of N is marked in its cache as
being unsynched. Upon receiving a value message vr, a applies the message’s update
to its cache and marks names(vr) as being synched. Requests depending on names(vr)
may be safely issued at that point. An optimized protocol could combine subscription
requests and value requests in the same message, to establish subscriptions and initiate
state transfer within the same network round-trip. The message could “detach” at
the first switch that is subscribed to the names, such that only the value request is
forwarded onwards. We leave out this optimization, for simplicity.
The protocol requires that response messages and value messages are delivered in the
order sent, which holds in our model since all responses in R are delivered in the
order sent, if at all. We make the simplifying assumption that switches forward a
value message to all subscribers of a name in the message, irrespective of whether
that subscriber is currently in the process of synchronizing with the name or not. A
refinement of the protocol could restrict the flow of value messages to those parts of
the network where they are currently needed. Alternatively, value messages could be
unicast to their receivers. We do not explore these options here.
Also note that we do not consider liveness for state transfers in the general case,
that is: ensuring that applications eventually succeed in synchronizing their caches
despite dropped requests and responses. While these are important issues in prac-
tice, the approaches to solving them are well understood, such as re-transmission of
messages after a time-out, e.g. At any rate, strong liveness guarantees require strong
assumptions about the failures that may occur and their detection [155, 156].
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6.5 DynamicAppHosti and DynamicServerHosti
We define I/O Automata for dynamic application hosts and dynamic data server
hosts below. We then show that composing these with dynamic atomic switches and
channels results in a system where invalid requests are never executed, similar to
Theorem 4.1 for the Atomic Cache (CS) system.
DynamicAppHost uses the single field cache to store its cached state, instead of a
separate stateb field per server as in SimpleAppHost. We define the global set of
states STATES as the set of all finite, partial functions from the global name domain
NAMES to value domain VALUES. We define the projection operator | : STATES ×
NAMES→ STATES, as the operator that for any global state s ∈ STATES and name
set N ⊆ NAMES yields the restriction of the state to the names, that is: {(n 7→ v)
∈ s | n ∈ N}.
We emphasize again that while STATES can represent any valid state of any server,
not every state in STATES corresponds to a valid state for every server. The projec-
tion sab = a.cache | NAMESb of the cached state at an application a to the names
of a server b is generally not an actual state of b: only the subset of sab corresponding
to the synched names of a is guaranteed to be equal to the same subset in a (recent)
state of b, as we will show. But by the definition of depends, this suffices to correctly
execute any request whose dependency set is synched, since other names do not affect
the request’s execution. Furthermore, if a has an up-to-date version of some subset
N of the effects(r) name set of a response r from b, response separability ensures that
the effects of r on names N in the cache of a will be the same as the effect of r on
names N in b.state in the state where b created r.
DynamicAppHosta
A refinement of SimpleAppHosta that dynamically adds or drops names from its
subscription set during execution.
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We overload operator ⊕ to STATES × STATESb → STATES, to yield for any global
state s and server state sb the state s updated with sb, that is: (s⊕ sb)(n) = sb(n) if
n ∈ NAMESb or s(n) otherwise.
State:
cache: the application’s cached state, an element of STATES, initially the empty map.
outQueue: queue of outbound messages, initially empty.
inNames: A total function NAMES → SUBSTATUS storing the name statuses that
a caches for i.outNames, where i is the home switch of a.
Initially unsub for all n ∈ NAMES.
synched: the subset of names of inSub (see below) that is synched at a, initially ∅.
Derived State:
inSub / inPend = { n ∈ NAMES | inNames(n) = sub / inNames(n) = pend }.
Input actions:
receive(r ∈ R \ SR \ V R)c,a
Effect:
cache′ = cache ⊕ TRANSb(cache, r), where b = sender(r)
outQueue′ = outQueue · ack(r)
receive(vr ∈ V R)c,a
Effect:
cache′ = cache ⊕ (vr | (synched ′ \ synched))
synched ′ = synched ∪ (names(vr) ∩ inSub)
receive(sr ∈ SR)c,a
Effect:
outQueue′ = outQueue · ack(sr)
∀ n ∈ NAMES: inNames′(n) =
inNames(n), if n 6∈ names(sr),
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sub, if n ∈ sub(sr),
pend, if n ∈ pend(sr),
unsub, if n ∈ unsub(sr).
synched ′ = synched \ unsub(sr)
Internal actions:
createRequest(q ∈ Q)a
Precondition:
∃ r ∈ R : (cache | NAMESb, q, r) ∈ executeb,
where b = destination(q) and depends(q) ⊆ synched
Effect:
outQueue′ = outQueue · q
subscribe(N ⊆ NAMES)a
Precondition:
N ∩ (inSub ∪ inPend) = ∅
Effect:
outQueue′ = outQueue · SQ(N, ∅)
unsubscribe(N ⊆ NAMES)a
Precondition:
N ⊆ (inSub ∪ inPend)
Effect:
outQueue′ = outQueue · SQ(∅, N)
Output actions:
send(m ∈M)c,a
Precondition:
head(outQueue) = m
Effect:
outQueue′ = tail(outQueue)
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The receive(r ∈ R \ SR \ V R)c,a action receives a request response and updates the
cached values of names affected by the response, using the appropriate server’s state
transition function. It also enqueues back an ACK for the response. The action is
essentially the same as in SimpleAppHost. Note that we could technically add the
names updated to synched here, but that is incompatible with the scalable refinement
developed in Chapter 7. Also note that for simplicity we model the cache as storing
synched as well as old, unsynched values. An implementation, however, might or
might not store old unsynched values, depending on whether it has uses for them or
not.
The receive(vr ∈ V R)c,a action processes a value message by applying its update to
the cache. It also notes that the message’s names are now synched. More specifically,
it notes exactly those names it is subscribed to, to preserve the synched ⊆ sub invari-
ant. The fact that the action ignores any non-subscribed names in value messages
is important for correctness. Note that the action only updates the values of names
that were not synched before.
The receive(sr ∈ SR)c,a action receives a notification of changes to the application’s
subscription, either due to an earlier subscription request it sent itself or due to
subscription changes initiated in the network. Note that the action adds and/or
removes names from inSub in this action, not the subscribe/unsubscribe actions. The
action enqueues back and ACK for the message. It also removes any unsubscribed
names from synched, to maintain the synched ⊆ inSub invariant.
The createRequest(q ∈ Q)c,a action is very similar to the synonymous action in Sim-
pleAppHost, non-deterministically issuing a new request. The crucial difference is the
additional precondition that a request only be issued if its dependency set is synched.
The subscribe(N ⊆ NAMES)a action non-deterministically decides to subscribe to
some set of names, issuing a subscription request to the home switch. As mentioned
here above, no names are added to inSub by this action.
Similarly, the unsubscribe(N ⊆ NAMES)a action non-deterministically decides to
unsubscribe to some set of names, issuing a subscription cancellation request to the
home switch. It does not remove the names from its subscription set immediately, as
the subscription request may yet dropped due to a conflicting subscription response.
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This is consistent with treating inNames as an application-cached version of the home
switch’s outNames set and simplifies reasoning about Conflict Locality.
The send(m ∈M)c,a action moves a pending message to the outbound channel.
DynamicDataServerHostb
A refinement of SimpleServerHost that sends value messages, proactively or in re-
sponse to value read requests.
We define the operator ∆ : STATES × NAMES → UPDATES, to yield for any
global state s and name set N the update u such that for any global state t: (t⊕u) | N
= s | N . The operator can also be characterized as follows:
s ∆ N = { (n 7→ v) ∈ s | n ∈ N } ∪ { (n 7→ ⊥) | n ∈ N \ names(s) }.
Additional State:
pending: a subset of NAMESb containing names whose values have been requested
but not yet served, initially ∅.
Additional Input actions:
receive(vq ∈ V Q)c,b
Effect:
pending ′ = pending ∪ names(vq)
Additional Internal actions:
value(N ⊆ NAMESb)b
Precondition:
N ⊆ pending and N 6= ∅
Effect:
outQueue ′ = outQueue · V R(b.state ∆ N)
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pending ′ = pending \ N
broadcast(N ⊆ NAMESb)b
Effect:
pending ′ = pending ∪ N
The receive(sq ∈ SQ)c,b action notes that a set of names has been requested, in its
pending set. There is no need to conflict-check the request, since depends(vq) = ∅,
by definition of value requests.
The value(N ⊆ NAMESb)b action non-deterministically decides to send a value
message for some requested subset of its names. It removes that set of names from
the pending set.
The broadcast(N ⊆ NAMESb)b non-deterministically adds names to the set of names
pending for a value message. This actions models the fact that a server is free to send
value messages without a value read request prompting it to do so.
6.6 Properties and Proofs
Let DCS be the I/O Automaton composed of an DynamicSwitchi automaton for each
switch si ∈ NODES, a DynamicAppHosta automaton for each application host a ∈
APPS, a DynamicDataServerHostb automaton for each data server host b ∈ DATAS
and a Channelc automaton for each channel c = (i, j) ∈ CHANNELS.
The event ordering relation <E and causes relation→E for an execution or execution
trace E are the same as before, with the addition to →E of each send(vr ∈ V R)c,i
event caused by a receive(vr ∈ V R)d,i event, where c and d are channels incident to
a switch i ∈ SWITCHES .
We begin with a simple invariant regarding the local state of DynamicAppHosta.
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Lemma 6.2 (Synchronized Implies Subscribed): In any state of DynamicAppHosta
: a.synched ⊆ a.inSub.
Proof: Both fields are empty in the start state. Inspecting the actions of DynamicAppHosta,
we readily see that all changes to a.synched and a.inSub preserve the invariant 2
It is easily shown that Lemma 5.3 of Chapter 5 holds even if node i is in APPS instead
of SWITCHES, since the only role i plays in the proofs of these Lemmas is to enqueue
an acknowledgement for a received subscription response, and DynamicAppHost ac-
knowledges a subscription the exact same way. Hence, we can use the Lemma when
proving the following Lemma, which effectively shows Name Conflict Locality for an
application and its home switch.
Lemma 6.3 (Application Name Conflict Locality): For each state t of each X ∈
execs(DCS) and host a ∈ APPS : n ∈ a.inSub ⇒ subscribeda(n, t).
Proof: Fix anyX ∈ execs(DCS) and a ∈ HOSTS communicating via channel c = (a,
i) with its home switch i ∈ SWITCHES . We proceed by induction on the prefixes of
X. As our base case, the invariant trivially holds in the start state of X since a.inSub
is empty. We claim that each action e extending a prefix X ′ into another prefix X ′′
of X preserves the invariant, because:
1. If e = receive(sr ∈ SR)c,a then e removes names unsub(sr) from a.inSub, pre-
serving the invariant, but it may also add a set N = sub(sr) to a.inSub. But
by Lemma 5.3, subscribeda(n, t) holds for each n ∈ N after e, preserving the
invariant.
2. If e = receive(sq ∈ SQ)c,i then e may add names from sub(sq) to j.outSubc,
preserving the invariant, but may also remove names N = unsub(sq) from
j.outSubc. But then e also adds a cancellation response cr with unsub(cr) = N
to j.responsesc, so the invariant is preserved.
3. If e = purge(N ⊆ NAMES)c,i then e may remove a set of names M = N ∩
nHopi(c) from i.outSubc. But then e also adds cancellation response SR(∅, M)
to i.responsesc and subscribeda(n, t) holds, preserving the invariant.
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4. There are no other events in DynamicAppHosta or DynamicSwitchi that affect
a.inSub or i.outSubc, respectively.
Since all possible extensions of X′ preserve the invariant it holds in X, completing
the induction 2
We prove lemmas regarding the order in which response and value messages from a
data server b are delivered to a host a, somewhat corresponding to Lemmas 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3 in Chapter 4. Unlike the static CS system, an application a in DCS may
receive only a subset of the update messages sent by a server b, due to dynamically
varying subscriptions and non-deterministic purging of subscriptions and dropping of
update messages by dynamic switches. Furthermore, dynamic switches may insert
any number of cancellation responses into the sequence of responses from b before it
reaches a.
We observe, though, that DynamicSwitch never changes the order of any responses
(including value messages and subscription responses) in any of its outQueues. We
show that if a switch i does receive a pair of responses sent by some other switch j,
then i forwards them in the same order as j.
Lemma 6.4 (Dynamic switch response order): For each E ∈ traces(DCS), any pair
i, j ∈ SWITCHES (including i = j) and any pair of responses m1, m2 ∈ R forwarded
along path F = i, s2, s3, ..., j: receive(m1)j,c <E receive(m2)j,c ∧ receive(m1)j,c →E
send(m1)i,d ∧ receive(m2)j,c →E send(m2)i,d ⇒E send(m1)i,d <E send(m2)i,d, with c
and d some channels incident to j and i, respectively.
Proof: Let m1,m2 ∈ R be a pair of responses received on a switch j in that order,
where their reception causes their sending on a switch i.
We proceed by induction on path F. For the base case of a single switch j = i, let d be
the channel on which j enqueues the messages. Since receive(m1)j,c <E receive(m2)j,c,
m1 is ahead of m2 in j.outQueued immediately after event receive(m2)j,c. Inspecting
the actions of DynamicSwitchj, we see that none of them can move m2 in front of
m1 on j.outQueued; they only append and / or remove messages from j.outQueued.
118
Since send(m ∈M)i,d sends and removes only messages from the head of j.outQueued,
send(m1)j,d <E send(m2)j,d.
For the inductive step let F ′ =sk, sk+1, ..., j be the sequence containing the last k+1
switches of F , where k is less than the length of F. By our inductive hypothesis,
send(m1)k+1,d <E send(m2)k+1,d, with d some channel incident to sk+1. By channel
FIFO, receive(m1)k,c <E receive(m2)k,c. Repeating the argument of the base case for
sk, we get send(m1)k,d′ <E send(m2)k,d′ , with d
′ = (k−1, k), completing the induction
2
The responses received by applications inDCS do not have the simple correspondence
with the responses sent by servers as they do in Chapter 4. Still, we show that during
the interval where an application has a name n in its synched set, the sequence of
values it caches for n is an interval of the sequence of values assigned to n at host(n).
We refine our definitions of response event and message sequences to talk about the
subsequences pertaining to particular names as follows:
Definition 6.4 For any execution or trace E, i ∈ NODES and N ⊆ NAMES let
respSndSeqi(E,N) (respRcvSeqi(E,N)) denote the maximal subsequence of trace(E)
or E, respectively, consisting of send(r ∈ R\SR\V R)c,i (receive(r ∈ R\SR\V R)c,i)
events such that N ∩ names(r) 6= ∅, where c denotes some channel in CHANNELSi,
possibly different in different events.
Let snd-seq-riN(E) = messagesOf(respSndSeqi(E,N)), the sequence of response mes-
sages sent from node i that contain a name in N . Let rcv-seq-riN(E) =
messagesOf(respRcvSeqi(E,N)), the sequence of response messages received at i that
contain a name in N . For any name n ∈ NAMES we take snd-seq-rin(E) (rcv-seq-
rin(E)) to denote snd-seq-ri{n}(E) (rcv-seq-ri{n}(E)).
We also introduce some notation to help us talk about the execution interval during
which a node is subscribed to a name, and the corresponding interval during which
another node is transmitting responses containing that name.
Definition 6.5 For any state t of any X ∈ execs(DCS), any node j ∈ NODES and
any name n ∈ NAMES with nHopj(n) = some channel d, let sub-interval(j,n,t) be
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undefined if ¬subscribedj,d(n, t), or else let it be the longest interval of X beginning
immediately after the latest event er = receive(sr ∈ SR)d,j event before t in X such
that n ∈ sub(sr) and for every state t′ ∈ sub-interval(j,n,t) : subscribedj,d(n, t′). We
call such an interval a subscription interval of j for n.
For any node i ∈ (fpjb ∪ {b}) where b = host(n), let pub-interval(i,j,n,t) be the
longest interval of X that begins immediately after an event es = send(sr)c,i such
that es causes the event er = receive(sr ∈ SR)d,j defining a subscription interval sub-
interval(j,n,t) and for each state s′ ∈ pub-interval(i,j,n,t) : n ∈ i.outSubc ∨ i = b,
where channel c is incident to i. We call such an interval a publishing interval of i
for n.
Figure 6.1 gives an example of a subscription interval and a corresponding publishing
interval. We observe that if a sub-interval(j,n,t) is defined then there exist for each
switch i ∈ fpjb exactly one corresponding pub-interval(i,j,n,t). By Lemma 3.2 chan-
nels do not spontaneously create new messages, so the event er = receive(sr) must be
caused by a particular chain of send(sr) events. We present a simple lemma saying
that subscription intervals exist for every name in a node’s inSub set.
Lemma 6.5 (inSub and subscription intervals) For any state t of any X ∈ execs(DCS),
any node j ∈ NODES and any name n ∈ j.inSubd for a channel d incident to j (or
j.inSub, if j ∈ HOSTS) in state t : sub-interval(j,n,t) exists.
Proof: Inspecting DynamicSwitch and DynamicAppHost we see that n is only added
to j.inSub(d) by an event er = receive(sr ∈ SR)d,j action with n ∈ sub(sr), so er is
an event before t that defines an interval sub-interval(j,n,t) 2
The next Lemma says that once a node (application host or switch) receives the
subscription confirmation message for a name, the sequence of responses it receives for
that name is a prefix of the sequence of responses sent by each node on the forwarding
path to the server hosting that name, for as long as the receiving node stays subscribed
to the name. It corresponds to Lemma 4.3 but only applies to a particular name and
only during its subscription intervals. Figure 6.1 gives an illustration of the main
entities involved in the Lemma. It shows abcd as an example of the rcv-seq-rjn(Ij)
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for a subscription interval Ij, which is a prefix of snd-seq-rin(Ii) = abcdefg... of the
corresponding publication interval Ii at i. The dashed arrows shows an example of
where intervals Ij and Ii might end, due to a cancellation response sent by i.
v
cd (w-1,w)
j iw
rcv-seq-rjn(Ij) = 
abcd
snd-seq-rn(Ii) = 
abcdefg…
ej = receive(sr)d,j
sr
ei = send(sr)c,i
subscribed(j,d)(n, t)
X
j
i
rk
Ij
Ii
(w,w+1)
Figure 6.1: The publish/subscribe Intervals of Lemma 6.6
Lemma 6.6 (Dynamic message order): For any X ∈ execs(DCS), j ∈ NODES, b
∈ DATAS and n ∈ NAMESb with nHopj(n) = some channel d, let Ij be any sub-
interval(j,n,t) for some state t ∈ X starting with an event ej = receive(sr ∈ SR)d,j
and let Ii be any corresponding pub-interval(i,j,n,t) for some i ∈ (fpjb ∪ {b}). Then
rcv-seq-rjn(Ij) ¹ snd-seq-rin(Ii).
Proof: If rcv-seq-rjn(Ij) is empty then the theorem holds vacuously. Otherwise, by
Lemma 6.4 and channel FIFO, every pair of messages from sndSeqc,i(X,i,R) that is
received by j is received in the order sent by i. Hence, rcv-seq-rjn(X) is a subsequence
of snd-seq-rin(X). Since Ii starts with the ei = send(sr)c,i event that causes the ej =
receive(sr ∈ SR)d,j event marking the beginning of Ij, and since by Lemma 6.4 and
channel FIFO all messages in R sent by i are received by j in the order sent, we have
that rcv-seq-rjn(Ij) is a subsequence of snd-seq-rin(Ii). To show that rcv-seq-rjn(Ij)
¹ snd-seq-rin(Ii) holds, it suffices to show that all the messages of snd-seq-rin(Ii) are
received, and none are dropped.
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Assume for contradiction that the k-th response rk of snd-seq-rin(Ii) is dropped.
Hence, the k-th response in rcv-seq-rjn(Ij) is not the k-th response from snd-seq-rin(Ii)
but rather the h-th response rh from snd-seq-rin(Ii), for some h > k. We show that
in this case, j receives a cancellation response containing n during Ij, contradicting
the fact that subscribed(j,d)(n, t) holds in each state t of Ij.
There are only two ways that rk can fail to be forwarded to j: if rk is received at a
switch where the channel leading to j is not subscribed to rk or if rk is purged at some
switch. Let s1, s2, ..., sm be the switches comprising the forwarding path fpji from
j to i, so s1 = sj and sm = si. We observe that the since sr was received at j, the
switches of fpji must all be subscribed to n at some point in Ii, that is: for 1 ≤ l ≤
m, n ∈ sl.outSub(l−1,l) immediately after each receive(sr)(l,l+1),l that causes the ej =
receive(sr)d,j event marking the beginning of Ij, since n ∈ names(sr). Furthermore,
since by Lemma 6.4, receive(sr)(l,l+1),l <X receive(r)(l,l+1),l for any r ∈ rcv-seq-rjn(Ij)
and 1 ≤ l ≤ m, rk is not dropped due to arriving at a switch before the subscription
for n is established at that switch; it must be because the subscription to n was
established and then removed again before rk was received. Finally, we observe that
at any switch l on the path that receives rk in Ii, receive(rk)d,j <X receive(rh)d,j, by
Lemma 6.4. Let us consider first the case when rk fails to be forwarded and then the
case when rk is purged.
1. In the first case, let sv be the switch on fpij such that v.outSub(v,v−1) ∩ names(rk)
= ∅ at event evr = receive(rk)(v+1,v),v, because n is removed from the subscription
of one or more switches on fpji before evr. Let sw be the first switch on fpji
to remove n from w.outSub(w−1,w) after its receive(sr)(w,w+1),w event, so w ≤
v. The event ewcr removing n is one of receive(sr ∈ CR)(w,w+1),w with n ∈
unsub(sr), purge(N ⊆ NAMES)(w−1,w),w with n ∈ N or receive(sq ∈ SQ)g,w
with n ∈ unsub(sq). In each case, ewcr enqueues a cancellation response cr ∈
SR on outQueue(w−1,w), where n ∈ names(cr). Since receive(rk)(v−1,v),v <E
receive(rh)(v−1,v),v and since w ≤ v and ewcr <X evr, by Lemma 6.4, receive(cr)d,j
<E receive(rh)d,j.
2. In the latter case, rk is dropped by an event ev = purge(N ⊆ NAMES)(v−1,v),v
event at some switch v on fpji. If n 6∈ v.outNamesv−1,v at ev then n is removed
by some earlier event at v or some other switch w < v (since ev is the first and
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only event that drops rk). By the argument for the first case, the earliest event
ewcr dropping n from an outSub field on fpji enqueues a cancellation response
cr ∈ SR where n ∈ names(cr), and since w ≤ v and ewcr <X ev, by Lemma 6.4,
receive(cr)d,j <E receive(rh)d,j. On the other hand, if n ∈ v.outSub(v−1,v) at ev
then ep enqueues a cancellation response message cr ∈ SR on outQueue(v−1,v),
where n ∈ names(cr). Since ev drops a contiguous sequence of responses from
the tail of v.outQueue(v−1,v) which does not include rh, rh is received and added
to s.outQueue(v−1,v) after ev. Hence, cr is ahead of rh on s.outQueue(v−1,v) so
once again by Lemma 6.4, receive(cr)d,j <E receive(rh)d,j.
Our assumption that rk is dropped implies that a receives cr ahead of rh. This means
that both receive events occur in interval Ij. But then j removes n from j.inSubd (or
j.inSub, if j ∈ HOSTS) in Ij and we have ¬subscribed(j,i)(n, t) in the state t following
receive(cr)j,d, which contradicts the fact that for every state t ∈ Ij : subscribed(j,d)(n,
t). Hence, response rk cannot have been dropped and rcv-seq-rjn(Ij) ¹ snd-seq-rin(Ii)
2
In static system CS there is a direct correspondence between server states and the
sequence of responses received by a subscribing application. In the dynamic system,
the correspondence is more complex because applications subscribe to a subset of a
server’s responses and their subsets may vary during executions. This added com-
plexity is reflected in our proofs. As a preliminary, we extend lemma 6.6 to talk about
the correspondence between the states of a server and the sequence of responses re-
ceived by an application following a subscription confirmation message. We begin by
defining the response sequence of a server with respect to a particular name.
Definition 6.6 For any execution or trace E and n ∈ NAMES, let resp-seq-rn(E)
denote the maximal subsequence of resp-seq-rb(E) such that for each response r in the
sequence: names(r) ∩ N 6= ∅, where b = host(n).
Lemma 6.7 (dynamic state change and response order): For any X ∈ execs(DCS),
a ∈ APPS, b ∈ DATAS and n ∈ NAMESb, let Ia be any sub-interval(a,n,t) for some
state t ∈ X and let Ib be the corresponding pub-interval(a, b, n, t). Then rcv-seq-
ran(Ia) ¹ resp-seq-rn(Ib).
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Proof: For each response r ∈ resp-seq-rb(Ib), in order from first to last, b sets its
b.state field to b.state′ = TRANSb(b.state, r) while simultaneously enqueueing r on
b.outQueue. Since names(r) by definition contains every name whose value may be
different in states b.state and b.state′, if b.state(n) 6= b.state′(n) then n ∈ names(r). By
the FIFO property of b.outQueue and the definition of snd-seq-rbn(Ib), snd-seq-rbn(Ib)
¹ resp-seq-rn(Ib). By Lemma 6.6, rcv-seq-ran(Ia) ¹ snd-seq-rbn(Ib), so rcv-seq-ran(Ia)
¹ snd-seq-rbn(Ib) ¹ resp-seq-rn(Ib) 2
We can now show that the sequence of values assigned to the names in a cache mirrors
the sequence of values assigned to the names on the original server. We show that
the projection of a cache on its synched names equals the same projection on a recent
or current state of the server.
Lemma 6.8 (dynamic cache synchronization): For any state ta of any X ∈ execs(DCS),
a ∈ APPS, b ∈ DATAS, let synchedb = a.synched ∩ NAMESb in ta and let tb be the
state in X immediately after the eb event enqueueing the latest response from b that
has been received by a. Then a.cache | synchedb in state ta = b.state | synchedb in
state tb.
Proof: We proceed by induction on the prefixes of X. As our base case, the invariant
trivially holds in the start state of X since a.synched is initially empty. We claim that
each action e extending a prefix X ′ into another prefix of X preserves the invariant.
As a preliminary, since a.synched ⊆ a.inSub then by Lemma 6.5 there exists for the
final state ta of X
′ and each n ∈ a.synched at ta a suffix Ian = sub-interval(a,n,ta) of
X ′ where for each such Ian, by Lemma 6.7, rcv-seq-ran(Ian) ¹ resp-seq-rn(Ibn), where
Ibn = pub-interval(a, b, n, ta). In other words, a is receiving every response affecting
any name in a.synched, in the order of the corresponding state changes.
Let eb be the event that enqueues the latest response message sent from b that has
been received by a at ta. By the inductive assumption, in the final state ta of X
′, sab
= a.cache | synchedb equals sb = b.state | synchedb in the state tb after eb.
1. If e = receive(sr ∈ SR)d,a then emay remove set N = unsub(sr) from a.synched,
which preserves the invariant.
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2. If e = receive(vr ∈ V R)d,a then e may add a set N = (a.synched′ \ a.synched)
∩ a.inSub of names to a.synched. Let ev be the value(N ⊆ NAMESb)b event
of DynamicDataServerHostb that enqueues vr. Since a.synched
′ = (a.synched
∪ N) ⊆ a.inSub, a receives all responses r such that names(r) ∩ a.synched′
6= ∅, and by Lemma 6.4, it receives them in the order sent by b. Therefore, b
cannot have sent a response r′ affecting N between eb and ev. Since ev does not
modify b.state, b.state | synchedb at ev = sb. Since e updates set N of names
in a.cache with values from vr, we have that s′ab = a.cache | a.synched′ in the
state t′a following e equals sb in the state t
′
b following ev. Since eb is still the
event enqueueing the latest response message from b that has been received by
a in t′a and sb = s
′
ab, the invariant holds after e.
3. If e = receive(r ∈ R\SR\V R)d,a then e updates a.cache with TRANSb(a.cache,
r). If names(r) ∩ synchedb = ∅ then e has no effect on a.cache | synchedb.
Otherwise, let e′b be the receive(q ∈ Q)c,b event of DynamicDataServerHostb that
enqueues r. By our preliminary reasoning here above, a receives the response for
each state change affecting names in synchedb in the order of the state changes.
Therefore, e′b is the first event following eb that modifies b.state | synchedb and
b.state | synchedb at e′b= sb. By our inductive assumption, sab = sb. Since
response r is separable, TRANSb(sb,r) | synchedb = TRANSb(sab, r) | synchedb
= s′b | synchedb, that is: both e′b = receive(q ∈ Q)c,b and e = receive(r ∈
R \ SR \ V R)c,a compute the same values for the names in synchedb. Since e′b
sets b.state to s′b and e overrides a.cache | synchedb with s′b | synchedb, we have
that a.cache | synchedb in the state t′a following e = b.state | synchedb in the
state t′b following e
′
b. Since e
′
b is the event enqueuing the latest response message
from b that has been received by a in t′a, the invariant holds after e.
4. No other events affect the invariant 2
Before we can prove the main Theorem, we must show the following:
Lemma 6.9 DynamicAppHosti preserves ACK Well-Formedness.
Proof: Immediate, since the only action in DynamicAppHosti that enqueues ack(r)
is receive(r)c,i2
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Lemma 6.10 DynamicDataServerHosti preserves Responder Well-Formedness.
Proof: Since DynamicDataServerHosti is identical to SimpleDataServerHosti except
for the additional value(U ⊆ NAMES)b action, the proof of Lemma 4.4 from Chapter
4 applies 2
We can now show that if a dynamic server executes a request q then the response is
among those possible given the dynamic application’s cached state at the time the
application issued q. Our proof is quite similar to the one in Chapter 4 for Theorem
4.1, showing that if this were not the case, then the intervening creation of a response
that altered the state of the server would have caused a response that conflicts with
q, and q would have been dropped.
Theorem 6.1 Dynamic Cache Operation Atomicity: For any execution X ∈ execs(DCS),
application a ∈ HOSTS, server b ∈ DATAS and channels d and c incident to a and
b, respectively: send(q ∈ Q)d,a →X send(rq ∈ R)c,b ⇒ rq ∈ executeb(sa, q), where sa
= a.cache | depends(q) at the createRequest event eq that enqueues q.
Proof: Assume for contradiction that there exists some execution X ∈ execs(DCS)
and server b ∈ DATAS where send(q)d,a →X send(rq ∈ R)c,b but rq 6∈ executeb(sa, q).
By inspecting the createRequest action, we see that depends(q) ⊆ a.synched at eq,
so by Lemma 6.8, b.state | depends(q) = sa at some earlier point in X, before the
receive(q)c,b event that executes q. Therefore, there must be an event er at b preceding
receive(q)c,b that assigns to b.state a value sb such that rq 6∈ executeb(sb, q). If we let r
be the response enqueued by er, then conflicts-inv(q, r), by the definition of conflicts-
inv. Since a.cache | depends(q) = sa at the createRequest(q)a event issuing request
q, we have createRequest(q)a <X receive(r)d,a and therefore by FIFO send(q)d,a <X
send(ack(r))d,a. This gives us er <X receive(q)c,b ∧ send(q)d,a <X send(ack(r))d,a.
Since by Lemma 6.9 a is ACK Well-Formed and by Lemma 6.10 b is Responder Well-
Formed, then by Theorem 5.2 we have send(q)d,a 6→X send(rq)c,b, a contradiction
2
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6.7 Liveness
We show that DynamicAppHosta preserves Dynamic Subscription Well-Formedness,
as in definition 5.6. Hence, liveness theorem 5.3 applies to DynamicAppHosta.
Lemma 6.11 (DynamicAppHost Preserves Well-Formedness): In any X ∈ execs(DCS),
DynamicAppHosta preserves Dynamic Subscription Well-Formedness for a.
Proof: Fix any event e = receive(q ∈ Q)c,i in any X ∈ execs(DAS), where i is the
home switch of a and c = (a, i). We must show that subscribeda(n, t) holds for each
n ∈ depends(q) in the state t preceding e. Inspecting DynamicAppHosta, we see that
e is caused by an earlier event send(q ∈ Q)c,a, in turn due to an earlier event e′ =
createRequest(q ∈ Q)a that enqueues q. The precondition of createRequest requires
that depends(q) ⊆ synched, so by Lemma 6.2, depends(q) ⊆ inSub in the state t′ at
e′. By Lemma 6.3, therefore, subscribeda(n, t′) holds for each n ∈ depends(q), that
is: n ∈ i.outSubc or ∃ cr ∈ i.responsesc ∩ SR : n ∈ names(cr).
1. In the case where n ∈ i.outSubc in t′, if also n ∈ i.outSubc in t then sub-
scribedc(n, t) holds. On the other hand, if n 6∈ i.outSubc in t then name n is
removed from i.outSubc by some intervening event en, where e
′ <X en <X e.
Event en must be one of receive(sr ∈ SR)d,i with n ∈ unsub(cr) and d ∈
CHANNELSi, purge(N ⊆ NAMES)c,i with n ∈ N or receive(sq ∈ SQ)c,i with
n ∈ unsub(sq). In each case, en adds a cancellation response crn to i.outSubc,
where n ∈ effects(crn). By FIFO, the earliest receive(ack(crn))c,i event occurs
after e, so crn ∈ i.outSubc at e and subscribedc(n, t) holds.
2. In the case where ∃ cr ∈ i.responsesc ∩ CR : n ∈ names(cr) at t′, then a has
not yet received and ACKed cr at e′, since that would imply n 6∈ a.inSub at
e′. Since an ACK for cr is sent after e′ by FIFO the earliest receive(ack(cr))c,i
event occurs after e, so cr ∈ i.outSubc at e and subscribedc(n, t) holds 2
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6.8 Optimizations
Since applications can receive their value messages in an arbitrary order, it is pos-
sible for a and/or b to prioritize the order of value messages, as to minimize the
synchronization delay of the most important requests or to refresh the values that
are most highly visible to end-users first, for example. Application a could hint at
the desired order when it requests the values and/or the server could use application-
specific knowledge to govern the order in which is sends values. This is orthogonal
to the state transfer protocol, though, and we do not explore the issue further here.
We note that these kinds of optimization also work with the scalable cache protocol
presented in Chapter 7.
Another orthogonal optimization would be to enable host a to receive values for only
those names in some set Na ⊆ NAMES whose values may have changed since a last
subscribed to Na. In other words, the host could receive a (non-conflict checked) delta
update that transforms its cache from that old state t′ to some more recent state t.
The host would then receive normal value update messages to complete the move
from t to the current state. To sketch an example, server b could periodically tag
its current state as a checkpoint state and simultaneously send a checkpoint marker
message to its subscribers, who would tag their current cached states with the marker.
Upon later re-subscribing, an application could send its latest marker with its value
request, and receive delta and value messages only for state that has changed since
the marker was created. The main requirement for any such algorithm is that it
satisfy the consistency guarantees of Lemma 6.8.
6.9 Discussion and Related Work
This section discuss issues related to the abstraction level of responses as well as
related work in optimistic concurrency control.
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6.9.1 Responses and Abstraction Levels
As discussed in section 6.2, we make the simplifying assumption that each response
r ∈ R is separable, so it can be individually applied to each name in its effects
set. Many operations that are useful for increasing concurrency, such as incre-
ment/decrement operations, are not affected by this restriction. However, it rules
out responses that depend on one name to compute the effects on another name,
such as assigning to one name the average of the values of a set of names. More gen-
erally it rules out some high-level course-granularity responses, such as executing the
action associated with a certain menu item on a user interface, since it may depend
on the values of arbitrarily many names.
The attraction of supporting such responses is that they permit low-bandwidth caching
of application state during periods of low contention. During the time a user is ex-
clusively editing a particular part of a CAD model or text document, for example, it
suffices to send high-level operation request such as “combine the currently selected
objects into one” or “cut the currently selected paragraph”. Rather than create a
response containing a large set of fine-grained operations on a large set of names, the
server could send back a response that is very similar to the request, i.e. “combine
set N of objects” or “cut paragraph X”.
The problem with high-level responses, as mentioned before, is that subscribers cannot
apply them unless they are synched with all the names they depend on. Furthermore,
large-granularity operations imply large-granularity conflicts, at worst requiring total
ordering of all operations in a system.
One approach we would like to investigate in the future is to structure a response
as a tree, corresponding to its refinement from a top-level response into the sub-
responses generated at successively lower levels of abstraction. For example, a “move
text” operation might refine to a pair of “delete text” and “insert text” operations
and ultimately to “rewrite the following disk blocks”. This concept aligns nicely with
nested [62] or multi-level transactions [157], where transactions are modeled as trees of
nested sub-transactions. It would provide flexibility in trading bandwidth and server
processor cycles off with subscription set sizes and conflict granularities. Some appli-
cation would maintain a coarse-granularity subscription to a relatively large subset
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of data but receive only a low-bandwidth stream of high-level responses (the roots of
response trees, for example). Other applications would maintain more specific, finer-
granularity subscriptions to parts of that same data but receive higher-bandwidth
streams of the lower levels of response trees, for example the leaves consisting of only
separable responses. As an example of the two extremes, an end-user application
might be cached at the end-user access device and replicated in whole by sending
as requests and receiving as responses the low-bandwidth stream of high-level mouse
and keyboard gestures input to it. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the device
could receive high-bandwidth bitmap images of the application’s user interface.
6.9.2 Caching and Optimistic Concurrency Control
Our AT-based Cache Consistency algorithm (AT-Cache, for short) is a form of Op-
timistic Concurrency Control [15], since application hosts first execute transactions
in a local data space and then attempt to validate the execution at the server. Pes-
simistic methods such as locking [1], by contrast, detect conflicts between transactions
as they execute and block (delay) later transactions until earlier transactions have
completed. A key difference between these methods is that locking limits host uti-
lization by blocking transactions while optimism limits it by wasting resources on
transactions that are later aborted and restarted.
The usual performance metric for transactional information system is sustained through-
put of transactions per second. Transaction response time is often a concern as well.
Generalized comparison of concurrency control methods is difficult, as their perfor-
mance depends substantially on multiple factors [158, 159], including:
1. The level of concurrency / multiprogramming.
2. The level of data contention, defined as the ratio of transactions that conflict
or the number of conflicting accesses to any particular datum.
3. The amount of computing and I/O (e.g. disk) resources consumed by transac-
tions and degree of resource contention.
4. The ratio between read-only and read/write transactions and operations.
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5. Network bandwidth and latency.
6. Transaction access patterns and cache hit rates .
In centralized settings, simulations and analysis suggest that optimism outperforms
locking in environments that are not significantly resource-constrained and where data
contention is moderate to low [158, 160]. When conflicts are rare, optimism needs to
restart few transactions. When resources are plentiful, the multiprogramming level
can be kept higher than with blocking, even as restarted transactions waste resources.
However, the same studies indicate locking performs better with hight contention in
centralized settings. While OCC has been a research topic for more than 25 years,
it has seen limited use in commercial database systems, which use locking almost
exclusively.
However, optimism may be particularly well suited to client/server transactional cache
systems [16]. Interest in such systems has coincided with the ascendancy of powerful
workstations and commodity PCs over minicomputer and mainframes, and the subse-
quent proliferation of data centers, comprising tens or hundreds of thousands of hosts.
An important reasons why client caching suits optimism is that aborted transactions
affect a server much less than in the centralized case, where a server must maintain
undo logs and actively roll back the changes of aborted transactions. In the case of
client caching, an aborted transaction will only have changed the client’s cached data
and the client handles the undoing of those changes.
6.9.3 Adaptive Optimistic Concurrency Control (AOCC)
The most relevant work to AT-Cache are the OCC algorithms developed for the
Thor distributed object database system [67, 14]. The initial algorithm was shown to
outperform the best lock-based method for the same environment, Adaptive Callback
Locking (ACBL) [161], with low to moderate contention. A later refinement, Adaptive
Optimistic Concurrency Control (AOCC) [162], outperforms ACBL for most work-
loads. Another OCC algorithm designed for a similar client-caching environment also
outperforms locking under a variety of workloads [134].
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AOCC keeps track of recently committed transactions and validates incoming trans-
actions against them. This is much faster than validating transactions directly against
the data they depend on (or data versions numbers) since that might entail fetching
the data from disk14. Simplifying a bit, for each data object x, an AOCC server
tracks all clients that cache a copy of it. When x is modified, the server adds x to
the invalid set for each client that caches x. As a part of validating a transaction
tc from a client c, AOCC checks that no object read by tc is in the invalid set of c.
When transactions commit, AOCC sends invalidation messages to clients to notify
them about updates to objects. It removes objects from invalid sets upon receiving
invalidation acknowledgements from clients.
AT-Cache, by comparison, offloads the responsibility for validating requests to the
network, by asking switches to conflict-check responses. In effect, rather than having
the server remember invalid sets for each application host on an end-to-end basis, the
network paths remember the sets as they forward them to their receivers, and take
care of processing acknowledgements on a hop-by-hop basis.
Let n be the number of requestes/clients actively using a data server. The main
differences between AOCC an AT-Cache can be quantified as follows:
1. An AOCC server must maintain n invalid-sets, one per client. An AT-Cache
server does not maintain invalid-sets, or rather: maintains exactly one, for its
home server. Furthermore, an AOCC server must retain invalid-set information
until it receives an end-to-end ACK from the corresponding client, while an
AT-server only retains it until it gets a next-hop ACK from its home switch.
2. An AOCC server must send on the order of n invalidation messages for each
request it executes15 and process on the order of n ACKs sent back by clients.
An AT-Cache server sends a single response message that is multicast to all
subscribers.
3. An AOCC server must maintain “subscription” information for n clients, to
track which objects each client is caching. It must also process O(n) subscrip-
tion changes, as clients add and remove objects from their cache. In Atomic
14This was a major cause for poor performance in some earlier OCC-based systems, as validation
was serialized under a global lock.
15The precise number depends on the number of clients subscribing to modified objects.
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Networks, by contrast, subscription processing can be distributed throughout
the network.
4. An AOCC server must send O(n) data object messages, as clients fetch objects
into their cache. By comparison, Chapter 7 of this dissertation shows how
Atomic Transfer can be used to distributed such reads across multiple caching
hosts, limiting the load on the original server.
5. An AOCC server must receive and process all conflicting requests sent to it, and
send a conflict notification message for each one. An AT-Cache server receives
only a fraction of the conflicting requests sent to it (see Section 3.7.1) and does
not need to send any conflict notifications.
This leads us to believe that AT-Cache scales better than AOCC and could outper-
form AOCC, especially during periods of heavy data contention. Some of the good
properties of AT-Cache stem from the use of multicast, more than Atomic Transfer
per se. Indeed, the scalability of AOCC might be improved by multicasting invalida-
tion and conflict notifcation messages, instead of sending them individually. Still, an
AOCC server would need to receive and process individual ACKs.
AT-Cache should preserve throughput during periods of high contention better than
AOCC. Let n be defined as before. Let mx be the average number of requests sent
to a server per second during some period of time that are successfully executed. Let
mc be the average number of requests sent to the server per second during that same
period that have a conflict and cannot be executed. The AOCC server must receive
and process mx +mc messages during that period and send O(n ·mx) invalidations
and mc conflict notifications. By comparison, the AT-Cache server receives on the
order of mx messages, since only a fraction of the mc conflicting requests are received
(see Section 3.7.1), and sends O(mx) responses. If message processing (receiving,
detecting concurrency conflicts, sending and possibly and authenticating, decrypting
and encrypting) comprises a significant part of a server’s effort, then the utilization
of an AOCC server may be limited to mx/(mx + mc), the fraction of requests that
are non-conflicting. By comparison, an AT-Cache server should be able to maintain
nearly full utilization, regardless of contention levels.
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Chapter 7
Scalable Cache Synchronization
The subscription protocol of Chapter 5 is scalable, since additional switches allow
a system to handle a greater number of application hosts. On the other hand, the
cache synchronization protocol of Chapter 6 does not scale, since the server of a
name n must handle the value read requests of all applications synchronizing with
n. To alleviate this bottleneck, this Chapter develops an algorithm that enables
applications to synchronize their caches using the caches of other application hosts.
This allows growth in synchronization traffic to be met with additional host resources.
The caching is transparent to applications, including applications serving as caches to
other applications; they do not distinguish between value messages from application
caches and original servers, in general. Caches and cache hierarchies use conflict
detection on switches to synchronize state transfers and concurrent response messages,
preserving atomicity.
7.1 Cacher Hosts and Cacher-Aware Switches
The protocol works roughly as follows. An application c subscribing to some set Nc
of names on a server b may offer its services as a cacher host (cacher) for Nc. Host
c notifies the switches on the forwarding path from itself to b about its intention to
serve as a cacher, by sending protocol messages or piggybacking data on subscription
requests, for example (we leave that detail unspecified in our model). A cacher-aware
switch i notes for each channel d ∈ CHANNELS i the cacher subset of its subscription
on d, that is: the subset of names forwarded on d for which one more hosts have
declared themselves as cachers.
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As illustrated in Figure 7.1, whenever switch i receives a read request vq for a set
of names that falls in the cacher subset of some channel d ∈ CHANNELSi, it may
choose to divert the request away from its destination server and onto d. The request
is converted into a diverted value request dvq, tagged as being diverted by i so that
other switches continue the diversion, forwarding it (non-deterministically) until it
arrives at some cacher host. The cacher host responds by sending back one or more
diverted value message(s) dvr to satisfy the read request. The cacher host tags its
diverted value messages with index i and switches forward them towards the home
server(s) of the names they contain, instead of towards subscribers like normal value
messages16. When switch i receives a value message with diversion tag i on it, it
removes the tag and forwards the value message towards subscribers as a normal
value message vr, same as if vr had just arrived from the original server.
bia
c
vq
dvq
dvr
vr
Cacher
Application Server
Figure 7.1: Diversion of value read request to a Cacher Host
The protocol outlined can both serve to increase the number of applications that
can be handled by a particular data server and/or to directly reduce application
synchronization delay, as applications can (transparently) peruse multiple caches in
parallel. We note that an application host can serve as a cacher alongside its primary
duties as an application host, improving system utilization.
16That is to say: they forward them like requests.
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7.2 Protocol Race Condition and Solution
The protocol sketched in the prior Section has a race condition, which occurs when the
server b = host(n) of a name n sends a response r updating n at the same time some
cacher c ∈ APPS is sending a value message vr containing an older value for n. While
c is by definition subscribed to n and will eventually receive response r, r may reach
the diverting switch si connecting b and c before vr does. Response r hence overtakes
vr at si, and a subscribing application a that is in the process of synchronizing with
n will receive r ahead of vr. Since n will not yet be be synchronized at a when it
receives r, a will ignore r and miss its effects, but install the stale value from vr as
the current cached value of n.
We prevent this race condition using Atomic Transfer, by defining a diverted value
message as conflicting with any response whose effect overlaps the message’s name
set. Dropping conflicting diverted value messages would ensure that any value mes-
sage reaching an application would be guaranteed to be fresh and up to date, since it
encountered no conflicting response along the way. However, this straightforward ap-
proach could lead to livelock, with caches repeatedly sending out new value messages
that conflict with the latest responses affecting some frequently updated name(s) and
are consequently dropped.
Instead of dropping a conflicting value message, therefore, we make the switch detect-
ing the conflict freshen the diverted message, by appending the conflicting response
to a list of responses contained in the value message. An application host a receiving
a value message vr applies the response list of vr immediately after applying vr′s up-
date (but atomically with the application of vr), resulting in correct synchronization
of the names.
As it happens, switches do not actually need to add conflicting responses to a value
message’s list. We observe that an application a only sends a value request for names
it is subscribed to, so a will generally have received the responses on the list already.
In our approach we let a buffer all responses affecting a name n from the time it sends
a value request for n until the time it has synchronized n. Then it suffices to include
in value messages a list of the identifiers of any conflicting responses, which a uses to
look up the corresponding responses in its own stored sequence of recently received
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responses. These identifiers could be implemented as message sequence numbers or,
alternatively, as digests of the corresponding responses. In either case, the identifiers
would be smaller than the response messages themselves, preserving bandwidth.
We can in fact reduce the size of the response identifier list in messages to unity, by
noting that an application a receives its responses in the same order as they would
appear on a identifier list. It therefore suffices to include the identifier of the first
conflicting response rf in the list, when the list is non-empty. Application a can then
infer the rest of the list by storing and checking each response in the sequence of
responses received after rf but before vr for conflicts with vr. This means additional
work for a but simpler processing in the network, since only a fixed-size message field
needs to be updated.
This does require that responses be unique, so that a particular response is sent
at most once in any execution. Otherwise the first conflicting response might not
unambiguously correspond to a list of conflicting responses. This assumption is likely
to hold in practice, as implementations of transactional systems usually include a
sequence number with requests to ensure exactly-once execution semantics and to
match responses to requests in the presence of failures and partitions17.
Since subscriptions may be added and removed at any time, a must take care that
it always infers a complete list of responses for a value message, with no responses
missing. For example, if a’s subscription to a set of names C is canceled after a
requests a set of names N ⊇ C (due to a purge on some switch, for example) but a
re-establishes the subscription in time to receive the value message(s) for C, then a
may have missed one or more responses affecting C during the subscription outage
and could infer an erroneous response list from value messages updating names in
C. To prevent this, subscription response are included in stored response message
sequences, enabling applications to detect any invalid lists.
17Systems where this assumption does not hold can use the version of the protocol based on lists
of message identifiers instead.
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7.3 CacherAppHosta and CacherAwareSwitchi
We refine the dynamic application and switch I/O Automata of Chapter 6 to become
the CacherAppHost and CacheAwareSwitch I/O Automata, respectively.
To model the freshening of value messages, let set V R now comprise, for any update
u ∈ UPDATES and any rf ∈ R a unique element vr = V R(u, rf ) of V R, such that
function update: V R → UPDATES maps vr to u and function first-resp: V R →
(R ∪ {⊥}) maps vr to rf . We let V R(u) now denote V R(u, ⊥), the value message
for u with an empty response list, so first-resp yields ⊥ for the message. An imple-
mentation would include a response identifier or digest in value messages instead of
actual response messages, but that detail is unimportant for our models.
We define the sets DVQ, DV R ⊆ Q of diverted value read request messages and
diverted value messages, respectively, disjoint with other message subtypes of Q. Note
that the latter really are defined as requests, not responses, since they are conflict-
checked against responses much like requests. Requests in DVQ do not conflict with
any response; in fact they travel in the same direction as responses. Diverted value
messages, however, conflict with all responses that they have a name in common with,
including subscription responses. Formally:
Definition 7.1 For all dvr ∈ DV R, r ∈ R: names(dvr) ∩ names(r) 6= ∅ ⇒ conflicts-
inv(dvr, r) .
Function diverted(v, j) maps any pair of a read request or value message v and switch
j ∈ SWITCHES to the message dv in DV R or DVQ, respectively, such that functions
message: DV R→ V R and message: DVQ→ V Q map dv to d and functions divert-
switch: DV R→ SWITCHES and divert-switch: DVQ→ SWITCHES, respectively,
map dv to j. Also, for any dv ∈ DV R ∪ DVQ let names(dv) = names(message(dv)).
CacherAppHosta
A refinement of DynamicAppHost that serves value messages from its cache on behalf
of the servers (or lower-level cacher hosts) hosting the corresponding state. Infers the
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list of responses that overtake a value message at a diverting switch from a stored
sequence of responses in the synchResp field. It stores responses that conflict with
names for which the application awaits value messages, which is sufficient. The list
is inferred by computing the subsequence of stored responses that affects the value
message’s name set, starting at the first-conflicting response from the value message,
if present in the response sequence. We capture this logic in the resp-list function as
follows:
Definition 7.2 Let R∗ denote the set of sequences over R. For any ρ ∈ R∗ and any
rf ∈ (R ∪ {⊥}), let resp-list(ρ, rf ) denote:
• λ if rf = ⊥, or else:
• ⊥ if rf 6∈ ρ, or else:
• the suffix of ρ that begins with rf .
CacherAppHosta also adds any subscription response messages received to its response
sequence. A value message vr with a first-conflicting response rf can only be used if
a is storing rf and has been continuously subscribed to each name in names(vr) since
receiving rf , so there are no subscription response messages following rf in synchResp
that affect a name in vr. Formally:
Definition 7.3 For any ρ ∈ R∗, N ⊆ NAMES and rf ∈ R ∪ {⊥}, let predicate
usable-list(ρ, N, rf ) be satisfied exactly if rf = ⊥ or else if rf ∈ ρ ∧ 6 ∃sr ∈ resp-
list(ρ, rf ) : (sr ∈ SR ∧ sub(sr) ∩ N 6= ∅).
Additional State:
requesteds: set of names being requested after a diversion by switch s, initially ∅.
awaiting: set of names awaiting a value response message, initially ∅.
synchResp: sequence of responses overlapping with awaiting, initially λ.
Modified Input actions:
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receive(q ∈ Q \ SQ \ V Q \DVQ \DV R)c,a
replaces receive(q ∈ Q \ SQ \ V Q)c,a, but behaves identically to it.
receive(r ∈ R \ SR \ V R)c,a
Effect:
cache′ = cache ⊕ TRANSb (cache, r), where b = sender(r)
outQueue′ = outQueue · ack(r)
// if this response affects a name we’re waiting for
if names(r) ∩ awaiting 6= ∅
// add to synch response sequence
synchResp′ = synchResp · r
receive(vr ∈ V R)c,a
Effect:
// set Nvr contains the names now becoming synched
let N = names(vr), Nvr = (N ∩ awaiting) \ synched, rf = first-resp(vr) in
// if we can safely infer the responses list
if usable-list(synchResp, Nvr, rf ) then
// these are synched now
synched′ = synched ∪ Nvr
// no longer awaiting these
awaiting′ =awaiting \ N
let svr = TRANSb(cache ⊕ vr, resp-list(synchResp | Nvr, rf )) in
// apply changes to Nvr only
cache′ = cache ⊕ (svr | Nvr)
// remove is the set of responses not containing any names that we’re waiting for
let remove = { r ∈ synchResp \ SR : names(r) ∩ awaiting′ = ∅ } in
let removed-resp = synchResp \ remove in
synchResp′ = longest suffix of removed-resp beginning with a response r /∈ SR
receive(sr ∈ SR)c,a
Effect:
outQueue′ = outQueue · ack(sr)
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∀n ∈ NAMES: inNames′(n) =
inNames(n), if n 6∈ names(sr),
sub, if n ∈ sub(sr),
pend, if n ∈ pend(sr),
unsub, if n ∈ unsub(sr).
synched′ = synched \ unsub(sr)
//awaiting ⊆ inSub
awaiting′ = awaiting \ unsub(sr)
//requesteds ⊆ synched
for each s ∈ SWITCHES
requested′s = requesteds \ unsub(sr)
// remember names we’re becoming subscribed to, for usable-list testing
if sub(sr) 6= ∅
synchResp′ = synchResp · sr
Additional Input actions:
receive(dvq ∈ DVQ)c,a
Effect:
// note that we should send value messages for the names
let s = divert-switch(dvq) in
requested ′s = requesteds ∪ (names(dvq) ∩ synched)
Additional Internal actions:
request(U ⊆ NAMES)a
Precondition:
// request subscribed names we′re not already requesting
U ⊆ inSub \ synched \ awaiting
Effect:
// send a value request message
outQueue′ = outQueue · V Q(U)
// note that we’re waiting for value messages
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awaiting ′ = awaiting ∪ U
resend(vq ∈ V Q)a
Precondition:
names(vq) ⊆ awaiting
Effect:
// retransmit a value request
outQueue′ = outQueue · vq
value(U ⊆ NAMES)a
Precondition:
U ⊆ requesteds, for some s ∈ SWITCHES, and U 6= ∅
Effect:
// send a diverted value message, using values from our cache
outQueue′ = outQueue · diverted(V R(a.cache ∆ U), s)
// this set of names is done
requesteds
′ = requesteds \ U
The receive(r ∈ R\SR\V R\DV R)c,a action is identical to the one in DynamicAppHosta,
except that if the response affects a name that the application is requesting, the re-
sponse is appended to the synchResp sequence.
The receive(vr ∈ V R)c,a action applies a value message to the application’s cache, the
same as in DynamicAppHosta, except it now applies the (possibly empty) sequence
of responses listed in a value message after applying the value message’s update. If
the response list cannot be used, the value message is ignored. This can happen, for
example, if the application is receiving a value message it did not request or if it has
recently lost and re-established a subscription to some of the message’s names. In any
case, the action removes the message names from the awaiting set. It also garbage
collects from synchResp responses that do not affect any names the application is
waiting for. It removes subscription responses only if no request response precedes
them, that is: it removes the prefix of the sequence that consists only of subscription
responses. They can be garbage collected because they will never be needed for a
usable-list test.
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The receive(sr ∈ SR)c,a action is the same as in DynamicAppHost except it also
removes unsubscribed names from all requesteds sets, to maintain the invariant that
requesteds ⊆ synched, which ensure that the application never transmits stale value
messages. It also removes unsubscribed names from awaiting to maintain the awaiting
⊆ inSub invariant.
The receive(dvq ∈ DVQ)c,a action receives a diverted read request. It simply notes
the set of names requested, that is: the subset of the requested names it has synched.
The value action will gradually send out value messages for that set until each name
has been handled by a value message. Atomically enqueuing the response(s) here is
impractical for requests for large name sets, and is not needed for correctness.
The request(U ⊆ NAMES)a action non-deterministically sends a value request mes-
sage for some non-synched subset of its subscription, to get these names synched.
It adds the set of names requested to the awaiting set. The presence of a name in
awaiting results in each response or cancellation response affecting that name being
added to the synchResp response sequence.
The resend(vq ∈ V Q)a action non-deterministically sends a value request message for
some set of names for which the switch is waiting to receive value messages. This
action captures the time-out and retransmission mechanism an application implemen-
tation would use to overcome loss of value request messages.
The value(vr ∈ V R)a action non-deterministically chooses some subset of the names
that have been requested by diverted read requests. It sends back a diverted value
message for the subset, while removing it from the set of pending requested names.
CacheAwareSwitchi
A refinement of DynamicSwitch that can divert read requests off the path to their
server(s) and onto the path towards a cacher host or hosts. Since we leave out the
details of how cachers are added or removed from consideration, there are no actions
that modify cachersc fields. We simply assume that the fields correctly identify names
cached by cacher hosts, throughout any execution.
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When forwarding a diverted value message, CacheAwareSwitch sets the first-resp of
the message to the first conflicting response buffered on the switch or else leaves it
unchanged, if the message already has a first-resp or if the switch is not buffering a
conflicting response. We capture this formally as follows, recalling that R∗ denotes
the set of all sequences over R:
Definition 7.4 Let first-resp-for be the function: V R×R∗ → (R ∪ {⊥}) such that:
• first-resp-for(vr, ρ) = first-resp(vr) if first-resp(vr) 6= ⊥ ∨ ρ = λ, or else:
• first-resp-for(vr, r · ρ) = r
Additional State:
for each c ∈ CHANNELSi:
cachersc: the subset of outNamesc that one or more cachers serve
Modified Input Actions:
receive(q ∈ Q \ SQ \ V Q \DVQ \DV R)c,i
replaces receive(q ∈ Q \ SQ \ V Q)c,i, but behaves identically to it.
receive(vq ∈ V Q)c,i
Effect:
// may divert some names of vq but forwards others normally
let d1, d2, ..., dn represent some ordering of CHANNELSi in
let { N0, Nd1 , ...,Ndn} represent a partitioning of names(vq)
such that for each di ∈ [1, n] : Ndi ⊆ cachersdi ∩ outSubdi , in
for each dk ∈ {d1, d2, ..., dn } where Ndk 6= ∅
// forward as diverted by i
outQueue ′dk = outQueuedk · diverted(V Q(Ndk),i)
for each d ∈ CHANNELS i such that N0 ∩ nHopi(d) 6= ∅
// forward rest normally, non-diverted
outQueue ′d = outQueued · V Q(N0) ∩ nHopi(d)
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Additional Input Actions:
receive(dvq ∈ DVQ)c,i
Effect:
// forward the names of dvq to arbitrary caches for the names
let d1, d2, ..., dn represent some ordering of CHANNELSi in
let { N0, Nd1 , ...,Ndn} represent a partitioning of names(dvq)
such that for each di ∈ [1, n] : Ndi ⊆ cachesdi ∩ outSubdi , in
for each dk ∈ {d1, d2, ..., dn } where Ndk 6= ∅
// forward with original switch tag
outQueue ′dk = outQueuedk · diverted(V Q(Ndk), divert-switch(dvq))
receive(dvr ∈ DV R)c,i
Effect:
// forward diverted value messages back towards diverting switch
let vr = message(dvr) in
// if the value messages doesn’t conflict with a cancellation response
if 6 ∃sr ∈ responsesc ∩ SR where conflicts-inv(q, sr)
// ρc has all conflicting responses, in received order
let ρc be the sequence of elements of { r ∈ responsesc | conflicts(vr, r) }
in the order they were added to outQueuec in
// vrρ is new value message with first-resp updated
let vrρ = V R(update(vr), first-resp-for(vr, ρc)) in
// if this switch diverted the request
if divert-switch(dvr) = i
// forward it as a normal value message
for each d such that names(vrρ) ∩ outSubd 6= ∅
outQueue′d = outQueued · vrρ
else
// forward as still diverted
let d be the channel such that names(vrρ) ⊆ nHopi(d) in
outQueue′d = outQueued · diverted(vrρ, divert-switch(vrρ))
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The receive(vq ∈ V Q)c,i receives a read request message and forwards different
parts of it to the appropriate server(s) and / or cacher host(s). The action’s non-
determinism stems from the way the action partitions the names of the request, with
the only constraint that the set of names diverted onto a channel must be a non-empty
subset of the cacher-subset of that channel’s subscription. Note that a request’s name
is only diverted to a cacher for that name if the corresponding channel is subscribed
to the name, otherwise the name is not synched at any cacher reachable through
that channel. Partition N0 represents the part of the request that is not diverted.
As a practical matter, given a choice of cachers, an implementation might perform
static or dynamic load balancing to efficiently distributed the effort of serving read
requests. Also, an implementation might forward messages unchanged to all relevant
destinations, rather than incur the processing cost of splitting up messages. Our
model shows the name sets that must be forwarded at a minimum.
The receive(dvq ∈ DVQ)c,i action receives a diverted read request, that is: a request
already diverted by another switch. It forwards it the same way as receive(vq ∈ V Q)c,i
does when diverting original read requests.
The receive(dvr ∈ DV R)c,i action receives a diverted value message. If the message
is in response to a request diverted by this switch, then the action converts it to an
ordinary value message and forwards it as if it had been received directly from the
original server. If not, the message is still traveling back towards its diverting switch
so it is forwarded essentially as if it were a request. Note that the switch never has
to split the message in the latter case, since all its names are bound for the same
diverting switch.
The key to the correctness of the scalable caching scheme is that the action also
conflict-checks the value messages against the responses buffered in responsesc. Rather
than dropping a conflicting value message, it tags the message with the first (earliest)
conflicting response, if it doesn’t have such a tag already. The receive(vr ∈ V R)c,i
action in CacherAppHost uses this information to infer the list of all responses that
the value message encountered on its way to its diverting switch, which as our proofs
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will show, is the same as the list of responses that overtook the value message at the
diverting switch.
The action drops the diverted value message if it conflicts with a subscription re-
sponse. Since the subscription to a name in dvr has been changed (the name has
been canceled, most likely) dvr may miss a conflict with a response and the responses
list inferred for it by its receiver may no longer correspond to the responses overtaking
it at the diverting switch.
7.4 Properties and Proofs
Let SDCS be the I/O automaton composed of a CacheAwareSwitchi automaton for
each switch si ∈ NODES, a CacherAppHosta automaton for each application host a ∈
APPS, a DynamicDataServerHostb automaton for each data server host b ∈ DATAS
and a Channelc automaton for each channel c = (i, j) ∈ CHANNELS.
We show that execution correctness Theorem 6.1 for Dynamic Atomic Cache Systems
still holds in SDCS even though applications may synchronize their caches using other
caches. Lemmas 6.1 through 6.7 and lemmas 6.9 and 6.10 of Chapter 6 are easily
shown to still hold in SDCS. Lemma 6.8 applies in SDCS only to value messages
sent directly by original servers. We will show that it also holds for messages sent by
cachers, and thus that Theorem 6.1 still holds.
Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3 hold in SDCS because CacherAwareSwitchi and CacherAppHosta
handle subscriptions, synchronization and request/response processing exactly the
same as DynamicSwitchi and DynamicAppHosta, respectively. CacherAppHost has
slightly different receive(vr ∈ V R)c,i and receive(sr ∈ SR)c,i actions, but their behav-
ior with respect to inSub and synched sets is the same. Lemma 6.4 concerns response
order along a particular path between two switches and still holds, since the be-
havior of CacherAwareSwitchi for responses is the same as that of DynamicSwitchi.
Lemma 6.5 concerns subscription and publishing intervals and holds for the same
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reason. Similarly, Lemmas 6.6 and 6.7 concern response messages and still hold for
CacherAwareSwitchi.
Lemma 6.8 holds if all value messages received are sent by original servers and
have not been diverted. CacherAwareSwitchi behaves the same as DynamicSwitchi
for those read requests it doesn’t divert and CacherAppHosta behaves the same
as DynamicAppHosta for non-diverted value response messages, since they have an
empty responses list. However, Lemma 6.8 does not hold for value messages sent by
cacher hosts, as message diversion can disrupt the consistent total order that exists
between value messages and responses sent from the same original server. What we
show is that when a value message vr from a cacher is received at a host, prepending
vr’s list of conflicting responses to the sequence of responses received after vr yields
a consistent state. Lemma 7.2 shows that Lemma 6.9 holds for CacherAppHosts, and
we observe that Lemma 6.10 still holds as it only concerns DynamicDataServerHost.
We extend the →E causes relation, with each send(dvr′ ∈ DV R)d,j event caused by
a receive(dvr ∈ DV R)c,j event, where d and c are channels incident to a switch j ∈
SWITCHES. Also, add to→E each send(vr ∈ V R)d,j event caused by a receive(dvr ∈
DV R)c,j event, i.e. when a switch j receives back a diverted value message sent in
response to a value request that j diverted or forwarded onto channel c.
As mentioned before, we do not model how cachers add themselves to the cachersc
fields of switches, but we will assume that a cacher’s value request is never diverted
back to the cacher. This should be straightforward to ensure in practice, for example
if a cacher never register itself as a cacher for a name until after it is synched with
that name. But we begin with two quick lemmas.
Lemma 7.1 (Requested implies Synched): In any state of CacherAppHosta : a.requesteds
⊆ a.synched, for each s ∈ SWITCHES.
Proof: Both fields are empty in the start state. Inspecting the actions of CacherAppHosta,
we readily see that all changes to a.requested fields and a.synched preserve the invari-
ant 2
Lemma 7.2 (CacherAppHosti preserves ACK Well-Formedness).
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Proof: Immediate, since the only action in CacherAppHosti that enqueues ack(r) is
receive(r)c,i 2
We now show a key lemma, saying that at the point when a diverted value message
dvr is received at its diverting switch i, the application of dvr and its response list
produces the state for names(dvr) that existed on the original server b immediately
after b enqueued the latest response affecting names(dvr) that has been received at
i. Hence, dvr can be safely “inserted” into the sequence of messages bound for a
subscriber a, since the state it produces will match up seamlessly with any later
responses from b.
This Lemma holds only if the cacher host generating dvr receives its value messages
directly from original server hosts. We later extend our results to multi-level caches,
so a cacher host can receive value messages from another cacher, as well as from
original servers.
We make the assumption that a cacher has exactly one network path connecting it
to any particular switch diverting value read requests to it. This assumption can be
relaxed, since (value) responses may be forwarded on multiple paths while preserving
Conflict Locality, but the assumption simplifies our proofs. However, the proofs are
somewhat complicated by the fact that a host may cache state from multiple servers,
and the name sets of value requests and responses may span multiple server
Figure 7.2 illustrates the main entities of Lemma 7.3, and shows an example of the
correspondence between response prefixes at servers. Server b has sent out a sequence
of response messages ending with abcdef (so each letter is one response). Diverting
switch i and cacher c have received prefixes of that response sequence, i.e. ending
with abcd and ab, respectively.
We introduce a new operator for sequences of responses, that filters out those re-
sponses that do not affect a particular name set.
Definition 7.5 For any sequence of responses ρ ∈ R∗ and N ⊆ NAMES, let ρ / N
denote the maximal subsequence of ρ such that for every r ∈ ρ / N : names(r)∩N 6= ∅.
We break out a part of the lemma’s premise into a separate predicate.
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Figure 7.2: Value message diversion, and naming for Lemma 7.3
Definition 7.6 For any execution X ∈ execs(SDCS), cacher host c ∈ APPS and
server b ∈ DATAS, let cache-cond(c,b,X) be true exactly if cacher c only receives
value messages from V R containing a name from NAMESb directly from b in X.
Lemma 7.3 (Freshness of diverted value messages base case): Let X be any execu-
tion fragment of SDCS with final event eidv = receive(dvr ∈ DV R)y,i at a switch i
= divert-switch(dvr) caused by a send(dvr)x,c event at a cacher host c ∈ APPS, with
y ∈ CHANNELSi and x incident to c. Let vr = message(dvr). Let N = names(vr)
and let Nb = N ∩ NAMESb, for a server b ∈ DATAS where Nb 6= ∅. Let responsesdvr
= resp-list(rcv-seq-riNb(X), first-resp(vr)). Let sb be the value of b.state immediately
after the er event enqueuing the response r leading to the send(r)w,b event causing
the latest event eir = receive(r ∈ R)z,i in X, for channels w incident to b and
z ∈ CHANNELSi, or let sb = startb if X has no such event. Then for any s ∈
STATES and d ∈ CHANNELSi, eidv →E send(vr ∈ V R)d,i ∧ cache-cond(c, b,X)
⇒ TRANSb(s ⊕ vr, responsesdvr) | Nb = sb | Nb.
Proof: Let eidv be an event fulfilling the lemma’s premise where eidv →E send(vr ∈
V R)d,i. Let ec be the value(N ⊆ NAMES)c event at cacher host c that enqueues the
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dvr message leading to the send(dvr)x,c event causing eidv. From the precondition
of the value(N ⊆ NAMES)c action we see that Nb ⊆ N ⊆ c.synched at ec, since
c.requestedi ⊆ c.synched by Lemma 7.1. Let sc be the value of c.cache at ec, so (s ⊕
vr) | Nb = sc | Nb for any s ∈ STATES.
Since cache-cond(c,b,X), we have by Lemma 6.8 of Chapter 6 that sc | Nb = b.state
| Nb in the earlier state tb of X immediately after the eb event enqueuing the latest
response from b that has been received by c.
Let fpci be the prefix s1, s2, ..., sn of the forwarding path from c to b, up to and
including switch si, so si = sn. By our assumption, each response forwarded from
i to c is forwarded via fpci, as well as each diverted value message sent from c to i.
Since N ⊆ c.synched at ec and dvr is not dropped due to a conflict with a cancellation
response, no response conflicting with dvr is purged on the relevant part of path fpci
(ahead of dvr on fpci) during the interval when dvr travels along fpci to i. Inspecting
the case in receive(dvr ∈ DV R)c,j action at each j ∈ fpci, where dvr is not dropped,
we see that j detects each conflict between dvr and a response in responsesc exactly
like the receive(q ∈ Q\SQ\V Q\DVQ\DV R)c,j action does for requests (recall that
DV R ⊆ Q). The crucial difference is that while j may alter dvr due to a conflict, dvr
is not dropped. By the reasoning in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2, each response r received
at i in X that conflicts with q for which c has yet to send an ACK is detected as a
conflict with dvr. In particular, the first response rf detected as conflicting with dvr,
if there is such a rf , is the first response updating any n ∈ N that is received after
ec at c, since c applies every prior response r to c.cache while enqueueing an ACK,
placing the ack(r) ahead of dvr in c.outQueue.
In the example of Figure 7.2, rf = c and c has received responses ...ab while i has
received responses ...abcd. Hence, cached state sc is the same as b.state immediately
after server b enqueues response b.
If there is a first-conflicting response rf , it is received at switch i before it is received
at c. Let Xrf denote the suffix of X beginning with the receive(rf )i,z event at i and
let rcv-seq-fpic denote rcv-seq-riNb(Xrf ), that is: each response affecting Nb that has
been received at i in X but has not been received by c at ec. If there is no such rf ,
then c has received every response in rcv-seq-riN(X) at ec and we define rcv-seq-fpic
to be the empty sequence λ. Observe that immediately after eidv, dvr has conflicted
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with every response in rcv-seq-fpic. Furthermore, since dvr is not dropped, there are
no cancellation responses in rcv-seq-fpic affecting N . Hence, Nb ⊆ N ⊆ i.inSubz at
eidv and for each n ∈ Nb, sub-interval(i, n, tX) = Iin exists by Lemma 6.5 and contains
Xrf , where tX is the final state of X. Therefore, by Lemma 6.6 rcv-seq-rin(Iin) ¹ snd-
seq-rbn(Ibn), where Ibn = pub-interval(b, i, n, tX). This establishes that i has received
a continuous sequence of responses from b, that is: rcv-seq-fpic ¹ snd-seq-rbNb(INb),
where INb is any suffix of X that includes Ibn for each n ∈ Nb.
We claim that rcv-seq-fpci = responsesdvr, that is: the response list computed for dvr
at edvi is precisely the sequence of conflicting responses that have been received at i
immediately after eidv but have not been received by c at ec, as c enqueues dvr. In the
case where dvr does not have any conflicts, by definition rcv-seq-fpci = λ. Then, since
dvr never conflicts, first-resp(vr) = ⊥, so resp-list(ρ, first-resp(vr)) = responsesdvr =
λ, for any response sequence ρ. On the other hand, if dvr does have conflicts then
the first one is detected in an event ej = receive(dvr ∈ DV R)(j−1,j),j on some switch
sj ∈ fpci, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Since first-resp(vr) = ⊥ at ej, event ej (via first-resp-for)
assigns response rf as the first-resp of the modified diverted value message forwarded,
where rf is the earliest received response among those in j.responses(j−1,j) that conflict
with dvr. If dvr (or more precisely: a message caused by dvr) is detected as a conflict
at a switch sk where j < k ≤ n, the corresponding receive(dvr ∈ DV R)c,k event
does not change first-resp(vr), by the definition of first-resp-for. At eidv, therefore,
first-resp(vr) is the first response from rcv-seq-riN(X) that has not been received
by c at ec, which is rf . Hence responsesdvr and rcv-seq-fpic are both the maximal
subsequences of the suffix of rcv-seq-riN(X) starting with rf consisting of responses
that affect names in Nb, and it follows that rcv-seq-fpic = responsesdvr.
We’ve established that responsesdvr = rcv-seq-fpci ¹ snd-seq-rbNb(INb). In the example
of Figure 7.2, responsesdvr is the sequence cd of responses enqueued by i but not yet
received at c, and sb is the state immediately after response d was enqueued, since
that’s the latest response r of b received at i. If responsesdvr = λ (so there is no
first-conflicting response rf ) then sb | Nb = c.cache| Nb = sc | Nb, and for any s ∈
STATES, TRANSb(s ⊕ vr, λ) | Nb = sb | Nb and the theorem holds. If responsesdvr
is not empty, observe that receive event eir = receive(r)z,i is the event providing the
last message r of responsesdvr. Also, the first message rf of responsesdvr is the first
response affecting a name in Nb after ec, when c enqueues dvr. Since we’ve shown
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hat responsesdvr is a (contiguous) prefix of snd-seq-rbNb(INb), responsesdvr is precisely
the sequence rf , r2, r3,..., r of responses that transforms sc | Nb = c.cache | Nb at ec
to sb | Nb, the value of b.state | Nb immediately after r was enqueued. In conclusion,
in the case where responsesdvr 6= λ, TRANSb(s ⊕ vr, responsesdvr) | Nb = sb | Nb, for
any s ∈ STATES 2
We now show that if the a.synchResp sequence of CacherAppHosta is usable with re-
spect to a name set Nb and a first-conflict response rf , then it contains a (contiguous)
sequence containing each response from b that affect Nb, at least from rf on. The
Lemma is generalized to talk about the responses sent by any node on the forwarding
path to b. The key idea is to show that in these circumstances, a has been subscribed
to each name in N at least since receiving rf .
Lemma 7.4 (completeness of responses sequences) For any state of any X ∈ execs(SDCS ),
a ∈ APPS, b ∈ DATAS, name set Nb ⊆ a.awaiting ∩ NAMESb, rf ∈ (R ∪ {⊥}) and
node o ∈ fpab · b : usable-list(a.synchResp,Nb, rf ) ⇒ there exist a suffix IoNb of X
such that resp-list(a.synchResp / Nb, rf ) = rcv-seq-raNb(IaNb) ¹ snd-seq-roNb(IoNb),
where IaNb is the suffix of X beginning immediately before event receive(rf )c,a in X.
Proof: As a preliminary, we claim that in every state of X, a.awaiting ⊆ a.inSub.
This trivially holds in the initial state where a.awaiting = a.inSub = ∅, and it is
easily verified by inspecting the actions of CacherAppHosta that modify a.awaiting
or a.inSub that this invariant is preserved.
Let Nb ⊆ a.awaiting ∩ NAMESb and rf ∈ R be respectively a name set and response
fulfilling the lemma’s premise, so usable-list(a.synchResp,Nb, rf ) holds. If rf = ⊥
then resp-list(a.synchResp, rf ) = λ and the lemma trivially holds. Otherwise, rf ∈
a.synchResp and there must be an event erf = receive(rf )c,a in X, where c is the
channel incident to a, since that’s the only event that can add rf to a.synchResp.
Since Nb ⊆ a.awaiting ⊆ a.inSub, by Lemma 6.6 of Chapter 6 we have for each
n ∈ Nb that rcv-seq-ran(Ian) ¹ snd-seq-rbn(Ion), with Ian and Ion the corresponding
subscription and publishing intervals of n. We claim that a has been contiguously
subscribed to each name of Nb since before receiving rf . More precisely, we claim that
suffix IaNb is contained in Ian, for each n ∈ Nb. Assume, for contradiction, that IaNb
is not contained by Ian, for some n ∈ Nb. Then the last receive(sr ∈ SR)c,a event in
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X with n ∈ sub(sr) occurs after erf , and sr follows rf in a.synchResp (and therefore
cannot have been garbage collected in X). But then ¬usable-list(a.synchResp, Nb,
rf ), which is a contradiction.
Hence, suffix IaNb must be contained by each of the Ian intervals, and since for each
of them we have rcv-seq-ran(Ian) ¹ snd-seq-ron(Ion) it follows that there exists a suffix
IoNb of X (contained by each Ion) such that rcv-seq-raNb(IaNb) ¹ snd-seq-roNb(IoNb).
Note that IoNb begins with the send(rf )o,d event causing erf , where d is some chan-
nel incident to o. Since a appends every response r affecting a name in a.awaiting
⊇ Nb to a.synchResp, and since resp-list(a.synchResp / Nb, rf ) contains every re-
sponse in a.synchResp after and including rf that affects Nb, it follows that resp-
list(a.synchResp / Nb, rf ) = rcv-seq-raB(IaNb) ¹ snd-seq-ron(IoNb) 2
We can now show that Lemma 6.8 of Chapter 6 still holds in the scalable system,
that is: the synched part of an application cache contains a consistent projections of
an earlier (or current) server state. The key is to show that the list of responses an
application infers from a value message is the same as the sequence of responses the
corresponding diverted value message conflicted with, which are exactly the responses
that the application missed as they overtook the value message at the diverting switch.
Applying the response list therefore recreates the effect of these omitted responses
and brings the value message’s names to the state that existed on the original server
just after it sent the last omitted response. We limit ourself, for the time being, to
the case where each cacher receives its value messages directly from servers, and not
from other caches.
We break out a part of the lemma’s premise into a separate predicate.
Definition 7.7 For any execution X ∈ execs(SDCS), application host a ∈ APPS
and server b ∈ DATAS, let app-cond(a,b,X) be true exactly if a only receives value
messages for names in NAMESb directly from b or from a cacher host c only if c
receives its value messages for names in NAMESb directly from b in X., that is: if
cache-cond(c, b,X) holds.
Lemma 7.5 (Scalable dynamic cache synchronization base case): For any state ta
of any X ∈ execs(SDCS), a ∈ APPS and b ∈ DATAS, let synchedb = a.synched ∩
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NAMESb in ta and let tb be the state after the eb event enqueueing the latest response
from b that has been received by a. Then app-cond(a, b,X) ⇒ a.cache | synchedb in
state ta = b.state | synchedb in state tb.
Proof: We proceed by induction on the prefixes ofX. As argued in the proof of Lemma
6.8, since a.synched ⊆ a.inSub then by Lemma 6.5 each state of X is contained in a
subscription interval Ian for each n ∈ a.synched and by Lemma 6.7 rcv-seq-ran(Ian)
¹ resp-seq-rn(Ibn), for the corresponding publishing interval Ibn. In other words,
a is receiving every response affecting any name in a.synched, in the order of the
corresponding state changes.
As our base case, the invariant trivially holds in the start state of X since a.synched
is initially empty. We claim that each action e extending a prefix X ′ into another
prefix X ′′ of X preserves the invariant. Let eb be the event that enqueues the latest
response message sent from b that has been received by a at ta, the final state of
X ′. By the inductive assumption, sab = a.cache | synchedb at ta equals sb = b.state |
synchedb in the state tb immediately after eb.
1. If e = receive(sr ∈ SR)d,a or e = receive(r ∈ R \SR \V R)d,a then the invariant
holds after e, by the same exact argument as in Lemma 6.8.
2. If e = receive(vr ∈ V R)d,a and e is caused by a send(vr)b,d event in data server
b ∈ DATAS then the invariant holds after e, by the same exact argument as in
Lemma 6.8.
3. If e = receive(vr ∈ V R)d,a and e is caused by a send(vr)i,d event at a switch i
caused in turn by an event eidv = receive(dvr ∈ DV R)y,i event, where d, y ∈
CHANNELSi, let N = names(vr), rf = first-resp(vr), Nvr = (N ∩ a.awaiting) \
a.synched (the names becoming synched) and Nb = Nvr ∩ NAMESb. If ¬usable-
list(a.synchResp, Nvr, rf ), then e modifies neither a.cache nor a.synched and
the invariant holds with the same state sb as before. Otherwise, let responsesdvr
= resp-list(rcv-seq-riNb(Xidv), rf ), where Xidv is the prefix of X ending with the
eidv event that enqueues vr on i.outQueued, towards a.
Since app-cond(a,b,X), the cacher c sending dvr gets its value messages for
Nb directly from b so by Lemma 7.3, for any s ∈ STATES , TRANSb(s ⊕ vr,
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responsesdvr) | Nb = sbi | Nb, where sbi is the value of b.state at the event eri
when b enqueues the latest response r that has been received by i at eidv. Note
that r is the last response of rcv-seq-riNb(Xidv).
Let rlist-a = resp-list(a.synchResp / Nb, rf ). We claim that responsesdvr = rlist-
a. We observe that since Nb ⊆ Nvr, usable-list(a.synchResp, Nvr, rf ) implies
usable-list(a.synchResp, Nb, rf ), by the definition of usable-list. Since further-
more Nb ⊆ a.awaiting ∩ NAMESb, by Lemma 7.4 there exist suffixes IaNb and
IiNb of X such that rlist-a = rcv-seq-raNb(IaNb) ¹ snd-seq-riNb(IiNb) where IaNb
begins with receive(rf )u,a, so by Lemma 6.6 we have rcv-seq-raNb(IaNb) ¹ snd-
seq-riNb(IiNb) ¹ rcv-seq-riNb(IiNb). Since event e receives the vr that is enqueued
by eidv at the end of Xidv, by Lemma 6.6 each response of rcv-seq-riNb(Xidv) has
been received at a inX, up to and including response r. Hence, rlist-a = rcv-seq-
raNb(IaNb) = resp-list(< rf , r2, . . . , r >, rf ) = resp-list(rcv-seq-riNb(Xidv),rf ) =
responsesdvr, so the claim holds.
Event e applies vr and rlist-a = responsesdvr to each name of Nvr (including
Nb) in a.cache, so we get a.cache
′ | Nb = sbi | Nb. Since we’ve shown that the
latest response from b received at a is r (enqueued by ebi) we have ebi = eb, so
sbi = sb and a.cache
′ | Nb = sb | Nb. Since e does not modify any names in M
= (NAMESb \ B) ∩ synchedb and since by the inductive assumption cache.a |
M = sb |M , we have that a.cache′ |M = sb |M . Therefore, a.cache′ | synchedb
equals sb = b.state | synchedb and the invariant holds after e.
4. No other events affect the invariant 2
Lemma 7.5 shows that an application’s execution atomicity is ensured although some
of the application’s value messages come from one or more cacher hosts, if they in
turn receive their value messages directly from the corresponding servers. We now
show that the Lemma holds even if the cachers receive value messages from other
cachers. We use structural induction on the length of chains of cachers to show that
if Lemmas 7.3 and 7.5 hold for cacher chains of length n, they also hold for cacher
chains of length n+ 1. Formally:
Definition 7.8 The cacher chain length chain-lenb(a) of an application (cacher) host
a ∈ APPS with respect to a server b ∈ DATAS is:
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• 0 if a only receives value messages for names in NAMESb directly from server
b, or more precisely: no cacher host connected to a switch on fpab sends diverted
value responses for names in NAMESb to a.
• 1 + max{chain-len(c) : c ∈ C}, where C is the set containing b and a non-
empty set of cacher hosts from which a can receive value messages for names in
NAMESb.
In other words, chain-lenb(a) is the maximum distance of a from b in the directed
acyclic graph connecting b to application hosts (including cachers) subscribing to
names in NAMESb and application hosts to other application hosts (including cachers)
that cache names from NAMESb. This network is a DAG because cachers for NAMESb
only communicate via switches on the forwarding path to b. Note that Lemma 6.8
of Chapter 6 corresponds to the base case with a chain length of 0 and Lemma 7.5
corresponds to applications with cacher chain length of at most 1.
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Figure 7.3: Cacher Chain Lengths Illustrated
Figure 7.3 shows an example of a small atomic network, where each host subscribes
only to hosts at or below its own level in the hierarchy of switches rooted at switch
α. We have chain-lenbx(a1) = 0, since there are no cachers to which to divert value
requests from a1 to bx. We also have chain-lenbz(c2) = 0, since value requests from
c2 to bx are never diverted back to c2. Note that if there were another cacher host
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c′ attached to the switch and the set of names served by c2 and c′ overlapped, then
their chain-lengths would be 1, as each could serve read requests from the other. We
have chain-lenbz(a2) = 1, since the value requests of a2 may get diverted to cacher
c2, whose chain length is 0. We have chain-lenbz(c3)= chain-lenbz(c2) + 1 = 1, since
c3 may use lower-level cacher c2 (by contrast, chain-lenbx(c3) = chain-lenby(c3) = 0)
Finally, we have chain-lenbz(a3)= chain-lenbz(c3) + 1 = 2, and we have chain-lenbx(a3)
= chain-lenby(a3) = 1.
Lemma 7.6 (Scalable dynamic cache synchronization): For any state ta of any X ∈
execs(SDCS ), a ∈ APPS and b ∈ DATAS, let synchedb = a.synched ∩ NAMESb in
ta and let tb be the state after the eb event enqueueing the latest response from b that
has been received by a. Then a.cache | synchedb in state ta = b.state | synchedb in
state tb.
Proof: Let C ⊆ HOSTS be the set containing server b and the set of applications
(including cachers) that receive (diverted) value messages for names in NAMESb. We
proceed by induction on the maximum length of cacher chains of hosts in C to show
that the invariant holds for each host in C, including a. As our base cases, Lemma 7.5
and Lemma 7.3 show that the theorem holds for each cacher c ∈ C where chain-lenb(c)
= 0 and chain-lenb(c) = 1, respectively. As our inductive assumption, the invariant
holds for each cacher c′ such that chain-lenb(c′) ≤ n, for some n ≥ 1. Let c be any
application host such that chain-lenb(c) = n+ 1. We observe that since chain-lenb(c)
= n+ 1, it follows by the definition of c and chain-lenb that any host c
′ from which c
receives value messages has chain-lenb(c
′) ≤ n. We make two claims.
1. Consider Lemma 7.3, with the new definition that cache-cond(c, b,X) is true
exactly if cacher c only receives value messages for names in NAMESb from a
host c′ if chain-lenb(c′) ≤ n. Call this modified lemma Lemma 7.3n. We claim
that this Lemma 7.3n holds for each diverted value message sent by c. The
proof is the same as for Lemma 7.3, except instead of invoking Lemma 6.8 we
invoke the inductive assumption, that is: we change the wording in the proof
to “Since cache-cond(c, b,X), we have by the inductive assumption that ... ”.
Hence, Lemma 7.3n holds.
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2. Consider Lemma 7.5, with the new definition that app-cond(a, b,X) is true
exactly if a only receives value messages for names in NAMESb from a host c
′ if
chain-lenb(c
′) ≤ n. Call this modified lemma Lemma 7.5n. We claim that this
modified lemma holds in each state of X, with a = c. The proof is the same as
for Lemma 7.5, except instead of invoking Lemma 7.3 we invoke the inductive
assumption and Lemma 7.3n, that is: we change the wording in the proof to
“Since by the inductive assumption app-cond(c′, b,X) holds for the cacher c′
sending dvr, by Lemma 7.3n, TRANSb(s⊕ vr, responses)dvr | Nb = . . .”.
Lemma 7.5n shows that the invariant holds for c, and hence any c with chain-lenb(c)
≤ n+ 1, completing the induction 2
We can finally prove (for the last time!) a theorem corresponding to Theorem 4.1 of
Chapter 4, saying that if a server in a scalable dynamic system executes a request
q then the response is among those possible given the dynamic application’s cached
state at the time the application issued q. Our proof is essentially the same as the
one for Theorem 6.1 (and Theorem 4.1), showing that if this were not the case, then
the intervening execution of some request that altered the state of the server would
have caused a response that conflicted with q, and q would have been dropped.
Theorem 7.1 (Scalable Dynamic Cache Operation Atomicity): For any execution
X ∈ execs(SDCS), application a ∈ HOSTS, server b ∈ DATAS and channels d and
c incident to a and b, respectively: send(q ∈ Q)d,a → send(rq ∈ R)c,b ⇒ rq ∈
executeb(sa, q), where sa = a.cache | depends(q) at the createRequest event eq that
enqueues q.
Proof: Assume for contradiction that there exists some execution X ∈ execs(SDCS)
and server b ∈ DATAS where send(q)d,a → send(rq ∈ R)c,b but rq 6∈ executeb(sa, q).
By inspecting the createRequest action, we see that depends(q) ⊆ a.synched at eq,
so by Lemma 7.6, b.state | depends(q) = sa at some earlier point in X, before the
receive(q)c,b event that executes q. Therefore, there must be an event er at b preceding
receive(q)c,b that assigns to b.state a value sb such that rq 6∈ executeb(sb, q). If we let r
be the response enqueued by er, then conflicts-inv(q, r), by the definition of conflicts-
inv. Since a.cache | depends(q) = sa at the createRequest(q)a event issuing request
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q, we have createRequest(q)a <X receive(r)d,a and therefore by FIFO send(q)d,a <X
send(ack(r))d,a. This gives us er <X receive(q)c,b ∧ send(q)d,a <X send(ack(r))d,a.
Since by Lemma 7.2 a is ACK Well-Formed and by Lemma 6.10 b is Responder Well-
Formed, then by Theorem 5.2 we have send(q)d,a 6→X send(rq)c,b, a contradiction
2
7.5 Discussion and Related Work
This section discuss the performance of our caching protocol and related work, as well
as suggesting some further uses for cacher hosts, including supporting the reliable
multicast needed for our model to apply in the first place.
7.5.1 Caching and Performance
The main purpose of cachers is to alleviate servers from handling value read requests,
conserving their processing and storage bandwidth for execution of requests and per-
sisting of their effects. Database transactions typically read between five and ten
values for every value they write [6]. Moreover, the relative benefit increases as data
contention rises, since many applications will be subscribing to and synchronizing
with the same names, raising cache hit-ratios.
Cacher hosts make limited demands on servers. Except for their initial value requests
to synchronize the names in their caches, they can provide service indefinitely without
any involvement from the server, by applying responses to their cached state. Servers
do not need to keep track of cachers nor send additional messages for their benefit.
Similarly, clients do not need to keep track of cachers and are essentially unaware of
caching.
Hierarchical caches are scalable, since growing demand for value messages and syn-
chronization can be met with additional cacher resources. A system based on our
model should be able to support large numbers of application hosts maintaining a
consistent view of a set of names. The underlying multicast provides efficient up-
date dissemination, while cacher hosts take care of bringing newly added applications
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up to date with the latest state. This could be a good fit for applications such as
large-scale trading and auctions, where many applications observe state and then oc-
casionally issue bid requests. It might also be a good fit with massively multi-user
online role-playing games (MMORPGs), where each player is subscribed to an area
of interest surrounding the player’s current location in the game but must frequently
(un)subscribe to parts of the world at the area’s edge, as the player moves across the
world.
While outside our scope, coordination of cache contents [74] could be used to increase
cache-hit rates and dynamically adjust caching strategies. For example, as a server
nears full utilization, it could send out a “cry for help,” calling for cachers to cache
certain name ranges. A cache nearing saturation could similarly cry to cachers at
the next chain-length level above, and so forth. The intent is that names should
get cached / replicated to a degree commensurate with the number of applications
synchronizing with them.
Our design is unique, as far as we know, in providing scalable, consistent caching
irrespective of data update rates while not adding latency. Since switches know
from their subscriptions which cachers are currently available for a given name, they
divert requests only to cachers that can service the value request for that name, with
high probability. Requests do not bounce between hierarchy levels, which would add
latency [163]. If cachers can be placed close to clients, the round-trip time to a cacher
can be made shorter than the round-trip-time to the original server. For example,
a cache placed near a site’s gateway to the Internet could significantly lower access
delays for data commonly used by applications in that site.
In chapter 6 we compared our caching algorithm to AOCC [162], an efficient conflict-
based concurrency control algorithm bearing many similarities to ours but operating
exclusively end-to-end. We do not see a straightforward way to extend AOCC to sup-
port cacher hosts, since an AOCC server is solely responsible for detecting all conflicts
and must be explicitly aware of all subscriptions of all applications, so that it can
maintain and propagate invalid sets. In our caching scheme, by comparison, servers
are oblivious to clients and cachers, but the switches along a diverting path ensure
that stale value messages are freshened through conflict-detection with concurrent
response messages.
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We observe that the distance of a cache’s diverting switch from a server has no effect on
the expected lengths of value message response list, which depends only on the length
of the path from the diverting switch to the cacher. We also observe that the response
time for value read request is essentially independent18 from a server’s data update
rate. Higher rates only increases response list lengths and create additional work
for application hosts. Assuming applications have enough bandwidth and resources
to process the response stream in the first place, this additional burden should be
negligible.
The price for this performance, though, is the assumption of efficient yet fine-grained
name subscriptions on switches. As discussed in Section 5.10.1, we do not address
the feasibility of such subscription processing in this dissertation.
Internet caching has received considerable interest in recent years [164], including
approaches based on multicast [76]. Ours is an en-route caching [165] scheme, since
it places caches along the forwarding path towards a data source. While methods
for optimizing the placement [165] and coordination [166] of such caches are mostly
orthogonal to our algorithm, they are applicable.
7.5.2 Cachers as Service Providers
Efficient, transactionally coherent cacher hosts may have other uses besides serving
value requests. Their location to the side of the “pathway” of requests and responses
traveling back and forth to a server makes them well placed to provide services related
to that server. We sketch a few ideas here, leaving proper consideration to future work.
The common theme is to use cachers to provide certain services without encumbering
data servers, whose performance may be the bottleneck for one or more applications.
This is more attractive from a scalability standpoint than requiring each such service
to execute only on original data servers.
A cacher host c could scrub a “dirty” request q from an application a that is not fully
synchronized with the depends(q) set of q. Application a would send the values19
it has cached for the subset of depends(q) that is not synched at a and switches
18Independent insofar as the updates do not require a large share of the available bandwidth.
19Or achieve the same effect through the use of timestamps or other version information.
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would preferentially try to divert such requests to cachers for those names. If a
cacher c receiving q found that each of these dirty values matched its own (synched)
values for the names, it would re-issue q on the behalf of a as a normal, “clean”
request. This request would get conflict checked and handled just like any other
request, and a would receive its response directly from the server. On the other
hand, if some of the dirty values did not match, c would discard q. It could also go
ahead and send value messages for the stale names, to hasten their synchronization
at a. This scheme would allow an application to issue a request without waiting
for its synchronization processing to complete. Alternatively, the application could
attempt to issue a request without synchronizing at all. This may yield an overall
gain over performing synchronization when an application issues requests infrequently
and/or the state in question changes infrequently. Note that it essentially emulates
classic optimistic concurrency control algorithms based on server-side validation of
transaction reads before commit. The difference is that it does it in a scalable manner,
as the validation effort can be distributed onto multiple cacher hosts.
Cachers could serve the role of “data warehouses,” by storing one or more snap-
shots of entire data subsets in a read-optimized format, with extensive indexing for
efficient query processing. This practice is common today, as it is very difficult to
efficiently combine long-running read transactions with short-lived update transac-
tions. A fundamental reason why is that the probability of transaction conflicts grows
quadratically with transaction sizes [12].
In general, cachers could serve as entry-point “switches” for clients of distributed
applications, providing services as well as aggregating clients for the purposes of
increasing the scalability of fine-grained multicast subscriptions. An application host
would use cachers as a bridge from a legacy network protocol into the atomic network,
translating back and forth between atomic multicast and a unicast connection to the
host, for example. The cacher would handle conflict-checking on the “last mile”
between end-host applications and an atomic multicast network, treating each host
as if connected by a separate channel. A cacher that is trusted by an organization
could perform services such as usage metering of the organization’s data, as well fine-
grained access control and encryption of response streams for individual hosts. While
commodity hosts cannot match the performance of dedicated switches, they can still
handle considerable traffic and manage numerous connections [115].
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7.5.3 Caches, Response Synch and Reliable Multicast
The cache synchronization algorithms we have described are based on applications
receiving state updates that replace existing cached values regardless of their previous
values. An alternative would be for an applications to receive a sequence of old
responses that roll forward its cache to a current state. The obvious advantage of
the state transfer method is that it “truncates” the response history, providing an
upper bound on the message complexity of synchronizing a cache that depends on
the size of its state, not the number of responses that have affected the state in
the past. Also, response sequences require some form of versioning for states and
responses, so that the appropriate subsequence of responses can be applied to the
old version of the state. However, the response synchronization method may have a
sigificant advantage in the case where hosts lose their subscription only briefly. In
that case, transmitting the sequence of responses missed during a subscription outage
may require fewer messages than explicit state synchronization. Cachers could readily
offer this alternative type of service in addition to the state-based one we described,
since they receive all responses affecting their cached state anyway.
In fact, cachers are ideally situated to play the role of message loggers in receiver-
based methods for reliable multicast [148, 149], discussed in Section 5.10.1. We could
take an approach similar to LMS [167], for example, where Negative ACKs (NACKs)
are diverted off the path towards their destination server and towards some switch
termed the NACK’s turnaround point, which directs it towards some replier receiver
host that can supply the missing message. The replier unicasts the missing message
to the turnaround switch, which multicasts it back to the receivers. In our model,
cachers would play the role of repliers. We might even improve upon LMS by ini-
tiating repairs immediately at the (sending or receiving) switch where responses are
dropped, sending repair requests to cachers for affected names along with identifiers
for the dropped responses. Cachers would, at their discretion, retransmit the miss-
ing responses (or value messages) for the names affected, possibly after getting a
“congestion cleared” notification from the switch. This could lower repair latency
while largely eliminating the need for applications to issue repair requests. While
this approach seems promising, we have yet to develop it. Fine-grained, name-based
multicast subscriptions and forwarding present a problem for reliable multicast, but
they might be part of the solution as well.
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Chapter 8
Prototype Implementation of
Conflict Checking
The feasibility of Atomic Transfer depends critically on how effectively requests and
responses can be conflict-checked. In particular, is is essential that conflicts on
switches can be checked at line rates, since otherwise packet queues can build up
and overflow. This chapter describes a data structure intended to address that chal-
lenge, dubbed Tree Intersection Bitmap (TIB). It is a succinctly encoded trie, based
on the Tree Bitmap [168] trie datastructure. TIBs are designed to rapidly detect
whether two sets of names overlap, where names are variable length bit strings. We
also sketch a high-level design for switches and how they could use TIBs to achieve
good conflict checking performance.
While TIBs are designed with Network Processors [169] in mind, we implement and
test them on the Intel x86 architecture, with an implementation written in the C
programming language. Our primary objective is to get a “ballpark” figure for the
performance with which conflicts can be checked, in best as well as worst-case sce-
narios.
8.1 Hierarchical Naming Scheme
Our prototype assumes a naming scheme similar to the one suggested in Section
5.10.1. More concretely, a name n ∈ NAMES is encoded as a variable-length bit
string m · n, whose first | m | bits represent the name’s authoritative owner, as
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a 64 or 128-bit cryptographic digest of the name owner’s public key, for example.
The remaining | n | bits identify a particular name in the “name space” defined by
m. Management of that name space is the owner’s responsibility, but the means by
which owners delegate responsibility for names to the public keys of host and data
center principals [170, 171] are largely orthogonal to Atomic Transfer and will not be
considered here.
We make the important assumption that names give certain clues about their physical
whereabouts. This is not to say that a name corresponds to a particular network ad-
dress or host: rather, we assume that the longer the shared prefix of two names (the
more similar the names, as we term it), the fewer network hops generally separate
their hosts. In particular, two names of equal length that differ only in their last bit
should be highly likely to reside on the same host. The reason for this assumption
is that it dramatically facilitates name-based forwarding and conflict checking. It
enables hierarchical routing, as in the Internet Protocol, that is: switches can aggre-
gate forwarding information for a large set of similar names by associating it with
their shared prefix. Similarly, we will assume that a request usually refers to a set
of similar names, which can therefore be succinctly encoded in tries and efficiently
checked for conflicts with the names in similarly encoded responses. While our model
would work correctly with arbitrary, meaningless identifiers, performance of conflict
checking would suffer considerably.
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Figure 8.1: Example mapping of names to nodes
Figure 8.1 shows an example of the mapping of a tiny name hierarchy to nodes
in a network. The names with prefix “0” map to server A, while prefixes “1110”
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and “1111” map to servers B and C, respectively. Prefix “10” maps to switch D,
suggesting that switch configuration data can be presented using global names and
updated using atomic actions. As an aside, we conjecture that this could simplify
network management and promote routing flexibility [172].
We see the data names used at the Atomic Transfer protocol level as occupying a
middle ground between network addresses and human-readable and meaningful iden-
tifiers. A name by itself gives no information about its host and can be transparently
re-mapped from one host to another. However, a name’s binding to a human-readable
moniker or higher-level abstraction or semantic happens through some form of in-
direction, for example through interpretation by a program or a cryptographically
verifiable chain of logical statements [170]. Hence, a name serves a dual purpose: it
uniquely identifies a datum and also encodes its physical location relative to other
names, to some degree.
A hierarchical naming scheme does represent a trade-off, though, as naming things
hierarchically can be restrictive and changes in data access patterns usually mean that
any “clustering” of data into hierarchies must be intermittently adjusted to maintain
performance. Load re-balancing is achieved by migrating data between servers while
simultaneously updating forwarding tables, so that names still refer to the same val-
ues. Renaming data items and otherwise reconfiguring the name hierarchy requires
even more coordination. However, dynamic reconfiguration [70, 173] is greatly facil-
itated by atomic execution, since changes to application data, application software
and configuration “metadata” (such as human-readable monikers) can be performed
in atomic steps. The impact of large-scale changes can be mitigated by dividing them
into a preparation phase and a subsequent installation phase, that moves in a wave
across the system [71]. So on a balance, we feel that the benefits of hierarchical
naming outweigh its costs.
For concreteness we sketch how a few common data abstractions can be mapped
into a hierarchical names in the name/value state abstraction of the Atomic caching
systems.
• A hierarchical file system can be mapped directly by encoding the full pathname
of each file into a bit string name, terminated with a designated character that is
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not a part of any filename. The name’s value is the file’s data. Alternatively, the
bits following the name terminator could be used as a binary-tree like subdivider
for the file’s data, allowing block level or even byte-level access to parts of the
file.
• A collection of Java-like objects in a heap can be mapped by assigning a code
to each of the object class’ fields and storing the value of each field under name
o · c, where o is a unique identifier for the object and c is a code identifying the
field. Objects created as a part of a larger object assembly or aggregation could
be given similar names, to increase the likelihood of them being co-located.
• A database relation r can be mapped by storing each row as name r · k with
value v, where k is a concatenation of the row’s primary key column and v is
the concatenation of the other colums. The absence of a row is indicated by the
absence of the name corresponding to it. Alternatively, each non-key column
could be assigned a unique code c and the value of column c stored under key
r · k · c. Note that in the latter case, the whole row can still be obtained by a
value read request for prefix r · k.
• Say a relation r′ is predominantly accessed through a join with relation r from
the prior example, that uses column c of r to look up a row of r′ by the primary
key of r′. Then we might store each row of r′ by name r · k · cr′ , where cr′ is a
code not denoting a column in r. This would increase the probability of rows
of r′ being hosted close to the rows of r through which they are accessed and
permit convenient access to a row k and its join dependencies, by subscription
to prefix r · k.
We note that these mappings would generally be transparent to end-users and pro-
grammers. A database programmer, for example, can still work in terms of tables
and queries while (re)mappings of data take place behind the scenes. The pre-joining
of rows could be designed by a clustering algorithm that infers access patterns from
execution traces.
We assume that name/value pairs are mapped onto hosts along name hierarchies,
so in general names with prefix p are assigned to the same host or next-hop switch.
Note that servers are free to choose their internal data representations, e.g. hash
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tables or hierarchical file systems. Application hosts can independently choose the
data representations best suited to their needs. The naming scheme does not dictate
internal data formats, it merely creates common ground for effective access to data
and, as we discuss in the next section: efficient conflict checking.
8.2 Organizing Packets for Fast Conflict Detection
This section discusses our prototype design and implementation for the encoding of
request and response name sets into network packets. We focus on the encoding of
name sets and those aspects of operations that pertain to conflict relations, ignoring
how other message information is encoded. For example, in our empirical evaluation
we use simple read/write operations and encode the operation type along with the
name to which it is applied, but leave unspecified the encoding of the values read or
written. Also, we limit our discussion to messages that fit in a single packet. We
note that atomic messages can be broken into multiple packet, as we discuss in Chap-
ter 9 on future work. Furthermore, many high-performance transactional systems,
such as On-Line Transaction Processing (OLTP) applications, predominantly create
small transactions that access only a few data items each. The widely used TPC-C
transaction performance benchmark [174] in fact uses only such small transactions.
Our encoding is based on the trie [175, 176], a fundamental data structure for storing
a set of strings over a fixed alphabet. A trie for an alphabet Σ with | Σ |= b is
an ordered tree of degree b, where each child of a node corresponds to a letter of
the alphabet. The search procedure for a string s begins at the root of the tree.
For each character of s, from first to last, the search navigates to the corresponding
child until a leaf is reached or no child is present for a character. Tries and prefixes
have a direct correspondence, since all strings sharing a prefix reside in the same
subtree. The longer the prefixes shared by a set of string, the more compact their
trie representation. On the other hand, a straightforward trie implementation where
each node has an array of b child references is relatively space inefficient, especially
for larger alphabets and sparser tries. Furthermore, for a low b such as a binary b = 2,
a naive implementation is relatively slow, requiring O(n) steps to search for an n-bit
string.
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8.2.1 Multi-bit Tries and Tree Bitmaps
What makes tries a candidate for high-speed set intersection checking is recent work
on using tries for fast IP lookup on routers [177, 178, 168], which has yielded very
efficient trie variants on which we base our approach. The first insight behind this
work is that the search needs to proceed in strides of several bits at a time, for speed.
While several multi-bit trie data structures have been proposed20, one of the simplest
yet best performing is the Tree Bitmap [168], shown in Figure 8.2. Starting at a node
in a regular trie, it is converted into Tree Bitmap form by encoding the next n levels
below the node into a single Tree Bitmap node, which we shall call a block. Since
each block corresponds to a small binary trie of height n we can succinctly encode
the set of n-bit strings (or seen in a different light, the n-bit characters) present in
a block using a bitmap of length 2n, whose k-th bit is set only if the k-th string is
present in the block, that is: the string whose path from the top node in the block
is labeled with the binary representation of k. We will refer to a string as being an
entry of a block. An entry can either represent a member of the original trie or a
prefix that extends into a child block.
0 1
0 10
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1 00 1 11
Original trie
01000101
11010000 01000011
Tree bitmap trie
Figure 8.2: Example tree bitmap encoding with stride n = 3
Figure 8.2 shows how a trie is converted into three Tree Bitmaps blocks with stride
three. The trie contains the string “101” of length 3 and six other strings each of
length 6. The top-level block has a 1 bit in positions 1, 5 and 7, since prefixes “001”
and “111” are present in the block, as well as member “101”. We describe later how
the encoding tells members from prefixes. We make the assumption that names are
20Reference [168] presents an overview.
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prefix-free, that is: no name is the prefix of another name. When the need for prefixed
names arises, such as in the example in Section 8.1 of mapping a file system to a name
space, the standard trick of terminating names with special symbols not used as a
part of any name can be employed.
In the case of the original Tree Bitmaps, another bitmap is needed to account for the
fact that IP forwarding prefixes may have arbitrary length and that IP forwarding
databases are not necessarily prefix-free. We simplify our implementation by stipu-
lating that the length of all names be a multiple of n. In fact, we will choose n = 4
as our stride, since it yields bitmaps of reasonable size (16 bits) that are convenient
for software implementation, being a power of 2. TIBs add 16 bits of information
to round out a 32-bit block which suits architectures requiring 32-bit memory access
alignment.
Tree Bitmaps save space by storing sibling blocks contiguously in memory, so a single
pointer suffices to navigate to all the child blocks of a parent block. In Figure 8.2
the gray arrow represents the pointer from the top-level block to its first child block.
This convention makes blocks highly uniform: each block has a bitmap and a pointer
to its first child block, if any.
The Tree Bitmap encoding is very concise. Moreover, it is well suited to computing
name set intersections. When comparing the two top-level blocks of a Tree Bitmap
trie, for example, we can determine the set of 4-bit entries they have in common by
performing a bitwise AND operation on their respective bitmaps, computing the set
of up to 16 possible common entries at a stroke. This is the key to the efficiency of
the data structure we adapt from Tree Bitmaps, the Tree Intersection Bitmap.
8.3 Tree Intersection Bitmaps
Our Tree Intersection Bitmap is essentially a Tree Bitmap less the encoding of arbi-
trary length strings plus the encoding of operation information. We discuss how child
pointers are encoded at the end of this section.
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We could easily use the k-th bit of the remaining 16 bits of a block to indicate whether
the k-th entry in the block is a member or a prefix. However, that encoding would
be fairly inefficient as most nodes below the uppermost levels of a trie are sparsely
populated. This is true for tries containing random strings [179], and we expect it to
be true for request and response name tries as well. Therefore, we store the additional
information as a list of consecutive j-bit codes in the remaining 16 bits of a block,
which we will call a block’s list.
This scheme is clearly more complex to decode than a straight bitmap. However,
the space efficiency gains are important because they reduce the number of memory
fetches a processor must make during intersection checking. The speed differential
between Dynamic RAM (DRAM) memory chips and processors has become such that
a processor can execute tens or hundreds of instructions in the time it takes to fetch
a chunk of data from DRAM, although that chunk can be relatively large (e.g. 32-64
bytes). General-purpose processors mask this latency to a large degree using several
levels of on-chip cache memories, but packet data streaming through a network device
has negligible temporal locality, limiting the effectiveness of caching. As a result, the
key to good performance is to fit as many TIB-blocks into each chunk’s worth of
memory as possible.
The choice of j depends on the number of distinct operations or operation equiva-
lence classes that must be encoded. For our empirical evaluation we assume simple
read/write operations, similar to table 4.1 of Chapter 4, and use j = 2. We will
assume all write operations read too, as “blind” writes without reads are rare in
practice. Also, our conflict relation ignores the values being read or written. The
only case that benefits from comparing the values is when a read does not conflict
because a write is writing that same value, which mainly occurs if requesters generate
unnecessary writes. Our conflict relation is shown in Table 8.1. While the rest of our
discussion is framed in terms of our chosen stride and operation encoding, we discuss
generalizations later in the chapter.
Figure 8.3 shows the format of an example block containing entries 1, 8 and 9 (cor-
responding to bitstrings “0001”, “0100” and “0101”). The block’s list contains the
respective codes for the entries, “01”, “00” and “01”. The meaning of list codes is as
follows:
172
read()/v write(v)/OK
read()/v′ true
write(v′)/OK true true
Table 8.1: Conflict relation for a simple read / write register.
1110 10 00 1
Low 16: entry bitmapHigh 16: list of two-bit codes
15  14   13  12   11  10    9    8     7    6     5     4    3  2    1     031  30  29   28   27  26   25   24  23   22  21  20   19  18   17  16
Figure 8.3: Tree Intersection Bitmap Block with three entries
• If the lower bit is set, the entry is a prefix and the higher bit is unused.
• If the lower bit is clear, the entry is a member, and:
– If the high bit is set (clear) the member is a write (read) operation.
In the example of Figure 8.3, members 1 and 9 are prefixes while members 8 is read
operation.
To navigate from a parent block to the block corresponding to the parent’s n-th prefix
entry, we count the number of prefix bits to the right of the nth entry in the list (Tree
Bitmaps use a similar technique). For example, the list of Figure 8.3 contains codes
for entries 1, 8 and 9, from right to left. There is one prefix code to the right of the
code of entry 9 (the code of prefix 1) so the child block corresponding to prefix 9 is
the second block from the first-child pointer, which points to the block for prefix 1.
The number of prefixes to the right of a prefix can be computed in constant time, by
masking off all even bits and bits to the left of the prefix in the list and the counting
the population of the bits remaining.
Since we only have 16 bits in which to encode up to 16 2-bit entries, a block’s bitmap
overflows if it has more than 8 entries. If any children among siblings overflow, we
capture the remainders of their lists in overflow blocks following the last sibling block
in memory. The first overflow block, if any, has a 16-bit index bitmap with bit k
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set exactly if the k-th sibling overflows. The sequence of 16-bit overflow lists follows,
alternatively in the high and low-order halfs of the 32 bit overflow blocks. Figure
8.4 shows an example with four TIB-blocks where block 0 and block 2 overflow. The
lower half of overflow block 4 contains the index, while the upper half of overflow
block 4 and lower half of overflow block 5 contain the remainder of the lists of blocks
0 and 2, respectively.
0                1              2          3  4                 5
Figure 8.4: TIB-blocks with overflowing lists and overflow blocks
Overflows should be relatively rare, occurring mainly at the top of densely populated
tries and when a collection of leave nodes with the same name lengths differ only
in their last two or three bits. But even when they occur, the overflow list can be
extracted in about 20 instructions.
Figure 8.5 shows the high-level algorithm for checking whether the TIBs rooted at
two blocks intersect, where o.list(n) denotes the n-th two-bit code from the list of
o. It first computes c, the bitwise AND of the block bitmaps. Each set bit of c
corresponds to a prefix or member that the blocks have in common. For each such
bit, the algorithm either recurses into the child blocks of the common prefixes or else
checks whether the member operations conflict. In the case of our conflict relation,
operations conflict if either is a write, so the n-th members of blocks a and b conflict
exactly if (a.list(n) OR b.list(n)) AND 2 6= 0.
We next describe the most important details and optimizations of our implementation.
We avoid recursive procedure calls by maintaining an explicit stack. Each stack entry
records information about two blocks, including how far along their respective lists
the algorithm has progressed. Avoiding explicit recursion is faster and allows our code
to be compiled for architectures lacking a hardware stack, such as IXP microengines.
[112]. We skip stack pushes and pops whenever possible, e.g. if two blocks have only
a single entry in common then we replace the top of the stack with their children
instead of pushing them. This also bounds the size of the stack to lg n, where n is
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intersect(block a, block b)
let c = a.bitmap AND b.bitmap
for each bit n of c that is set: // for each common entry
if (a.list(n) AND b.list(n)) AND 1
// both entries are prefixes
recursively intersect() their child blocks ...
else if not (a.list(n) OR b.list(n)) AND 1
// both entries are members
if operations a.list(n) and b.list(n) conflict
note and / or handle conflict ...
else
// error, one is a member, the other a prefix!
Figure 8.5: Block intersection algorithm at a high level.
the number of block pairs compared during an intersection, since new blocks are only
pushed onto the stack when the current blocks have at least 2 prefixes in common.
We use constant-time bitwise operations to advance from one common bit of c to the
next. We use the expression (c AND −c) to isolate cr, the rightmost (least significant)
bit of c [180], so cr− 1 yields a mask for the bits to the right of cr. We use that mask
when counting21 the number of bits to the right of cr in a block’s bitmap, yielding the
index of the corresponding entry in the block’s list. Hence, the main loop proceeds
in time O(| a∩ b |), where we take a and b to denote the set of entries in blocks a and
b, respectively.
The last point is important because we expect request tries to be “skinny” at the top,
branching into “bushes” primarily near the bottom. Assuming name hierarchies are
designed to achieve high locality data accesses, most names in a request will be highly
similar and have a long shared prefix. This results in a low | a ∩ b | for upper-level
blocks and fast intersection checking for the long “stem” of request tries. Other things
being equal, longer stems increase the probability of intersection checks terminating
before reaching the “bushy” parts of tries, in the common case where tries do not
intersect.
21Many architectures have a “population count” instruction that can perform this count in a cycle
or two. Since the x86 architecture only recently gained such an instruction (with Core i7 and SSE4.2)
our tests simulate it with a slower table lookup and additions.
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As described, TIBs do not encode long stems particularly efficiently, requiring 8n bits
to encode an n bit long prefix stem, e.g. 32 bytes for a 32-bit long stem. If “skinny”
request with long stems are indeed common, much of the first DRAM fetch would be
spent on the stem, necessitating further fetches.
In the special case, therefore, when a block has a single prefix entry and continues
to form a single stem for one or more levels, we use the block’s list to encode up to
3 · 4 = 12 bits of that stem. Following the entry’s operation code in the list we place
a 2-bit count of the number of 4-bit prefix extensions present in the list (from 0 to 3)
with 4, 8 or 12 bits of next-level prefixes in the remaining bits.
11 10 01 0
A single entry: a special case
0 1 1 0 0 1
code
Number of extensions (2)
Extension 1
Extension 2
15  14  13   12   11   10   9    8     7    6     5     4    3  2    1     031  30  29   28   27  26   25   24  23   22  21  20   19  18   17  16
Figure 8.6: A TIB-block with two prefix extensions
Figure 8.6 shows an example, where the prefix “010110001101” is encoded with prefix
extension in a single block, instead of being encoded into three one-entry blocks
containing prefixes “0101”, “0001” and “1101”, respectively. Note that extensions
appear in reverse order on the list, with the first extension in the most significant
bits. This makes decoding a bit faster. The prefix extension optimization can encode
an n-bit stem in as little as 2n bits, allowing the 32-bit stem we used as an example
to fit in 8 bytes.
What remains to be discussed is the encoding of the pointers from a block to its first
child block. A straightforward way is to keep the pointers in a separate array, so the
first-child pointer of block n is the n-th element of the array. For example, 8-bit block
indices would work for tries of up to 256 blocks, fitting a small Ethernet Maximum
Transmission Unit packet. The space overhead for this method is a relatively modest
25%. A disadvantage of this method is that it requires two chunks of DRAM to
be fetched at each time: a chunk of TIB-blocks and the corresponding pointers.
This might be remedied by interleaving pointers with blocks, but such schemes are
complicated by variable-length sibling blocks and the internal fragmentation resulting
from the mismatch between 8-bit indices and 32-bit memory alignment requirements.
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We do not develop such a scheme for our experiments but use an array of pointers.
However, a reasonable direction for future work is to investigate the use of the HEXA
hashing technique [181], where a prefix, from the root though to a prefix in the current
block, is hashed to yield the index of its first child block. Collisions are avoided by
including a few freely varying discriminator bits from nodes in the hash, where n
discriminator bits give a choice of 2n hashed locations for the first-child node. In
our case, unused list bits could serve as our discriminator bits. Since most blocks
will have a few unused list bits, choosing discriminators that hash to a free block
should generally not be a problem. However, we must consider the run-time costs of
constructing such tries and traversing them.
On the other hand, using explicitly encoded pointers affords us full freedom to lay
out subtries in efficient ways, for example as close as possible to the cache-oblivious
“Emde van Boas” layout [182], to minimize the number of DRAM fetches needed
during conflict checking. Achieving a combination of HEXA-style hashing and cache-
obliviousness could be an interesting problem for future work.
Spending some effort on the careful encoding of requests on the application side seems
justified, if it accelerates network and server-side processing. This effort may be less
welcome on the server side. We note that the cost of encoding packets is less of an issue
with the atomic caching systems presented earlier in this thesis, since applications
can include responses with their requests, obviating servers from encoding response
packets.
8.4 Switches and Responses Sets
TIB intersection is performed on switches, when the TIB of a request inbound on
a switch port p is compared with the set of responses that have been enqueued for
p. This set of responses corresponds directly to the responsesp set for a channel p
in our I/O Automata model of switches (see Chapter 3). While the details of an
implementation will depend on the hardware architecture of the switch for which it
is intended, we sketch a generic design for a switch that buffers packets at outbound
ports. Routers and switches typically buffer packets in DRAM memory, while queues
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and other data structures are often kept in faster (and more expensive) Static RAM
(SRAM) memory.
High performance packet switching does not allow for much processing per-packet. A
1Gbps port, for example, sending a steady stream of 100-byte packets must forward
roughly a million packets per second to keep up with line rates, that is: a packet
every microsecond, on average. As a rule of thumb, a switch can execute around 10
instructions per byte of packet data [183]. Clearly, a switch cannot perform extensive
data structure maintenance as a part of processing a packet. Yet, it must somehow
maintain the responses set for each port.
The size of a port’s responses set depends on its response sending rate and the res-
idency times of responses on the switch, which is upper-bounded by the amount of
packet memory available. Switches are designed to minimize packet residency time,
since it corresponds directly to latency. An average delay of 100µs for our 1Gbps
port sending nothing but 100 byte responses would by Little’s Formula have around
1.000.000 responses/sec * 0.0001 sec = 100 responses in its responses set at any one
time. Clearly, checking a request against each in turn would be time consuming.
Hence, we do not store responses sets as lists but rather as a trie, so that a request
can be intersected with a single responses trie instead of many response tries.
p
DRAM packet memory
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SRAM data structure memory
Figure 8.7: High-level schematic of conflict-checking switch port p
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Our basic approach to maintaining switch responses tries is to incorporate TIB-
encoded packets into them wholesale. Instead of adding request names individually
to a switch’s trie, which would be hopelessly slow, we propose to “wire” a response
packet into the switch trie directly, by adding a pointer from the appropriate block
in the switch trie to the appropriate TIB-block in the response’s TIB trie in packet
memory. Figure 8.7 shows a schematic for this design, for a port p on an atomic
switch.
White boxes represent data in SRAM while gray boxes represent data in packet
DRAM memory. The schematic shows a “blown up” view of one response packet,
containing a trie made of TIB-blocks. We assume the standard optimization of having
an initial array of trie blocks as the first level in the switch trie, indexed by the first n
bits of the stems of packet TIBs, e.g. n = 16 for an array of 64K blocks (the names in
the domain rooted at the switch are then restricted to being at least n bit long). The
top-level blocks may point to packet TIB-blocks or other switch-trie blocks, shown
in white. If we let i be the index encoded by the first n bits of a response r being
forwarded onto p, then the i-th block in the initial array would be updated to point
to the TIB-block of r that continues the trie of r past the first n bits. Upon receiving
the ACK for r, the switch removes the pointer to r before reclaiming its memory.
We note that the format of switch-blocks would be different from packet TIB-blocks.
They cannot easily use the Tree Bitmap single child-pointer optimization due to the
dynamic updates the switch trie must support. Furthermore, it might be beneficial to
use larger switch-blocks with a simpler, more direct encoding, so they can be quickly
updated. Getting many blocks in each fetch matters less with SRAM than DRAM,
since SRAM is faster and it is hard for switch to keep related trie blocks close in
memory anyway.
With n = 16, the 1Gbps port from our earlier example containing 100 responses in its
responses set on average, the probability of a response’s slot in the initial array being
occupied can be approximated as 100/216 ≈ 0.15%22, assuming uniformly random
n-bit stems in responses. This is a best-case scenario though, since accesses will be
22Since 100 << 216 we simplify by treating the additions of entries to the array as independent
events.
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more clustered in practice, yielding higher hit ratios, e.g. 100% in the worst case
where all messages have the same n-bit prefix.
When a new incoming response finds one of its prefix slots in the initial array is
occupied, the insertion proceeds down the response’s TIB and the trie of existing
responses on the switch, until a slot is found. Packet TIBs cannot be modified,
of course, since they will eventually be transmitted to the next-hop node. Hence,
the insertion adds new blocks to the switch trie as it recurses down the TIB of r,
performing a “copy on write” instead of modifying blocks. A newly created switch-
block will point to the same child blocks in packet memory as the original old-TIB-
block. Once the branches of the old-TIB and the new-TIB diverge, the last switch-
block added or traversed is updated to point to a child (or children) of the current
new-TIB-block.
To recap, the insertion of a response into a responses set starts with a switch-block
and the top-level TIB-block from the response and then proceeds in two phases (for
each trie prefix branch): first the insertion proceeds down switch-blocks, until an
empty slot is found in a switch-block or the search “falls off” the switch trie and into
an old, existing response’s TIB trie. The search then proceeds down the old and new
TIBs, adding new switch trie blocks along the way, until the search “falls off” the
old-TIB and the current new-TIB-block is inserted as a child of the latest switch trie
block added.
When an acknowledgement is received for a response packet, a similar traversal is
needed to remove the packet’s TIBs from the switch-trie. Alternatively, the switch
could store a list of the switch-trie blocks modified by each packet, to accelerate the
packet’s removal. Once the bitset of a switch-trie block becomes empty, it can be
removed from its parent block (and so on recursively) and its memory reclaimed.
While following a long chain of switch-blocks to insert a response is expensive, it
cannot be avoided in the worst case. On the flip side, if a particular prefix is very
“hot”, with many messages containing it, the cost of building a path of switch-blocks
for it will be amortized over many responses. In fact, the search may go faster while
traversing switch-blocks, as memory chunks for new-TIB and switch-blocks can be
fetched in parallel from DRAM and SRAM. A potential problem remains that even
if the initial array keeps average response insertion times low, the variance could be
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quite high due to those responses that lead to long trie traversals. Subsection 8.6.2
sketches a possible solution to this problem.
The performance implications of these trade-offs are best evaluated with a proto-
type software implementation and simulation, followed by experimentation on a pro-
grammable switch. We have not implemented the switch trie or the insertion pro-
cedure for responses, but we have implemented packet TIB tries and section 8.5
evaluates the performance of intersecting a packet trie with a large, static TIB trie
playing the role of the switch trie.
8.4.1 Trie and Set Asymptotics
The asymptotic behavior of trie intersection does not yield itself to easy analysis.
Trabb Pardo’s thesis [184] yields a “hopelessly inscrutable answer” for the general
case of trie intersections, to quote the author, but a probabilistic analysis yields an
average time (number of comparisons) of O(m lg(n/m)) for sets N and M of size m
and n, respectively, where m ≤ n23. This is the same as the general worst-case bound
for merging two ordered sets. However, it has been shown [185] that if ordered sets
N and M can be divided into k blocks N1, N2, . . . , Nk and M1,M2, . . . ,Ml (where
k = l ± 1) such that their merged set is an alternation of these blocks, then the sets
can be me merged in time Ω(k lg((n + m)/k)). The lower the k, the “easier” the
problem of merging the sets.
In our case, if requests have high locality, accessing mostly similar names, then the
names of a new response (setM) are likely to form a single contiguous block, so k ≈ 1
for the purposes of merging the names of M into the names of the responses set (set
N) and the bound becomes Ω(lg(n + m)), or assuming n + m ≈ n, Ω(lg n). The
worst-case of k = n similarly yields Ω(n). This tells us that conflict checking is highly
sensitive to the blocking factor k, and that the effort required to check two messages
of similar size against a responses set can vary by a factor of n/ lg n depending on
how their names interleave with the set.
23In our case, m would correspond to the number of names in a message while n would be the
number of names in a responses set
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It also tells us that it is beneficial to keep the size n of responses sets as small
as possible, to reduce variability. This is something most designs would strive for
anyway, since it corresponds to lowering packet residency times and latency. However,
this variability is fundamentally problematic in the context of switches and routers,
which are usually designed with an eye towards worst-case performance, in order to
keep traffic flowing smoothly. Bounding worst-case performance is difficult when the
amount of processing for an incoming message can vary by an order of magnitude or
two. To avoid wild performance fluctuations and mitigate the potential for denial-of-
service attacks, a switch may have to bound the amount of processing it performs for a
requests or response, dropping it if the bound is exceeded. Since dropping responses
is expensive, the switch might shirk responsibility instead, as discussed in Section
3.6.3.
The main victims of such bounding policies would be large, complex requests (and,
consequently, responses) concurrently accessing many names interleaved at a fine
granularity. While dropping such requests as contention rises might sometimes be
appropriate to protect servers from overload, it might also lead to liveness problems
when applications are unable to get complex yet non-conflicting requests through to
servers. We briefly discuss an approach for mitigating such problems in chapter 9 on
future work.
8.5 Conflict Checking Performance Evaluation
The main objective of our experiments is to get a rough estimate for how many
intersection checks a single processor core can perform per second.
8.5.1 Experimental setup
As discussed in the previous section, one of the most important factors for conflict
checking difficulty is the locality of tries, that is: whether they have highly localized
accesses to blocks of similar names or whether the accesses are diffusely spread across
dissimilar names. Figure 8.8 shows examples of tries with low, medium and high
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localities, corresponding to a high, medium and low block factor k, as discussed in
the preceding section.
Low-locality trie Medium-locality trie High-locality trie
Figure 8.8: Three tries with different localities
We will quantify locality in terms of the distribution of branches across trie levels.
For example, the “low-locality” trie of Figure 8.8, has all but one of its branches at
the top level. The “medium” locality trie has its branches at its median level, while
the “high” locality trie branches at its lowest level only. When generating tries for our
experiments we use a parameter l ∈ [0, 1] to shape locality, as follows. We distribute
the branches a trie we generate onto its levels according to a normal distribution
centered at maxl · l, where maxl is the maximum number of levels in the trie. We
use a standard deviation of one-eighth the maximum number of levels, i.e. 2 for
maxl = 16. We normalize the area of the curve between 0 and maxl to 1 and move
some of the uppermost branches down to lower levels if needed, since the top-level can
accommodate at most 16 branches, the second level 256 branches and so on. Hence,
l = 1 gives a highly local trie with most of its branches at the bottom, while l = 0
gives a trie with most branches at the top and low locality. Our test routines can
generate tries with a given number of nodes and locality factor.
We wish to evaluate our performance for a relatively large namespace, with names
of up to 64 bits. Choosing names at random from such as large name space is futile,
as the probability of tries overlapping beyond the uppermost levels dwindles rapidly.
Instead, we define a data trie containing a set of names and then randomly draw names
from that trie to create packet tries. The data trie is defined by a recursive pseudo-
random generator function and its nodes are only instantiated on-demand as names
are drawn from the trie. The generation takes as input the minimum and maximum
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number of bits in names as well as the average density of child nodes at different
levels in the trie. To generate a trie, a random walk is made down the branches of the
data trie, choosing names and prefixes in a way that satisfies the specified branching
distribution. Our method is carefully designed as not to introduce any bias to the
selection. We use an implementation of the Mersenne Twister [186] algorithm from
its authors to supply the pseudo-random numbers that drive our experiments.
In our experiments, the length of names in the data trie varies between 16 and 64
bits, with an average length of roughly 40 bits. The data trie is highly dense at
the top levels, relatively sparse at the middle levels (around 6-15% block occupancy)
but highly dense at the bottom levels, since that’s where most of the actual data
items would reside. For each locality factor in our experiments, we scale the data trie
densities by trial and error to achieve a median conflict ratio of 5%, that is: until
roughly 5% of packet tries have at least one member in common with the switch trie.
The expected number of names in the data trie ranges from roughly a trillion to 10
trillions, corresponding to the amount of data stored in a small data center or sizeable
cluster of servers.
When running an experiment we first generate a switch trie by generating the desired
number of (response) tries with member counts varying uniformly between 10 and
500 and then merging the tries into a single trie. For each request trie size that is
to be evaluated, we generate a few thousand (request) tries according to the method
described here above. We then conflict-check each trie against the switch trie several
thousand times, measuring the time elapsed using the highest-resolution timer offered
by the host operating system (Windows XP SP 2). We ran our experiments in
a single thread on a 3.20GHz Pentium 4 with 1GB of RAM. Note that this is a
more powerful processor than some of the network processors we’re targeting. Intel
IXP2800 Microengines, for example, are clocked at 1.4GHz and have a simple, non-
superscalar architecture. On the other hand, a single IXP2800 chip can achieve
greater throughput as it comprises 16 such engines.
In all our experiments, we measure our implementation’s conflict-checking through-
put, measured in tries conflict-checked per second.
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8.5.2 Varying Conflict Locality
In our first set of experiments, we vary between 5 locality factors ranging from 1.0 to
0.3. For each factor, we generate a switch TIB trie as described in the prior section,
containing 100 “response” tries. We then create packet TIB tries of varying sizes,
from 5 to 250 names, and intersect with the switch trie as described in the prior
section. The switch trie contains around 25.000 names, in each experiment.
Figure 8.9 shows our main performance results, showing the number of names in tries
on the horizontal axis and the millions of conflict checks per second on the vertical
axis. For tries with relatively high locality, the performance is pretty good. At 11.03
million checks per second, each check takes about 90 nanoseconds or 290 CPU cycles
on average. With 250 names per trie, the performance is still above 2 million checks
per second, corresponding to roughly 500 nanoseconds or 1600 cycles. Beyond a
certain threshold for trie locality, however, performance tapers off very quickly.
For concreteness, we also plot the approximate conflict checking throughput required
to sustain conflict checking at rates of 1Gbps and 10Gbps, using the formula that
each packet has 40 bytes plus 5 bytes per name.
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Figure 8.9: Performance as trie localities are varied.
We note that since our experiments repeatedly intersect the same tries, most of the
memory accesses are served from the processor’s L1 cache, so the results represent
mainly processing time, not stalls for memory fetches. We feel that leaving out the
185
effects of the memory system is more instructive in our context24. For completeness,
we did test the reverse, worst-case order of testing a different trie every time, and this
reduces performance steadily from around 55% of what is shown here down to 15%,
for the largest tries.
In other respects, our results are conservative. For example, we do not use an initial
array in our experiments. An initial array for the first 16 bits (4 levels) removes the
need for 3 block comparisons, which would mostly remove the need to look beyond
the initial array in the case of high-locality tries of up to 50-100 names. Also, a
conflict ratio of 5% is on the high side of the 1-5% range considered typical [6]. Lower
conflict rations yield faster checks, as demonstrated by Figure 8.19 on page 193. Our
experiments also correspond to the worst-case traffic consisting solely of requests and
responses. A more typical scenario would have a significant part of the traffic consist
of non-conflict checked value requests and responses.
While our performance results do not transfer directly to network processor settings,
due to divergent processor and memory subsystem architectures, they indicate that
conflict checking at high rates may be feasible, as long as tries have high locality.
Continuing with our 1Gbps port example, it needs to handle roughly a million checks
per second to keep up with line rates with small packets of 100 bytes. This seems
to be within reach for a processor core of comparable power to a Pentium 4. Note,
though, that we do not include the effort required to update response tries upon
reception of response packets, which would likely cut their conflict checking rates by
at least half.
It is not as clear that a single core could sustain 10Gbps rates using our implemen-
tation, once other overheads have been factored in. But if multiple processors and
memories can be applied to the checking in parallel, that level of performance may
be achievable. For single-name, 45 byte packets, for example, a switch would need to
sustain roughly 22 million checks / second. The initial-array optimization or TCAMs
(see Section 8.6.2) would help, but sustaining these rates likely requires multiple
processors/cores working in parallel.
24A tuned implementation on a network processor would mask memory latency to a large degree,
using simultaneous multithreading to achieve a similar throughput but with higher latency.
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Our conflict checking cannot sustain high rates when tries have low locality, and the
analysis of Section 8.4.1 suggests that high performance in that case is fundamentally
hard to achieve. Yet, tries corresponding to localities below 0.5 seem unlikely to occur
in practical name hierarchies, or can and should be avoided in most cases. A request
with significant branching in the uppermost levels of the name hierarchy would likely
be forwarded to multiple hosts, requiring an expensive two-phase atomic commit
which is expensive compared to requests executing on a single host. Hence, name
spaces and host allocation will aim to concentrate related data on the same hosts as
much as possible, leading to high trie localities. Generally, most of a name’s prefix
will correspond to some relatively high-level collection, such as a database relation
or a set of related objects. The last, least-significant bits of the name discriminate
between individual data items in that collection. Still, our algorithm might be able
to sustain 1Gbps of purely low-locality requests.
The performance difference between the high-locality and low-locality cases is largely
explained by the number of block comparisons performed, that is: the number of times
the intersection algorithm looks at a new block from each trie. While that number
remains relatively low for high-locality tries, it grows at a significantly faster pace for
low-locality tries. We believe the main reason is that low-locality tries “saturate” their
top levels with prefixes, and must therefore initiate searches down many branches,
comparing many blocks. High-locality tries, by comparison, have a thin “stem” that
“slices” through the dense switch trie top levels, since the maximum number of bits
their top-level bitmaps can have in common with the tree switch bitmap is 1.
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Some of the jitter in Figure 8.9 can be explained by variations in the conflict ratio
obtained for different trie sizes. Controlling for conflict ratio variance completely
is hard without introducing bias, and in the case of the low-locality tries it grows
significantly with trie sizes. Figure 8.11 shows the conflict ratios occurring during
the experiment. Since conflict checking performance is very sensitive to the degree
of overlap between tries, the variations in conflict ratios show through in our other
results.
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Figure 8.11: Ratio of tries that conflict.
To evaluate the number of DRAM fetches that our implementation would incur,
we instrumented our implementation to note from which 32-byte section of memory
each block from the trie being checked against the switch trie was “loaded”. This
number corresponds to the number of fetches a network processor would have to
make to conflict check an incoming request or response, assuming 32-byte DRAM
bursts. Figure 8.12 shows the average number of chunks per check, leaving out the
low-locality cases to reduce clutter. We plot the number of chunk fetched per block
compared, in Figure 8.13. We are not sure why the extreme low-locality case has such
a low ratio. We suspect it is because these lowest-locality “fill in” the upper levels
underlying data trie, resulting in packet tries and the switch trie taking on the same
shape and ending up with the same arrangement of blocks into chunks.
Aside from performance, the size of the tries is of interest. We report the size of the
blocks alone, without including any overhead for child pointers. Figure 8.14 shows
the number of blocks for tries, while Figure 8.15 shows the average number of bytes
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Figure 8.12: Number of memory chunks “fetched” in tries.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0  25  50  75  100  125  150  175  200  225  250
N
um
be
r o
f c
hu
nk
s 
fe
tc
he
d 
pe
r b
lo
ck
Number of names in tries
l = 1.0
l = 0.8
l = 0.6
l = 0.4
l = 0.3
l = 0.2
Figure 8.13: Number of memory chunks “fetched” per block.
per name encoded in a trie. Unsurprisingly, the higher the trie locality, the more
efficient the encoding.
The results presented so far correspond to the case where a response is added to
the switch trie, since we make the intersection test find and report all intersections.
However, when conflict checking requests the search can be terminated as soon as the
first conflict is found. Figures 8.16 shows the performance in this case.
These results probably overstate the benefits for high-locality tries, as in our exper-
iments conflicting requests tend to have very many names in common when they do
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Figure 8.14: Number of blocks in tries.
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Figure 8.15: Number of bytes per name encoded in tries.
conflict, as shown in figure 8.17. In a system where conflicting requests have fewer
names in common, the performance benefit would not be as significant.
8.5.3 Varying the Switch Trie Size
We ran our experiments again, this time varying the number of tries from which the
switch trie is built, from 100 to 10.000 tries. Figure 8.18 shows the performance
results with locality factor 1.0. The performance is relatively slightly affected by this
hundredfold increase in the size of the switch trie. Most intersection checks only
compare between 2 and 10 blocks near the upper levels of the trie, that are near
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Figure 8.16: Performance as trie localities are varied, first-conflict only.
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Figure 8.17: Average number of names in common to conflicting tries.
full density for all trie sizes (which is one of the reasons why it makes sense to use
an initial array). As soon as the “stem” of a packet trie gets beyond these dense
levels, the probability of it coinciding with switch tree stems decreases rapidly. With
reference to the analysis in Section 8.4.1, the effort clearly grows closer to lg n than
n.
8.5.4 Varying Conflict Ratios
In the final set of experiments, we vary conflict ratios, from 0 to 40%. We do it the
same way as we controlled for conflict ratios in the other experiments, by scaling the
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Figure 8.18: Performance as switch trie sizes varies.
block density factors of the data trie to increase or decrease the number of names in it,
thus increasing or decreasing the probability of conflicts. Figure 8.19 shows the results
for trie locality 1.0. The performance is quite sensitive to conflict ratios, due to the
higher number of blocks that must be compared, as Figure 8.20 shows. This poses a
problem; if routers are to help protect servers against contention overload, they must
be able to filter out conflicting requests rapidly enough. A server that is becoming
overloaded due to high conflict ratios might simply drop requests whose processing
exceeds some bound, assuming that the request probably conflicts. But again, this
graph represents the worst-case scenarios, as those requests that conflict have many
names in common and the intersection routine is set to find them all. Figure 8.21
shows the best-case scenario, where the conflict routine stops after finding the first
conflict. Real-world scenarios probably fall somewhere in between these extremes.
8.6 Possible Optimizations
This section discusses some optimizations that might enhance the performance of
conflict checking and atomic switches.
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Figure 8.19: Performance as conflict ratios vary (all conflicts).
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Figure 8.20: Number of blocks compared as conflict ratios vary.
8.6.1 Combining detection with Forwarding
It may be possible to amortize the cost of traversing the switch trie by storing forward-
ing information in it, looking up next-hop information while detecting conflicts. For
example, a tree switch-block could have associated with it the set of ports subscribing
to requests or responses, respectively, that contain a name beginning with the block’s
prefix. After all, this is essentially how Tree Bitmaps are used for high-performance
IP lookup; a block is associated with next-hop information for the prefixes termi-
nating in the block. Even if the switch’s entire multicast subscription database does
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Figure 8.21: Performance as conflict ratios vary (first conflict only).
not fit into the switch trie, parts of it could be cached there since switch trie entries
correspond to “active” prefixes for which packets have recently been forwarded.
While this is an attractive idea, it must be judged in the context of the overall
multicast subscription management design. But within an autonomous subnetwork,
where the naming hierarchy can be made to correlate with the network topology
and forwarding tables can be kept compact, combining detection with forwarding
could provide conflict checking with minimal additional cost, at least in the case
of high-locality, non-conflicting requests. In Chapter 5 we do indeed model fine-
grained multicast subscription as a set-intersection problem, that is: the switch must
determine whether the intersection of a channel’s subscription and a packet is non-
empty. switch-blocks could possibly serve the dual purposes of storing subscription
information and determining forwarding ports as well as detecting conflicts, increasing
performance while reducing implementation complexity.
8.6.2 Hardware, TCAMs and Parallelism
The operation of comparing two TIB-blocks to find conflicts and/or the list of common
child prefixes may be amenable to hardware implementation, in an FPGA (Field
Programmable Gate Array) or ASIC, for example. A hardware implementation could
potentially perform a block comparison in a few cycles. We observe that Tree Bitmaps
have been implemented in FPGAs as well as an ASIC in a commercial router [178,
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168], achieving excellent lookup performance bounded mainly by memory bandwidth
and latency. We anticipate that decoding the TIB-block list-structure may pose a
challenge, since it is geared towards iterative processing rather than combinational
logic.
Another way to boost conflict checking performance would be to utilize the Ternary
Content-Addressable Memories (TCAMs) available in many Network Processor archi-
tectures, such as the Intel IXP [112]. A TCAM is an associative memory supporting
constant-time lookup of the value associated with a key. The sizes of keys and values
can range from dozens to hundreds of bits and TCAM capacities can range from thou-
sands to hundreds of thousands of key/value entries. A TCAM achieves constant-time
lookup by searching its entries in parallel, using multiple comparator circuits. This
enables TCAMs to sustain tens to hundreds of millions of lookups per second. A
bitmask specifying don’t-care bits is included with each key, permitting matching on
a subset of a key’s bits. If multiple entries match a search key, the highest-priority
entry is returned. While TCAMs were designed for fast next-hop lookup of variable-
length IP address prefixes, their function is quite general and TCAMs have been used
to accelerate other types of packet classification tasks [187]. Their main drawbacks
are high cost and energy consumption, as compared to ordinary SRAMs.
An straightforward use of a TCAM would be to store an initial-array in it. One could
map each n-bit prefix present in the switch-trie to the TIB-block continuing that
prefix. While up to 2n TCAM entries might be needed in theory, only a few hundred
or thousands of entries would be needed in practice, depending on switch-trie sizes
and prefix distributions. In the best case when none of an incoming request packet’s
n-bit prefixes are present in the TCAM, the packet can be forwarded without stalling
for switch-trie memory fetches. Furthermore, conflict-free response packets can be
added to TCAM without stores to switch-trie memory.
This simple approach is effective when the n-bit prefixes of packet names are uniformly
distributed across the space of n-bit prefixes. But as data contention increases25, a
larger proportion of incoming packets will have an n-bit prefix match in the TCAM.
Also, using the TCAM as a high-speed memory does not take full advantage of its
capabilities. We now sketch a different solution that addresses the issue of biased
25Or if the name space is biased towards a relatively small set of n-bit prefixes.
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names, using don’t-care bits for longest prefix matching. It essentially uses the TCAM
as an index into the switch-trie, enabling many conflict-checks to skip over its topmost
levels.
As an incoming response packet p is processed, a covering set of prefixes from p are
chosen for insertion into the TCAM, that is: a set of non-overlapping prefixes Kp such
that every name in p has some member of Kp as a prefix. The heuristics for choosing
the prefixes could be something as simple as adding the first few extended prefixes
encountered in p in a depth-first traversal26. The heuristics must be deterministic,
though, as the packet will be traversed again to remove it from the TCAM and
switch-trie, upon reception of its acknowledgement.
Prefixes are kept sorted by length in the TCAM from longest to shortest, so a sin-
gle TCAM lookup returns the longest matching prefix. A simple way to allow fast
insertion of prefixes in proper order is to partition the TCAM entries into “blocks”,
corresponding to different prefix lengths. Since name lengths are multiples of four,
m/4 blocks would be needed for prefixes of length up to m, e.g. 20 for prefixes of
length up to 80 bits. The TCAM is kept prefix-free like the switch-trie itself, that
is: no entry in the TCAM is the prefix of another entry in the TCAM or switch-trie.
The value stored into the TCAM for a prefix key is a trie-block, containing a member
bit-set and the addresses of child-blocks in SRAM and/or DRAM.
Let p be an incoming response packet. For each prefix k from Kp, the switch looks k
up in the TCAM. The main cases that can arise are:
1. There is no match. In this case, the switch trie has no names with k as a prefix,
and the conflict-checking of k is complete. Prefix k is added to the TCAM,
having as its value a trie-block pointing to the continuation of k in p’s DRAM
packet memory.
2. A matching prefix kT is found, where the length of kT is no greater than the
length of k. In this case, the conflict-checking of k “backs off” to kT and
26Applications could give “hints” by preferentially extension-encoding long top-level prefixes,
and/or those known to experience contention.
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continues with the trie-block of kT . It may subsequently proceed to read switch-
trie SRAM blocks and ultimately, packet DRAM blocks. At the end, if k turns
out to be non-conflicting, it is added to TCAM, as in the first case.
3. A matching prefix kT is found, where the length of kT is greater than the length
of k. In this case, k cannot be added to the TCAM, since it is a prefix of kT .
The lookup process therefore continues separately for each prefix k · k′ of p,
where k′ is a child-prefix of k. Ultimately, these extensions of k will match an
entry of equal length or have no match, leading to case 1 or 2 here above.
Request packets are processed similarly, except they are not added to the switch-trie
and processing terminates immediately upon discovery of a conflict.
A single TCAMmatch can potentially skip a substantial number of trie-block compar-
isons. A 64-bit long match, for example, would skip sixteen 4-bit comparison steps,
potentially obviating the need for several SRAM and DRAM reads. The TCAM op-
timization is more robust to biased name spaces and long names than a (reasonably
sized) initial-array, as a greater number of prefix bits are be used to discriminate
between conflicts and non-conflicts.
Since only prefixes of conflict-free names are added to the TCAM, a match on a prefix
p implies that no TCAM entry for any proper prefix of p points to a switch-trie subtree
containing names with prefix p. Note however that the TCAM entry for p may be
shared by multiple response packets, whose prefixes continue in the switch-trie block
pointed to by p and ultimately separate into non-overlapping branches. A TCAM
entry is only removed once its bitmap becomes empty, meaning the entry no longer
points to any trie-blocks. Hence, “hot” prefixes present in many responses tend to
stay “cached” in TCAM, accelerating conflict-checking on these prefixes.
The TCAM optimization may be particularly effective in the case where acceleration
is most needed: for hot prefixes affected mainly by small response packets, containing
less than 10-20 names. Most of the names from such packets may be stored com-
pletely in TCAM, with long prefixes stored for the rest. Hence, many trie branches
of incoming request packets can be processed entirely through TCAM lookups, with
the rest requiring few memory fetches.
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As a final, more general note, switches are inherently concurrent devices and conflict-
checking is an inherently parallel process. Packets bound for different ports can
obviously be conflict-checked in parallel, with multiprocessor cores assigned to sets of
ports, e.g. Multiple messages bound for the same port can also be checked in parallel,
although this requires careful coordination to ensure the conflict checking fulfills the
AtomicSwitch automaton specification. Furthermore, a particular trie can be conflict-
checked in parallel; when two blocks have multiple prefixes in common, each prefix
can be processed independently of the others. They might be processed concurrently
by different thread contexts on CPUs supporting hardware multi-threading, for ex-
ample. Hence, there is considerable scope to parallelize conflict checking to scale its
performance.
8.7 Discussion and Related Work
This section discusses related work on tries, as well as issues related to generalizing
TIBs to other operations and conflict relations.
8.7.1 Related Work on Tries
Two well-known compressed trie variants are the Patricia Trie [188] and the Ternary
Search Trie [189]. A trie can be converted into a Patricia Trie by removing each single
child from the trie and appending its character to the label on its parent edge. Hence,
edges are labeled with variable-length character strings, not characters, reducing the
number of nodes. A Ternary Search Tree (TST) combines aspects of binary search
trees with tries. A TST node’s left (right) pointer points to a sub-TST continuing
all strings that are lexicographically before (after) the node’s prefix, while its middle
pointer points to a sub-TST containing all strings that begin with the node’s prefix.
Bagwell [190] describes a data structure similar to Tree Bitmaps, dubbing it an “Array
Mapped Tree” and tracing the idea’s lineage to Bird in 1977 [191]. Guy Jacobson
[192] describes an asymptotically optimal way to encode static binary trees, using bit
sequences to encode absence and presence of child nodes. The Shape Shifting Trie
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[193] is an elegant trie variant based on Jacobson’s encoding, where the underlying
“shape” of a block is not a fixed, full binary trie but can vary according to the shape
of the trie being encoded. This allows longer stems to be encoded within a single
block. That data structure is geared explicitly towards hardware implementation,
though, and intersections cannot be directly computed with bitwise AND unless the
shapes of the underlying blocks conform.
8.7.2 Generalizing to Arbitrary Operations
The primary objective of our experimental evaluation was to get some empirical data
about the set-intersection performance levels achievable with a Tree Bitmap-like data
structure. But to use TIBs or some other suitable data structure for conflict checking
in practice, the repertoire of operations must be expandable beyond simple reads and
writes.
This issue could be addressed on an ad-hoc basis within isolated subnetworks, or
Metanetwork [154], with application-specific packet formats installed into switches.
However, the basic function of conflict detection is remains basically the same, re-
gardless of application domain. Still generality must be weighed against performance.
Given the performance constraints27, it seems likely that switch conflict checking soft-
ware would be a fixed, compiled binary, upgraded only as a part of system evolution.
This may limit the number of available ADTs in an atomic network to a few dozen or
hundreds, at best. On the other hand, availability of a good set of basic abstractions
such as numbers, strings, lists, maps, queues, sets, objects and trees, for example,
could facilitate interoperability between atomic applications.
Our experiments needed only a single bit to store operation information: whether
the operations was a read or a read/write. For other ADTs, more operations may be
available and some conflict relations may take operation arguments or return values
into account. However, TIB-blocks can only accommodate so many bits in its list, e.g.
up to 8 bits per entry. A reasonable compromise might be to split conflict detection
into two parts: a detection based on up to 27 coarse-granularity operation conflict
classes, detecting a superset of all conflicts. A conflict detected at this coarse level
27And in some system environments: code size constraints.
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would lead to a second stage of conflict checking, using more detailed information
about the operations in question. We note that the overflow block system can be
easily extended to allow chaining of overflow blocks, supporting variable-length data
in a relatively efficient way. Aso, a TCAM could possibly be used to quickly look up
the conflict properties of a pair of operations. But the present dissertation does not
further investigate these issue.
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Chapter 9
Future Work
This section discusses future directions and extensions of the work presented in this
dissertation, some of which are already in progress and others that are more specu-
lative in nature. While concurrency control is one of the pillars of distributed atomic
execution, it also rests on two other foundations: persistent recoverability and atomic
commit.
Persistent recoverability refers to the fact that in an atomic execution a client should
only receive an operation’s response if the operation’s effects have been persistently
committed to the system’s state. However, the persisting of operation effects in (slow,
non-volatile) stable storage is often at odds with the desire to send back operation
responses as quickly as possible. A common practical approach is to append operation
records to a persistent log upon execution, while persisting their state effects in a
background process. When a server recovers after a crash, it reconciles its log with
its persistent state, completing the effects of committed operations while undoing
the effects of aborted ones. Nonetheless, the logging delay can significantly increase
response times in systems where persisting a log record takes a long time as compared
to executing a request.
Atomic commit refers to the fact that operations must be atomic even if they span
multiple servers. While this dissertation is intentionally restricted to systems where
each request is executed on a single server host, transactional systems must generally
be able to execute operations involving multiple hosts. An atomic commit protocol
is required to ensure that a request is either successfully committed at each host it
involves or else that it is aborted at each host. Atomic commit is an inherently expen-
sive algorithm, as it generally requires at least two message rounds as well as locking
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of affected state while a request’s fate is being determined. This determination is usu-
ally performed by a designated host called the request’s coordinator. Unfortunately,
failure of the coordinator can lead to the request being hung indefinitely, getting
neither committed nor aborted.
This chapter sketches ideas for dealing with recoverability by using switch packet
memory as stable storage, removing logging delays. It then sketches a new atomic
commitment protocol that uses Atomic Transfer to achieve “stateless coordination”,
where switches act as coordinators for atomic commit without retaining any state for
requests. The protocol assumes and retains the property that requests are addressed
to variable names instead of servers and is furthermore transparent to requesters.
The chapter then sketches some ideas for optimizations aiming to further lower request
response-times, motivated mainly by the desire to lower the rate of concurrency-
control conflicts in cached systems such as those of Chapters 4, 6 and 7. These
optimizations exploit the guarantees of Atomic Networks for aggressive, speculative
execution that might otherwise not be practical. Finally, the chapter briefly discusses
security and replication issues, which have otherwise been left outside scope.
9.1 Resilient Transfer
As outlined in the introduction, transactional systems commonly use operation log-
ging to persist the execution of an operation before transmitting its response. If the
response were sent any earlier and the server crashed between sending the response
and persisting its effect, clients might erroneously receive the response for an oper-
ation that apparently never executed. Logging is commonly performed by forcing
a log record to disk, waiting until the record has been persistently written to the
disk’s platter surface. This can be a significant source of latency, as even the fastest
disks take several milliseconds to complete a write operation. Solid-state disks (SSDs)
promise to lower this latency to tens or hundreds of microseconds, reducing the im-
pact of logging delay. Yet, this corresponds to hundreds of thousands of processor
cycles, so the delay remains significant in many cases.
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There have been proposals for redundantly storing data in multiple volatile memory
banks [127, 128] to create fast28 stable storage. If banks fail independently and
are backed by a battery and/or uninterruptible power supplies, the probability of all
banks simultaneously losing their contents can be made arbitrarily small. One scheme
would be for server hosts send their log records to other hosts and regard their records
as stable upon receiving f acknowledgements of receipts, where f is the number of
failed banks that should be tolerated. Still, this may result in longer delays than
SSD-based logging, as sending and receiving logging messages and ACKs can take
tens or hundreds of microseconds, besides consuming host resources.
Our observation is that the switches on a network path “naturally” create redundant
copies of requests as they store and forward them. Hence, all that is required for
switches to serve as redundant memory banks is for each switch to buffer each request
packet until it knows that the f -th next-hop switch has received it. This ensures that
a request is buffered on at least f switches at any instant in time. In the scheme
we detail in the next section, a server can execute a request and send a response
immediately without waiting for a log record to be written. Once the log record
has been written in the background, the responder acknowledges the request to the
switches, enabling them to purge their copies of it. If the responder fails before
writing the log record or sending an ACK, the switches retain their copy of the
request until they succeed in retransmitting it. Once the responder recovers, any
non-acknowledged requests are thus replayed to the responder, allowing it to rebuild
the state that existed following its last acknowledged request. Even if up to f − 1
consecutive switches on a forwarding path fail simultaneously, the non-faulty switch
preceding that segment of the path will retransmit any lost packets, ensuring eventual
delivery to the f -th switch on the path as long as the network’s topology remains
constant.
9.1.1 Resilient Transfer protocol sketch
This section sketches a protocol for fault-tolerant resilient transfer (RT) in some
detail. The protocol adds limited overhead to switches, apart from increasing the
amount of memory a switch requires to buffer packets. That amount increases roughly
28A store to DRAM can complete in tens of nanoseconds.
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by a factor of f , where f is the maximum number of simultaneously failed switches
tolerated. Since switches are generally designed for high reliability, f = 2 or f = 3
should suffice for most applications.
The core idea is that an ACK from a next-hop switch i acknowledges not only the
reception of packets by i but also the reception of packets by switches up to f − 1
hops beyond i. Instead of sending a single sequence number a acknowledging receipt
of all packets up to and including a, switch i sends an f -tuple A = (a0, a1, . . . , af−1)
of sequence numbers where an acknowledges that all switches n hops beyond i have
received all packets up to and including an, for n ∈ [0, f − 1]. Note that an is a lower
bound, as some switches n hops removed may have received packets with sequence
numbers exceeding an.
Each packet p has encoded in it a fault tolerance fp ∈ [0, f ], indicating the number
of failed switches the packet’s transmission must tolerate. Since fault-tolerance is
assigned on a packet-by-packet basis, a resilient network can carry a mixture of un-
reliable (fp = 0), reliable (fp = 1, corresponding to hop-by-hop reliable transmission)
and fault-tolerant (fp > 1) packets. Let sseq(p)d denote the send sequence number of
a packet p enqueued on channel d ∈ CHANNELSi, that is: the number of packets
enqueued ahead of p on d. A switch buffers a packet p enqueued on d until it receives
an ACK tuple A via d where afp ≥ sseq(p)d, since then it knows that the packet is
buffered on the next fp switches on every path that p is forwarded along.
Let rseq(p) denote the reception sequence number of a packet p received on some
channel c ∈ CHANNELSi, that is: the number of packets received ahead of p on
c. In a typical hop-by-hop reliable scheme, a switch would periodically send the
latest rseq back on c in an ACK, to acknowledge the reception of packets. In the
RT protocol, i must also infer and send back the corresponding rseqs of the f − 1
next-hop switches to which packets from c have been forwarded. To do this, i must
“translate” incoming ACK rseqs from those channels to outgoing ACK rseqs for c.
Switch i can do this by tracking for each packet p enqueued onto a channel d the
channel c = rcvChan(p) on which p was received, as well as rseq(p) and sseq(p)d.
It maintains for each pair of channels c, d ∈ CHANNELSi and fault-tolerance level
k ∈ [1, f ] the latest (greatest) rseq number of a packet received on c and forwarded on
d that has been acknowledged by all switches k hops removed from d, which we denote
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by #ackedc,d,k. This information is updated as new acknowledgements are received.
For example, if an acknowledgement arriving from a channel d allows a packet p with
pf = 2 to be purged, then #ackedc,d,2 is increased to rseq(p), where c = rcvChan(p).
When switch i sends an ACK A = (a0, . . . , af−1) on c, it uses as the value for ak the
lowest acknowledged sequence number among the channels forwarding to c, that is:
ak = min( {#ackedc,d,k | d ∈ CHANNELSi} ).
A problem can occurs, if packets temporarily cease to flow from some channel d′
to c, halting the flow of ACKs for packets enqueued on d′. Then the ACKs sent
on c will be stuck at the rseq of d′, while #ackedc,d,k grows for d 6= d′, leading to
unbounded buffering. To remedy this, switch i maintains a counter #rsMaxc,d,k,
containing the rseq of the latest packet from c with fault-tolerance k enqueued on d.
Hence, #rsMaxc,d,k - #ackedc,d,k is the number of packets with redundancy degree
k forwarded from c to d that have yet to be acknowledged back via d. When that
number is zero, no packet from c with redundancy degree k needs to be retained for
d, so we omit #ackedc,d,k from the computation of ak. In the case where it is zero
for all channels, we define ak as #rseqc, the highest reception sequence number of
any packet received on c29. Formally, we define the ACK A that should be sent on
channel c as:
Definition 9.1 For any c ∈ CHANNELS i on a switch i, the current ACK for c is
the tuple A = (a0, a1, . . . , af−1) where for each k ∈ [0, f−1] : ak = min( {#ackedc,d,k |
d ∈ CHANNELS i ∧#ackedc,d,k < #rsMaxc,d,k} ∪ {#rseqc} ).
We must account for the fact that switches sometimes send their own packets, without
any corresponding packet having been received, for example their own ACKs. Any
such packet p is enqueued as having no associated channel and no rseq. It may have
an arbitrary fault-tolerance and can be reliably transferred like other packets, but is
ignored for the purposes of updating #ackedc,d,k fields.
Clearly, A is an underestimation of the number of packets buffered on neighboring
switches, so switches generally buffer packets slightly longer than they have to. The
overshoot increases linearly with the fault-tolerance level f , and the worst case occurs
29Here we mean the highest sequence number of a packet received in-order and without sequence
number gaps.
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when one of the paths to which a channel’s packet are forwarded has a significantly
slower transmission rate than the other paths. However, such rate differences would
lead to overflow in any reliable transmission scheme, so RT does not introduce a new
problem in that regard.
A host a ∈ HOSTS also maintains send and receive counters, but sends ACKs of
the special form (#rseq,∞, ...,∞), that is: a acts as if each received packet had
been acknowledged by all “switches” on the non-existent path extending beyond a.
This ensures that switches can purge packets that a has acknowledged, regardless of
the packet redundancy degree or network path lengths. Hosts retransmit and purge
outbound packets in a similar manner as switches do.
9.1.2 Recoverability through Resilient Transfer
RT is not intended as a general alternative to end-to-end reliable transfer, but rather
as a mechanism for end-host recoverability without logging delays. The basic idea is
that hosts store their send and receive packet counters, and use them to recover after
failures and ensure exactly-once semantics for request execution. Switches maintain
send and receive sequence counters persistently “forever”, obtaining them back from
neighboring switches upon recovering from failures. Hence, these sequences can be
used as a part of end-host recovery.
A server host b executes requests and sends responses immediately, without waiting
for a log record to be persisted. Host b persists log-records in the background, includ-
ing with each record the rseq sequence number(s) of the request packet(s) causing
the response. Crucially, b only acknowledges a request after b has persisted the cor-
responding log-record. Since request response-times are now independent of logging
delay, b can persist groups of log records together, amortizing the write operation’s
latency over many records 30. Upon recovering from a failure, the home switch i of
b retransmits a superset of the requests that b had yet to persist at the time of fail-
ure. Host b recovers by replaying its log to obtain the state following the last request
packet p present in the log, updating its rseq to n = rseq(p) in the process. It then
30As log records are relatively small in general while the bandwidth of block-oriented storage
devices is usually maximized for large, sequential writes, logging should be able to keep up with
server throughput increases.
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(re)executes received requests with receive-sequence numbers exceeding n. Switch i
detects and drops any duplicate responses (those with sequence numbers less than i’s
rseq for the channel connecting i to b) so the first response forwarded onto the network
represents the “continuation” of b’s execution beyond the point where it failed. We
note that b may alternatively skip logging completely, proceeding to directly update
its persistent state, as long as it can accurately track the progress of these updates
[125]. In any case, average response times can be reduced by a factor of up to φ,
where φ is the fraction of request response times due to waiting for persisting of log
record.
Our scheme, like any recovery scheme, is complicated by non-determinism in request
executions, caused by concurrency and scheduling decisions, for example. The se-
quence of requests executed by a recovering server, in particular, must contain those
already sent as a prefix. Non-determinism can be handled by allowing servers to in-
clude a determinant [194] in a response message r, that is: information that suffices
for the server to reconstruct any non-deterministic choices it made as it originally
executed q, the corresponding request. The determinant for q is carried with r up
to f hops into the network31. When retransmitting requests, a switch includes any
determinants received with responses to those requests. Upon recovery, a server
therefore receives its determinants back with any retransmitted requests, allowing it
to re-create their execution exactly. Determinants are garbage-collected on switches
as the corresponding request packets are purged.
As an aside, a requester requiring exactly-once semantics for its requests (such as
a work-flow processor atomically dequeuing and executing tasks from a task queue)
could perform server-like recovery by including itself as a responder for its exactly-
once requests, turning them into multi-server request32 (see Section 9.2 here below),
although we do not develop this idea further here.
A failed switch recovers by receiving re-transmitted packets from its neighbors, includ-
ing sequence numbers. Neighboring switches detect and drop any duplicate packets
forwarded by the recovering switch during this period. Hence, it is possible to avoid
31The determinant could also include undo information, to support undo/redo recovery [125]
32We prefer the term multi-server transaction instead of “distributed transaction”, as single-server
transactions are distributed despite being handled by a single server.
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packet loss despite the simultaneous failure of up to f consecutive switches on a net-
work path. Observe, though, that switches are inherently non-deterministic due to
their scheduling of multiple packet flows onto an outbound channel. The order of
packets sent can be re-created with the help of determinants. We leave these details
to future work.
Our scheme is related to work on replay recovery for systems comprised of distributed
processes sending and receiving messages [194, 195, 196]. However, these schemes are
very general, dealing with arbitrary networks of stateful nodes performing arbitrary
computations. They are therefore more complex and more expensive in terms of
bandwidth and processing than our network and persistent-state-centric scheme. For
example, processes must sometimes send auxiliary messages for recovery purposes,
since redundancy is only achieved when multiple process nodes buffer messages. By
contrast, our scheme relies on the “natural” redundancy occurring as switches for-
ward packets, and assumes the specifics of store-and-forward processing, resulting in
lower overhead on switches and hosts. The actual overhead is best evaluated using a
prototype implementation, but this awaits future work.
As a final note, our scheme has some security implications. For example, a crashed
server relies on switches to hold on to its non-persisted requests until the server
recovers. This may be acceptable in practice, as the server chiefly depends on the
last f switches on its inbound path(s) to store the requests, and one or more of these
switches are likely a part of the server’s trust domain. Also, all f switches would have
to renege on their duty to store the request for it to be lost. We don’t claim tolerance
to Byzantine, arbitrary failures, but these issues would have to be considered in a
robust implementation.
9.2 Multi-server Requests
As mentioned in the chapter’s introduction, this dissertation limits its scope to single-
server transactions, for simplicity and to keep separate the issues related to atomic
commit. However, scalable systems need to able to execute atomic transactions across
multiple hosts. While data name spaces can and should be designed to minimize the
need for such transactions, they often cannot be avoided altogether.
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This section sketches a novel approach for using atomic switches to accelerate the
commit of multi-server transactions, showing that Atomic Transfer combines with
atomic commit. In our approach, switches function as commit coordinators but in
a stateless manner, exploiting name-based packet forwarding and atomic transfer to
distribute most of the coordinating duties among network switches and server end-
hosts. But first we must consider the issue of multi-packet requests and responses,
which arises in practice even with single-server transactions.
9.2.1 Multi-packet Messages
The models of the preceding chapters assume that requests and response messages are
forwarded as atomic units, effectively corresponding to network packets. In practice,
some requests and responses may be too large to fit in a single packet of maximum
size, and must therefore be broken up into multiple packets. A simple way to process
such a packetized message m would be for each switch to buffer the packets of m
and re-assemble m in memory before processing it. However, this could significantly
increase latency, implementation complexity and the amount of packet buffer space
needed on switches, in addition to placing a de facto limit on the maximum size of
messages.
It is more attractive to retain packet-by-packet processing on switches. This is pos-
sible, by placing the following restriction on the way requests and responses are
split into packets: if a request q ∈ Q and response r ∈ R where conflicts(q, r) are
split into respective sets of packets PQ and PR, then there exists a pair of packets
pq ∈ PQ, pr ∈ RQ such that conflicts(pq, pr), where the domain of conflicts has been
extended to packets. This ensures that if messages q and r cross in the network,
packets pq and qr will cross too and be detected as a conflict. The naming scheme
of Chapter 5 can easily be seen to have this property, if each name/operation pair of
each packetized request or response can be decoded from a distinct packet.
Message name tries could be broken up into packets by introducing a new type of
entry list code “11” in the TIB format of Chapter 8, denoting a prefix that continues
in another packet. This encoding also enables a host to know when it has received its
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part of a request or response: when all such continuation prefixes have been “filled
in” by sub-tries from other packets.
While packetization preserves the correctness of Atomic Transfer, it reduces the effec-
tiveness of switches in shielding end-hosts from receiving conflicting request packets,
as it cannot be known that two messages conflict until their first pair of conflicting
packets is detected. In the worst case, where conflicting messages always have a single
pair of conflicting packets, roughly half of the packets of a conflicting request q can
be expected to be forwarded through the switch that detects the conflict. The rest
of the packets of q, however, can be dropped by having the switch send a request
cancelation packet cq towards the sender of q, defined to conflict with all packets of q.
As a compensating factor, multi-request packets will generally be large and therefore
relatively cheap to receive and conflict-check on a per-byte basis, as indicated by the
experiments of Chapter 8. Also, Section 9.3.1 discusses how conflict detection can be
shifted from hosts to switches completely.
If the conflicting packet of q is not the first packet of q then a copy of it might
be forwarded on to the responder, to notify about the dropping of q and prompt it
to purge the packets of q it has already received. This is only be an optimization,
though, as responders would time out incomplete requests to handle failed requesters,
anyway.
We leave to future work the extension of the results of Section 3.7.1 to packetized
messages, to evaluate the percentage of conflicting packets from packetized messages
that can be expected to be detected on end-hosts as a function of contention. As a
practical heuristic, though, we note that if requesters know which names are most
likely to be contended, they can encode their operations for those names in the first
packet(s) of any request involving the names.
9.2.2 Handling Multi-server Requests
The processing of multi-server requests must preserve two properties that trivially
hold for serializable executions of single-server requests in our model:
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1. Global consistency, meaning that a request is either committed at each of its
cohort servers where it executes or committed at none of them. It cannot be
committed at one cohort and aborted at another, for example.
2. Global serializability, meaning that there must exist a global serialization order
for all committed transactions in a system of hosts, that is compatible with the
local serialization order at each host.
As is well known, local serializability at each host does not imply global serializability
across hosts, as two transactions may be ordered differently on different hosts. Con-
sider, for example, mutually conflicting read/write requests q1: “a = 1, b := 2” and
q2: “b = 1, a := 2”. The first request assumes that a has value 1 and assigns value
2 to b, while the latter assumes b equals 1 and assigns 2 to a. If host(a) 6= host(b)
then host(a) might receive and execute sub-requests “a = 1” of q1 and “a := 2” of q2
in that order, while host(b) might receive and execute sub-request “b = 1” of q2 and
“b := 2” of q1 in that order. Although the requests conflict globally and no global
serialization order can include both requests, the servers cannot observe the conflict
based on their local information.
The following two sections sketch approaches to ensuring global consistency and serial-
izability for multi-server requests. These approaches preserve the naming abstraction
of our models, and a request is issued the same way regardless of whether it will be
served by one or multiple servers. A requester plays no role in the atomic commit pro-
tocol and remains oblivious to the mapping of names to hosts, promoting flexibility
in the allocation of data to servers and load-balancing, etc.
9.2.3 Global Consistency with Atomic Transfer
Atomic commit of a multi-server request q generally requires a two-phase commit
(2PC) [2, 6], which works roughly as follows. In the prepare phase, each cohort of
q receives and executes its sub-request of q and sends back a prepare message for q
to every other cohort, signalling its readiness to commit q. Upon learning that all
the other cohorts of q have prepared q, a prepared cohort enters its commit phase,
irrevocably committing the effects of its sub-request of q and sending a response. On
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the other hand, if some cohort sends an abort message in lieu of a prepare to indicate
that it cannot process its part of q, then all cohorts abort q, ensuring that q has no
effect on the state of any cohort.
Ensuring consistency is a challenge with failure-prone servers and communication
channels, as the cohorts must agree whether to commit or abort the request even as
some of them are crashed or partitioned. The standard solution is to let a central co-
ordinator host oversee the 2PC processing and make the final abort/commit decision.
The cohorts send their prepare or abort messages to the coordinator, which decides
the request’s fate and communicates its decision back to the cohorts in a commit or
abort message. Since the central coordinator has full autonomy in making its deci-
sion (while the cohorts have none after sending their prepares) it can handle crashed
cohorts and failed communication links by deciding to abort, after a time-out, for
example.
Two-phase commit requires two rounds of messages between the coordinator and
the cohorts, increasing request response time. Furthermore, after a cohort sends
its prepare message for a request, the request is in-doubt at the cohort and any
conflicting request must be delayed or dropped, pending the final commit or abort of
the in-doubt request. Worse, if the coordinator crashes the cohorts remain blocked
until the coordinator recovers and resumes processing. While there are non-blocking
alternatives to 2PC [197], they add another round of messages, significantly increasing
response times in the normal case.
Our proposed protocol does not fundamentally deviate from traditional 2PC, requir-
ing two message rounds and blocking on coordinator failure. However, we attempt to
minimize message latency and the probability of coordinator failure by deputizing the
switch iq that first splits a request q as the coordinator for q. Switch iq stamps q with
its identity, alerting subsequent switches that they are not the top-level coordinator
for q. However, switch iq retains no state for q and performs almost no special pro-
cessing for multi-server requests beyond forwarding messages and performing Atomic
Transfer, limiting additional switch complexity. Instead, the tracking of the progress
of q is handled entirely by the cohorts. If a cohort suspects that progress has ceased
due to another cohort failing, it challenges the request by sending a special packet
to the coordinator switch. As described later, the switch resolves race conditions
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between a challenge and a final, missing prepare message using Atomic Transfer. Our
protocol is interesting in that the cohorts communicate only in terms of names; they
track neither the number nor identities of other cohorts.
We extend our model so that qHop is no longer a function, but rather a relation that
forwards a request packet on each channel leading to a host of a name encoded in
the packet. This somewhat complicates the definitions of conflict locality without
fundamentally altering them. A server host b knows that the request q to which a
packet p belongs is a multi-server request if at least one name or prefix in p (including
continuation prefixes) is not mapped to b. In that case, b executes its part qb of q
only tentatively, but sends a prepare packet that contains prefixes that cover each
name of qb, indicating that the operations on those names are prepared. The prepare
packet is sent back to coordinating switch iq, which forwards it to the other cohorts.
Once b has received a set of prepare packets covering the whole of names(q), it knows
that all other cohorts have prepared q and so commits qb, sending out the response
packet(s) for qb.
Prepare packets could be routed back to coordinator switch iq by addressing them to
iq directly (iq having stamped its network identifier on the packet before forwarding it)
or by sending packets “upwards” in hierarchical networks, e.g. The thornier question
is how iq can know where to forward prepare packets for q, and how a cohort b knows
when all the names of q have been covered by a prepare, given that iq maintains
no state for q and that b only receives those packets of q that are relevant to b. A
straightforward solution is for the issuer of a multi-packet request to always send a
survey packet as the first packet of any request, containing continuation prefixes that
cover q as far down q’s name trie as there is space in a single packet. When host b
is prepared, it converts the survey packet into a prepare packet by marking its own
branch(es) of the packet’s trie as prepared and sending it to iq, which forwards /
multicasts the packet normally to the other cohorts, as per the packet’s prefixes. We
note that the concise encoding of Chapter 8 can encode hundreds of prefixes in a
single 1500-byte packet, but our method could be extended to allow multiple survey
packets if needed.
A problem can occur if the survey is not “detailed” enough, so a switch would have
to forward the survey packet based on a continuation prefix. The switch can preserve
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correctness in this case by aborting the request (see below), prompting the requester
to retry with a more detailed survey. Alternatively, if the survey is being forwarded
to a relatively small sub-network, the switch may simply flood the packet onto the
subnetwork, which guarantees that all cohort hosts will receive it.
In the failure-free case, cohort b sends a prepare packet for its part of request q and
adds prefixes from incoming prepare packets to the set of prefixes it knows to be
prepared. Once all names of q are prepared, b commits qb and sends response rb,
its part of the response r to q. On the other hand, if b decides to abort q instead
of preparing it, it converts the survey packet into an abort packet and forwards to
the other cohorts, via iq. If b receives such an abort packet it aborts qb immediately.
Note that Atomic Transfer works the same as before, i.e. requests conflicting with
rb are dropped. If the conflicting request q
′ is a multi-server request detected below
its coordinating switch iq′ , then q
′ might be forwarded on as an abort request, to
expedite the aborting of q′.
The problem of crashed and partitioned cohorts is handled as follows. If a cohort b is
dissatisfied with the progress of q, because b has not received any prepare messages for
some duration of time, for example, it challenges q by converting the survey packet
into a challenge packet pc and sending to iq. Note that it is not safe for b to send
an abort packet, since b has already sent its prepare packet and some cohorts may
already have committed q, so sending an abort could lead to violation of atomicity.
Rather, pc is converted into an abort packet pa at iq, but only if it is safe to do so.
This requires handling the possible race condition between pc and a remaining prepare
packet pp that may already be in transit. Our solution is to define challenge packets
and prepare packets as being in conflict, so that prepare packets dominate challenge
packets and cause them to be dropped. Hence, if a prepare packet pp is received at
iq before pc, then pc is dropped and does not become an abort packet. On the other
hand, if pc is received before pp, then pc becomes an abort packet pa that is forwarded
to all cohorts. By defining aborts as conflicting with and dominating prepares, no
cohort will receive pp and safety is ensured. Note that this solution requires that a
cohort b not commit a request before receiving its own prepare packet. Our scheme
ensures that a request can be aborted and unblocked as long as a single cohort is alive
and connected to the coordinating switch.
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In traditional 2PC, failed and partitioned cohorts query the coordinator about the
fate of a pending request q, upon recovering. This is not possible in our scheme,
as the coordinating switch iq does not maintain any state for q. Instead, a recover-
ing cohort b sends a recovery packet to the other cohorts, which simply respond by
retransmitting prepare or abort packets, as appropriate. Theoretically, this entails
cohorts remembering the fate of each multi-server requests they execute “forever”,
since a recovering host may query about it at some arbitrary later time. In practice,
this state (a bit per request) can be discarded using some garbage collection protocol
or simply timed out, assuming an upper bound on the delay from when a server fails
until it is brought back online or permanently removed.
It may appear that our protocol suffers from O(n2) message complexity, as each cohort
sends it prepare to every other cohort. This compares unfavorably with the O(n)
complexity of sending n prepares to a stateful coordinator that sends n “commit” or
“abort” messages back. However, since coordinating switch iq multicasts messages,
only a single prepare is received and sent over each network link in the forwarding tree
of q (including the links incident to iq) for each cohort, so from that perspective the
complexity of our protocol is also O(n), albeit with a higher constant. The number
of round-trip message hops until a host can commit a request is also the same in
both cases, but our protocol may yield an improvement in practice as switches can
generally forward messages more rapidly than end-hosts. Furthermore, our protocol
chooses coordinators efficiently, i.e. as close to the cohorts in the network as possible,
localizing 2PC communication and reducing latency.
As stated before, this scheme blocks upon coordinator failure. However, relatively
fixed-function switches can be engineered to achieve far higher availability than gen-
eral application end-hosts, making coordinator blocking a commensurately rarer event.
Furthermore, since the coordinator switch is stateless, it may be possible to devise
a scheme whereupon a redundant backup switch takes over coordination duties for a
failed switch, although we leave consideration of this to future work.
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9.2.4 Global Serializability with Atomic Transfer
Atomic Transfer can be used to ensure local serializability of execution at a single
responder host. However, as illustrated in by the example of Section 9.2.2, local seri-
alizability at each individual does not imply global serializability across all hosts, i.e.
that there exists a sequential execution corresponding to the execution of all com-
mitted requests on all server hosts, including requests that span hosts. We propose
two possible solutions for achieving global serialization for multi-server transactions:
bloated requests and gateway ordering. The first is generally applicable, while the lat-
ter is more efficient but only applicable to certain network topologies, albeit common
ones.
Global serialization violations stem from the fact that cohort servers of a request q
have only a partial view of q; a cohort b only detects conflicts on variables that are
hosted on b. A simple “brute-force” solution, therefore, is to ensure that each cohort
receives entire requests, including the parts involving names not hosted on the cohort.
This bloating of requests, as we term it, enables each cohort to detect all conflicts,
the same as if requests were being sent to a single server. In the example of Section
9.2.2, if host a were to receive q1: “a = 1, b := 2” first and q2: “b = 1, a := 2”
second, then a could detect the conflict on variable b even though b is not hosted
on a, by performing conflict-checking processing on the whole of q1 and q2, including
the sending of a response for a name not hosted on a! We note that such “bloated
responses” do not have to be forwarded beyond the node splitting the corresponding
request.
Bloating does lead to a higher cost in bandwidth and conflict-checking, as requests
are sent in whole instead of getting split into sub-requests per cohort. However,
bandwidth is an increasingly abundant resource [183], and the added conflict-checking
burden is somewhat mitigated by the effectiveness of our conflict-checking methods
and the network’s participation in conflict detection. Less brute-force methods, such
as having servers exchange explicit transaction dependency information, incur the
more serious cost of additional message rounds
We face the problem of how to enable switches to forward all packets of a multi-
server requests to each cohort, instead of forwarding to each cohort only the packets
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relevant to it, as dictated by the forwarding relations. One solution would be to use
survey packets, as in Section 9.2.3, containing a high-level overview of the names of
the packets yet to come. Upon receiving the survey, a switch i would remember a
mapping q → Cq from (the identity of) q to the set Cq ⊂ CHANNELSi onto which
prefixes from the survey packet of q may be forwarded, and forward any subsequent
packets of q on the channels of Cq
33. Switch i can discard the map entry for q after
forwarding the final packet of q, or after a time-out, to handle failed requesters.
A cohort b receiving a bloated request q2 conflict checks it with any other bloated
request it has prepared. Upon detecting a conflict with another bloated request q1, it
could abort q2 right away. However, this might lead to both requests getting aborted,
if some other cohort receives q2 first and aborts q1. In the worst case, livelock may
ensue, with the respective requesters repeatedly resubmitting the requests only to
have them be aborted.
We resolve the issue as follows. Let b be a server receiving a pair of mutually conflict-
ing bloated requests q1 and q2, say in that order. Rather than immediately aborting
q2, b computes the relative order of q1 and q2 according to some total order <Q on re-
quests. An implementation could use the integer value of the (cryptographic) digests
of the first packet of the two requests, for example. If q1 <Q q2 then b immediately
aborts q2. On the other hand, if q2 <Q q1 then b waits, delaying q2 from getting
committed. If q1 is received before q2 on all servers that receive both requests, then
b will receive the prepares required to commit q1, leading it to abort q2. Otherwise,
q2 is received before q1 on at least one server, which will immediately send an abort
packet for q1 since q2 <Q q1. Upon receiving that abort, b aborts q1 while sending its
prepare for q2, in effect resuming the 2PC processing of q2. This algorithm ensures
progress, since at least one out of a pair of conflicting requests will get committed.
We propose a similar algorithm in [71], but leave a formal correctness proof to future
work.
We observe though, that global serialization violations occur only if cohort servers
receive their sub-requests for two conflicting requests in the opposite order. If they
always receive their sub-requests in the same order then they simply conflict-check
the response from earlier requests with those of latter requests as usual, which ensures
33The mapping could be stored in the switch’s TCAM, in a high-performance implementation.
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consistent conflict-checking across servers without the need for request bloating. In
the example of section 9.2.2, if both servers process q1 and q2 in that order, then the
server hosting b detects the conflicting operations on b and aborts q2.
If all requests to a set of server hosts traverse a common gateway switch ig, and two
multi-server requests qa and qb are split at or below ig, then any pair of these servers
receives each pair of packets from qa and qb in the same order, when they do receive
both packets. In the common hierarchical (star) network topology, for example, all
packets to nodes below a switch in the hierarchy traverse that switch.
We can exploit this to derive a common agreed order for multi-server requests across
servers in that subhierarchy, for example by defining the order of requests as the order
in which their last packet is received. This works if requesters repeat a request’s survey
in the last packet of a request, ensuring this trailer packet is received at all cohorts. If
a gateway switch is the coordinator for a request, it marks the survey packet as being
gateway-ordered and does not bloat the request, forwarding its remaining packets
normally. Hence, servers can process and conflict check a mix of gateway ordered and
bloated requests. Gateway switches could also help to create an “official” total order
on responses from their sub-hierarchies, by stamping response trailer packets with
sequence numbers. Such orders can be used as the basis for delta-update processing,
as sketched in Section 6.8.
As a parting thought, algorithms for concurrency control are subtle, and many erro-
neous ones have been published. We leave the modeling and correctness proving of
these sketches to future work.
9.3 Optimizations for Cached Systems
While Atomic Transfer is a relatively general concept, its main application may lie
in the construction of efficient atomic caching systems, such as those modeled in
preceding chapters. The hallmark of such systems is that requesters can usually
“predict” the response that results from a request and its effect on the state, since
they cache the input and output data of each request they issue. In many cases,
the only cause for mispredictions will be concurrent requests from other hosts. Also,
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for operations such as simple writes, the response to and effect of a request is always
known. In such circumstances, the decision to commit a request and send its response
can be decoupled in time and space from the act of updating persistent server state
with its effect. This section outlines ideas for optimizations applicable to caching
systems. Their common goal is to reduce the delay from when a request is issued
until requesters are aware of its response, enhancing performance and reducing the
scope for concurrency conflicts.
The optimizations depend on requesters embedding the expected reply to each request
in the request itself. This could be achieved, for example, by encoding request packets
in such a way that they can be easily converted into response packets by changing
a packet type designation field. Note that embedding of responses is only possible if
the request’s execution is deterministic, or can be made deterministic by having the
requester make and encode any non-deterministic choices along with the request.
9.3.1 Request Short-Circuiting
The main idea for reducing the response time for a request q bound for a server host b
is to short-circuit q by multicasting its (expected) response rq before q reaches b. As
long as q has no conflicts, rq would have been generated and sent by b later, anyway.
Short-circuiting reduces the response-time for requests as well as obviating servers
from encoding and sending response packets. More importantly, when combined with
resilient transfer (Section 9.1) and gateway ordering (Section 9.2.4) it can be used
to remove the need for two-phase commit (2PC) of multi-server requests, allowing
the performance of multi-server requests 34 to approach that of single-server requests
[198]. This might justify the considerable additional switch complexity introduced by
short-circuiting.
A switch i can short-circuit a request bound for a set of servers B ⊆ DATAS if it is
a gateway switch for each server in B, that is: if all requests for servers in B pass
through i. Note that in our model, the home-switch of a server b is always a gateway
for b. More generally, switches in networks with a hierarchical (star) topology are
gateways for the servers in their subnetwork. The core idea of short-circuiting is for
34Including requests redundantly sent to the replicas of a replicated logical host.
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switch i to decide the total order of requests executed by the servers of B and send
back their responses without waiting for the servers of B to persist their effects. In
addition to forwarding a conflict-free request q towards it responders, i converts it
into a response rq and enqueues for subscribed channels, the same as if rq had been
received from the responder(s) of q. To the outside world, switch i is essentially
indistinguishable from a single, high-performing server host.
While this is an attractive idea, there are several obstacles to its realization. First of
all, short-circuiting more or less requires resilient transfer (Section 9.1), as switch i has
effectively promised that request q will be executed and that it will generate response
rq. If one or more of the responders were to fail before completing q, the system
would become inconsistent. Furthermore, short-circuting implies that requesters are
trusted to issue only valid request with correctly predicted embedded responses35.
This together with the implied hierarchical structure of the network means short-
circuiting may be most applicable within the lower abstraction levels of a system,
e.g. at the level of reads and writes. Still, that may also be the level where short-
circuiting may be most helpful, as it is the level where many conflicts are detected
and where requests and responses are comprised of a relatively large number of simple
operations.
Multi-packet requests present another obstacle. First, the relative order of two multi-
packet requests flowing concurrently through a switch is not entirely well-defined.
We suggest using the reception of the final packet of a request as defining its order
relative to other requests. Hence, once the final packet of a request is received and
determined to be conflict-free, the request is added to the total order of requests and
the corresponding response enqueued for transmission. While this is clearly biased
against large requests, placing q into the order any sooner than this might lead to all
other requests being delayed until the packets of q have been received and conflict-
checked. Using the final packet also prevents “hung” partial requests from failed
requesters from blocking progress of other requests. In the general case of a conflict
being detected on two non-final packets from two concurrent requests q1 and q2, it is
not clear which one should be dropped. While a switch could decide to arbitrarily
35Speculative Byzantine fault-tolerance protocols such as Zyzzyva [199] may point the way towards
dealing with malicious requesters.
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drop one of them, a more advanced implementation could note the conflict and let
the request whose final packet is received first “win”, dropping the other request.
This highlights a second problem, which is that switch i cannot determine whether
request q is conflict-free before it has received all its packets. Furthermore, it must
buffer the packets up to that point, or else a conflict with one of the packets al-
ready purged from the buffer might go undetected. While this obviously increases
the amount of buffer space required on switches, it might not increase it noticeably
beyond what is needed for resilient transfer anyway, at least for requests of less than
a few dozen packets. As mentioned in Section 9.2.1, the re-assembly of request mes-
sages in switch memory places an upper limit on request and response sizes. This
might be circumvented by allowing switches to “shirk” responsibility for such requests
and forward them tagged as “un-ordered”, signaling that they have not been short-
circuited and may conflict with future requests. Lower-level switches or responders
would re-assemble such requests and conflict-check and delay them until all responses
concurrent with the shirked request are complete. These ideas await future develop-
ment.
As a final remark, we note that many of the same problems and solutions for concur-
rency control and short-circuiting of (multi-packet) requests apply on responder hosts
as well as switches. Some of the solutions might apply to multiprocessor (multi-core)
CPUs, for example by using one core as an I/O processing “switch” that forwards
request fragments to other cores for processing and handles conflict checking and
coordination for the “sub-network” comprised of subordinate cores, e.g. But proper
analysis of these issues awaits future work.
9.3.2 Request Pipelining
As we noted in Section 3.7.1, the round-trip-time between requesters and responders
upper-bounds throughput in our model, as an operation on a name n cannot be
successfully requested before the response to the prior conflicting operation on n
has been received. This is unfortunate, especially in the case where a single requester
issues requests to a set of names with complete absence of contention. As an example,
the requester could be an interactive end-user application editing a document.
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This restriction can be relatively easily lifted by defining a response r to be non-
conflicting with a request q from the same requester, that is: if sender(r) = sender(q).
This allows a requester to pipeline a sequence of requests into the network without
waiting for the responses to its earlier requests, issuing each new request based on
the predicted state effects of the ones preceding it. This requires that requests from
the same requester not be re-ordered in the network or alternatively that responders
can re-establish the correct order.
The requester’s speculation can fail if it issues a request q′ assuming the effects of an
earlier request q that is dropped, due to a concurrency conflict, for example. Hence,
a speculative request q must have a premise field identifying the latest prior request
whose effects were assumed as q was issued, using a sequence number, for example.
Request q is then defined to conflict with the cancelation packet (see Section 9.2.1)
for any request from the same requester with a lower or equal sequence number. The
development and modeling of this scheme awaits future work.
9.3.3 Request Queueing for Liveness
While Atomic Transfer ensures execution correctness despite concurrency interfer-
ence, it does not ensure liveness for requesters whose requests are dropped due to
concurrency conflicts. In fact, as mentioned in Section 3.7.1, the network topology
can induce perpetual unfairness for requesters many network hops away from a server.
One way this might be addressed is by letting the network help requesters coordinate
access to contended data, by letting them “queue up” for access to the data after a
conflict, rather than blindly re-issuing requests. When a request q is dropped due to
a conflict with a response r, the cancelation notification would include the identity of
r. Upon receiving the cancelation notification, the responder (or the switch currently
buffering q, if short-circuiting is employed) would send the survey packet of q as a
queue packet qq, including the identity of r. Packet qq would be forwarded normally to
the subscribers of the relevant state, keeping them informed about conflicts affecting
the state.
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The requester host a of q knows that q has been dropped upon receiving r. However,
instead of immediately re-issuing q, a would wait until receiving the queue packet
qq for q. Moreover, a would keep track of all other queue packets received between
r and qq that are tagged with r, indicating requests received ahead of q that were
also dropped by r. It would delay the re-issuing of q until receiving the response
corresponding to the last queue packet before qq. In other words, a waits until the
earlier conflicting requests have been re-issued and completed, before issuing its own.
This way, contending requesters queue up for resubmission of their requests, giving
each a fair chance to complete its request. Practically speaking, time-outs would be
used to prevent unbounded waiting for failed requesters or dropped queue packets,
etc.
The downside of this approach is that it places the burden of sending queue packets
for dropped requests on responders, reducing the shielding from contention provided
by the network. The requirement for responder involvement makes the approach
less attractive. Gateway switches can shoulder that burden, when short-circuiting is
employed. But even then, the forwarding of survey packets based on their prefixes
may be problematic, as the set of overlapping subscribing hosts may be quite large,
leading to excessive distribution of queue packets. On the flip side, the orderly queuing
reduces the number of conflicting requests issued, lowering the load on switches and
hosts alike. Proper analysis of these trade-offs awaits future work.
9.4 Security and Replication
This dissertation leaves security outside its scope. To be effective, though, security
measures must be an integral part of a system’s design. While proper consideration
of security awaits future work, we briefly discuss the main security implications of
systems based on Atomic Transfer.
The main observation is that Atomic Transfer needs atomic switches to see the names
of requests and responses in cleartext, to be able to check them for conflicts. Fur-
thermore, switches need to see the names to be able to forward packets to their
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destinations. By contrast, end-to-end concurrency control works with end-to-end en-
cryption, allowing the data contents of a communication session to be completely
hidden from eavesdroppers.
The parts of atomic packets not containing names may be encrypted end-to-end, e.g.
the parts containing values. Also, the channels between switches may be encrypted,
including software-defined channels such as TCP/IP connections and Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs). We also note that Atomic Transfer does not adversely affect
authentication, as atomic packets can include digital signatures [152, 200] and message
authentication codes [201] the same as normal packets. The fact remains that trusting
each switch along a network path results in lower security than trusting only the end-
point hosts, as is the case with end-to-end encryption. Still, many distributed systems
today run over VPNs overlaid on the Internet, sometimes placing significant trust in
the gateway nodes and switches defining the VPNs. These security issue and trade-
offs must be analyzed as a part of any thorough feasibility study of Atomic Transfer.
This dissertation also leaves replication outside its scope. However, some form of
replication is necessary to achieve fault-tolerance in computing systems. We observe
that application data caches come very close to being replicas of their data, the main
difference being that caches are not required to persist their data and may unilaterally
discard it at will. It would be interesting to extend our models to support flexible and
dynamic replication, building on the cache synchronization protocols of Chapters 6
and 7 as well as Resilient Transfer and multi-server requests, as sketched in Sections
9.1 and 9.2 of this chapter. The main challenges, as in many replication schemes, are
to detect replica host failures and/or atomically add and remove replicas from replica
groups. We believe that network switches could help with these tasks, as they are
in the unique situation of being able to divert network traffic from one destination
to another. Furthermore, switches usually have more accurate information about the
state of channels than do end-hosts. But such investigations await future work.
Adding complexity to the network is contentious [133], but we believe that switches
are uniquely positioned to accelerate concurrency control, recoverability and atomic
commit, in ways not open to end hosts. In summary, we believe that programmable
switches can play an important role in the design of scalable infrastructures for effi-
cient and flexible atomic applications.
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